Hi Craig Weinberg Berkeley had to finally admit that matter is real, and not an illusion, not because WE see it, but because God does. But, to revert back to Leibniz, because God sees all things from all the perspectives of the infinity of monads, L's view is in the end identical to Berkeley's revised position.
[Roger Clough], [[email protected]] 12/15/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-15, 13:53:11 Subject: Re: Leibniz is not an immaterialist. Reality is not an illusion. On Saturday, December 15, 2012 12:41:08 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King As with Berkeleyism, Immaterialism denies the existence of matter. Leibniz doesn't, so I'll stick with Leibniz, whose metaphysics is a double aspect type or close to that and was taken up by Kant, also a double-sperspective type. Modern neurophilosophy is said to be essentially Kantian. Leibniz is close to Kant in double aspect about a thing: 1) thing "in itself " as perceived mentally (as a monad) from your perspective as a phenomenon. 2) thing "for itself," as it actually is physically without a perspective (as a scientist would treat it) For Kant, perception occurs through the joining of these two aspects. So the thing isn't an illusion, or hallucination. Any object as seen by you is only seen phenomenologically, that is, "in itself", as it appears in your mind, from your perspective. But as with Kant, matter it is not an illusion, it is a "for itself". You can still perform precise experiments on the object. So I can still stub my toe. I don't know about Bruno. im ma te ri al ism (m-t r--lzm) n. A metaphysical doctrine denying the existence of matter. imma teri al ist adj. & n. immaterialism [ m t r l z m] n Philosophy 1. (Philosophy) the doctrine that the material world exists only in the mind 2. (Philosophy) the doctrine that only immaterial substances or spiritual beings exist See also idealism [3] immaterialist n [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] 12/15/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen I agree with Stephen, nice post. I think that where my view improves on these is that I see every 'for itself' is also something else's 'in itself', on some level of description, and vice versal. Multisense realism points to that joining and sees it instead as a twisting, a pseudo-separation. In other words, all 'itselves' are nothing but the capacity to pseudo-separate 'for-ness' from 'in-ness', and that capacity is 'sense' participation, and it is the absolute ground of being. Think of for-ness and is-ness as the collector and emitter, while the base is what makes those two pseudo-separated modalities into a monad-whole. Maybe Berkeley would have had it right if he knew the extent of the sophistication of the microcosm. He was correct that there is no universally objective 'for itself' entities of matter, but rather for-ness is the underlap of all in-ness of any given participant. Craig Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/a0Rb3KHJjawJ. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
