Hi Stephen P. King 

Yes. I'm getting a lot of flack on what was obviously a poor analogy.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-08, 11:22:33
Subject: Re: Why a supreme monad is necessary

On 12/8/2012 6:49 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King 

The supreme monad is as necessary as the CPU of a computer,
for Leibniz's world is a system, and systems need a control unit.

Dear Roger,

    Is this a postulation, a conjecture or an authoritative claim? The way that 
the physical systems that humans have created to perform computations are 
arranged is merely for convenience of how we are accessing the results of those 
computations. What I am considering is more like how a nucleus in a living cell 
is the CPU of the cell and many cells are combined into a body that has another 
CPU at that level. Going further, humans compose into societies and form 
governments that are the CPU of the society. Do you see the pattern of this? 
    The centralization of governorship is not imposed from the outside, but 
from within! It is more like the 'center of mass' that arises when ever a 
collection of entities have a mutual relationship of motions.

BTW, the materialist mind/brain has no such governor.

    Could you point to one claim of this by a materialist philosopher? Marx 
tried to claim this but was only able to make the governor vanish in some 
perfect future 'utopian' state.

I could go on and on, 

    Please do. I would like to understand how these claims follow from some as 
of know unknown postulates and how do you chose those postulates as inevitable.

for every part of Leibniz's metaphysics is necessary.
and follows logically from his concept of a monad. 
Here's just a two of many reasons for there being a supreme monad:

1) A supreme monad is needed, for one thing, because monads have no windows
to see out of. Their "perceptions" are supplied by a third party, 
the supreme monad.

    NO! This is inconsistent with L's definition of a monad! Let me quote 

17. It must be confessed, however, that perception, and that which depends upon 
it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and 
motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, 
sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with 
the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would 
into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one 
another, but never would he find anything to explain perception. It is 
accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the compound nor in a machine 
that the perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides 
perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in 
these alone that all the internal activities of the simple substance can 
18. All simple substances or created monads may be called entelechies, because 
they have in themselves a certain perfection. There is in them a sufficiency 
which makes them the source of their internal activities, and renders them, so 
to speak, incorporeal Automatons.
Leibniz proposes God as the coordinator of percepts, not as the 'supplier': 

51. In the case of simple substances, the influence which one monad has upon 
another is only ideal. It can have its effect only through the mediation of 
God, in so far as in the ideas of God each monad can rightly demand that God, 
in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regarded it 
also. For since one created monad cannot have a physical influence upon the 
inner being of another, it is only through the primal regulation that one can 
have dependence upon another.
52. It is thus that among created things action and passivity are reciprocal. 
For God, in comparing two simple substances, finds in each one reasons obliging 
him to adapt the other to it; and consequently what is active in certain 
respects is passive from another point of view, active in so far as what we 
distinctly know in it serves to give a reason for what occurs in another, and 
passive in so far as the reason for what occurs in it is found in what is 
distinctly known in another.
53. Now as there are an infinity of possible universes in the ideas of God, and 
but one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason' for the choice of 
God which determines him to select one rather than another.

    It is what is delineated in #53 that find important and that which I seek 
to elaborate upon in my thinking. This "sufficient reason" I take to be mutual 
consistency of pairs of percepts (in a combinatorial and concurrent sense) in 
the sense of satisfiability for a Boolean Algebra. But as to your claim above 
let us look further: 

60. Besides, in what has just been said can be seen the a priori reasons why 
things cannot be otherwise than they are. It is because God, in ordering the 
whole, has had regard to every part and in particular to each monad; and since 
the monad is by its very nature representative, nothing can limit it to 
represent merely a part of things. It is nevertheless true that this 
representation is, as regards the details of the whole universe, only a 
confused representation, and is distinct only as regards a small part of them, 
that is to say, as regards those things which are nearest or greatest in 
relation to each monad. If the representation were distinct as to the details 
of the entire Universe, each monad would be a Deity. It is not in the object 
represented that the monads are limited, but in the modifications of their 
knowledge of the object. In a confused way they reach out to infinity or to the 
whole, but are limited and differentiated in the degree of their distinct 

      Here Leibniz is discussing the Pre-established Harmony idea that I find 
to be mathematically unsound as it assumes that what is equivalent to the 
result of an infinite computation can be accesses without actually performing 
the computation!  

2) Another reason is that monads are ideas, and so are not physical and
cannot physically interact with other monads. Also, mind and
brain cannot physically interact. The Supreme monad is the
third party for such situations who can direct the interactions
theoretically (not physically).

    All notions of physicality are purely perceptual, there is no exterior to 
monads except in an imaginary sense.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen



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