On 12/8/2012 6:49 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
The supreme monad is as necessary as the CPU of a computer,
for Leibniz's world is a system, and systems need a control unit.


Dear Roger,

Is this a postulation, a conjecture or an authoritative claim? The way that the physical systems that humans have created to perform computations are arranged is merely for convenience of how we are accessing the results of those computations. What I am considering is more like how a nucleus in a living cell is the CPU of the cell and many cells are combined into a body that has another CPU at that level. Going further, humans compose into societies and form governments that are the CPU of the society. Do you see the pattern of this? The centralization of governorship is not imposed from the outside, but from within! It is more like the 'center of mass' that arises when ever a collection of entities have a mutual relationship of motions.


BTW, the materialist mind/brain has no such governor.

Could you point to one claim of this by a materialist philosopher? Marx tried to claim this but was only able to make the governor vanish in some perfect future 'utopian' state.

I could go on and on,

Please do. I would like to understand how these claims follow from some as of know unknown postulates and how do you chose those postulates as inevitable.

for every part of Leibniz's metaphysics is necessary.
and follows logically from his concept of a monad.
Here's just a two of many reasons for there being a supreme monad:
1) A supreme monad is needed, for one thing, because monads have no windows
to see out of. Their "perceptions" are supplied by a third party,
the supreme monad.

NO! This is inconsistent with L's definition of a monad! Let me quote http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/leibniz.htm:

17.It must be confessed, however, that/perception/, and that which depends upon it,/are inexplicable by mechanical causes/, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the compound nor in a machine that the perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the/internal activities/of the simple substance can consist.

18.All simple substances or created monads may be called/entelechies/, because they have in themselves a certain perfection. There is in them a sufficiency which makes them the source of their internal activities, and renders them, so to speak, incorporeal Automatons.

Leibniz proposes God as the coordinator of percepts, not as the 'supplier':

51.In the case of simple substances, the influence which one monad has upon another is only/ideal/. It can have its effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God each monad can rightly demand that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regarded it also. For since one created monad cannot have a physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only through the primal regulation that one can have dependence upon another.

52.It is thus that among created things action and passivity are reciprocal. For God, in comparing two simple substances, finds in each one reasons obliging him to adapt the other to it; and consequently what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view,/active/in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to give a reason for what occurs in another, and/passive/in so far as the reason for what occurs in it is found in what is distinctly known in another.

53.Now as there are an infinity of possible universes in the ideas of God, and but one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason' for the choice of God which determines him to select one rather than another.


It is what is delineated in #53 that find important and that which I seek to elaborate upon in my thinking. This "sufficient reason" I take to be mutual consistency of pairs of percepts (in a combinatorial and concurrent sense) in the sense of satisfiability for a Boolean Algebra. But as to your claim above let us look further:

60.Besides, in what has just been said can be seen the/a priori/reasons why things cannot be otherwise than they are. It is because God, in ordering the whole, has had regard to every part and in particular to each monad; and since the monad is by its very/nature representative/, nothing can limit it to represent merely a part of things. It is nevertheless true that this representation is, as regards the details of the whole universe, only a confused representation, and is distinct only as regards a small part of them, that is to say, as regards those things which are nearest or greatest in relation to each monad. If the representation were distinct as to the details of the entire Universe, each monad would be a Deity. It is not in the object represented that the monads are limited, but in the modifications of their knowledge of the object. In a confused way they reach out to infinity or to the whole, but are limited and differentiated in the degree of their distinct perceptions.



Here Leibniz is discussing the Pre-established Harmony idea that I find to be mathematically unsound as it assumes that what is equivalent to the result of an infinite computation can be accesses without actually performing the computation!

2) Another reason is that monads are ideas, and so are not physical and
cannot physically interact with other monads. Also, mind and
brain cannot physically interact. The Supreme monad is the
third party for such situations who can direct the interactions
theoretically (not physically).

All notions of physicality are purely perceptual, there is no exterior to monads except in an imaginary sense.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net]>
12/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


--
Onward!

Stephen

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