On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:11:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Apr 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:

A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?

"Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No computer can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness can be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."


You can represent many real numbers by the program computing their approximation. You can fan constructively on all real numbers (like the UD does notably).

Only if a brain uses some non computable real number as an oracle, with all decimals given in one "strike", then we cannot simulate it with Turing machine, but this needs to make the mind actually infinite.

If the mind is what is real, then there are no decimals.

But there are decimal, and so if you are correct, the mind is not real. But the mind is real, so you are not correct.




The brain is the public representation of the history, and as such, it can only be observed from the reduced 3p set of qualia. The 3p reduction may rationalize the appearance. From an absolute perspective, all phenomena are temporary partitions within the one "strike" of eternity.

OK.





So the statement above is just a statement of non-comp, not an argument for non comp, as it fails to give us what is that non computable real playing a role in cognition.

What does the machine say when we ask it why it can't understand pi without approximating it?

One machine can answer "It seems that I can understand PI without approximating it. PI is the ratio of the length of a circle divided by its perimeter, and a circle is the locus of the point in a plane which share the same distance with respect to some point." Then the machine drew a circle on the ground and said, look, it seems PI is about a tiny bigger than 3.





But there is something correct. A computer, nor a brain, can simulate consciousness. Nor can a computer simlulate the number one, or the number two. It has to borrow them from arithmetical truth.

Then why would your son in law's computer brain provide him with consciousness?

It is not the computer brain which provides him consciousness. The computer brain provides him a way to manifest his consciousness in your restaurant, and to get pleasant qualia of some good food (I hope). What provides the consciousness is God, or (arithmetical) truth. Nobody can program that, in the same sense than nobody can program the number one. But we can write program making possible to manifest the number one, or to make some consciousness manifest relatively to you.

Bruno





Craig

Bruno






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