On Saturday, December 15, 2012 12:41:08 PM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
> Hi Stephen P. King
> As with Berkeleyism, Immaterialism denies the existence of matter.
> Leibniz doesn't, so I'll stick with Leibniz, whose metaphysics
> is a double aspect type or close to that and was taken up
> by Kant, also a double-sperspective type. Modern neurophilosophy
> is said to be essentially Kantian. Leibniz is close to
> Kant in double aspect about a thing:
> 1) thing "in itself " as perceived mentally (as a monad) from your
> perspective as a phenomenon.
> 2) thing "for itself," as it actually is physically without a perspective
> (as a scientist would treat it)
> For Kant, perception occurs through the joining of these two aspects.
> So the thing isn't an illusion, or hallucination.
> Any object as seen by you is only seen
> phenomenologically, that is, "in itself", as it appears in
> your mind, from your perspective. But as with
> Kant, matter it is not an illusion, it is a "for itself".
> You can still perform precise experiments on the object.
> So I can still stub my toe. I don't know about Bruno.
> im・ma・te・ri・al・ism (m-tîr--lzm)
> A metaphysical doctrine denying the existence of matter.
> *imma・teri・al・ist** adj.** & n.*
> immaterialism [ˌɪməˈtɪərɪəˌlɪzəm]
> *n* *Philosophy*
> *1.* (Philosophy) the doctrine that the material world exists only in the
> *2.* (Philosophy) the doctrine that only immaterial substances or
> spiritual beings exist See also
> *immaterialist* *n*
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
I agree with Stephen, nice post.
I think that where my view improves on these is that I see every 'for
itself' is also something else's 'in itself', on some level of description,
and vice versal. Multisense realism points to that joining and sees it
instead as a twisting, a pseudo-separation. In other words, all 'itselves'
are nothing but the capacity to pseudo-separate 'for-ness' from 'in-ness',
and that capacity is 'sense' participation, and it is the absolute ground
Think of for-ness and is-ness as the collector and emitter, while the base
is what makes those two pseudo-separated modalities into a monad-whole.
Maybe Berkeley would have had it right if he knew the extent of the
sophistication of the microcosm. He was correct that there is no
universally objective 'for itself' entities of matter, but rather for-ness
is the underlap of all in-ness of any given participant.
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