# Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

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On Thursday, April 25, 2013 6:04:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 25 Apr 2013, at 00:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:49:00 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:11:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
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>>> On 22 Apr 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>>> "Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real
>>>> numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No
>>>> computer
>>>> can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness
>>>> can
>>>> be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You can represent many real numbers by the program computing their
>>> approximation. You can fan constructively on all real numbers (like the UD
>>> does notably).
>>>
>>> Only if a brain uses some non computable real number as an oracle, with
>>> all decimals given in one "strike", then we cannot simulate it with Turing
>>> machine, but this needs to make the mind actually infinite.
>>>
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>> If the mind is what is real, then there are no decimals.
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>> But there are decimal, and so if you are correct, the mind is not real.
>> But the mind is real, so you are not correct.
>>
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> How do you know that the mind uses decimals?
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> I just said that decimal exists. Then the mind of mathematician uses
> decimal because they are handy.
>```
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Right, but that doesn't mean that beneath their conscious threshold, their
mind actually runs on decimal computations.

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> It seems that our natural understanding is primarily in ratios and real
> number type concepts.
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> Real numbers can be seen as a terrible simplification of reality.
>

Why is an immediate understanding of a conceptual ratio more terrible than
an infinite computation of approximate figures?

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> Decimals could be a notion derived from stepping down experience through
> the body, but the native experiential fabric of all has no decimal content.
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> I can agree. With comp you don't need to put real numbers and decimals in
> the ontology.
>

Interesting. Do you see both reals and decimals as
distortions/reductions/masks of the universal numbers? If so, that leaves
us with arithmetic truth as a pure abstract essence with only potential
forms and functions. Meta-Platonic? Even so, to me it's still sensory-motor
experience. There is no urge or expectation except for one which is
experienced.

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>> The brain is the public representation of the history, and as such, it
>> can only be observed from the reduced 3p set of qualia. The 3p reduction
>> may rationalize the appearance. From an absolute perspective, all phenomena
>> are temporary partitions within the one "strike" of eternity.
>>
>>
>> OK.
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>>
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>>> So the statement above is just a statement of non-comp, not an argument
>>> for non comp, as it fails to give us what is that non computable real
>>> playing a role in cognition.
>>>
>>
>> What does the machine say when we ask it why it can't understand pi
>> without approximating it?
>>
>>
>> One machine can answer "It seems that I can understand PI without
>> approximating it. PI is the ratio of the length of a circle divided by its
>> perimeter, and a circle is the locus of the point in a plane which share
>> the same distance with respect to some point." Then the machine drew a
>> circle on the ground and said, look, it seems PI is about a tiny bigger
>> than 3.
>>
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> Are there any machines that do as we do, and say 'pi is the unchanging
> ratio between the distance across the circle compared to the distance
> around it, and a circle is self evident pattern which manifests literally
> as [circle shape] and figuratively as any pattern of returning to the
> starting point repeatedly.
>
>
> Yes. You.
> (I *assume* comp).
> For man made machine, it is far too early. I would say that PA could say
> that, but it might be long and tedious to prove, and you would be able to
> say "she does not really meant what she says", so you would not been
> convinced. You argument will conflate knowledge and knowledge theory, so I
> will not try.
>

All that would be required is to walk a person off of their brain onto a
machine and back. If that works, then we could assume that comp is correct
enough to rely on. What if it turns out never to work though? Is comp
falsifiable? How many centuries of failure until we can begin to doubt the
underpinnings of comp?

I think that the reals vs rationals issue another obvious clue, along with
the geometry issue, the hard problem, the explanatory gap, the metaphorical
residue in language (is there any language in the world where machines are
associated with warmth and love rather than unfeeling or unconsciousness?),
that Comp is a very hard sell to match with the universe we actually live
in. It's a great theory, with a great vantage point provided by the kind of
anti-world perspective of mathematics on top, but if we really want to
understand the nature of experience and awareness, it's going to steer us
in exactly the wrong direction.

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>>>
>>> But there is something correct. A computer, nor a brain, can simulate
>>> consciousness. Nor can a computer simlulate the number one, or the number
>>> two. It has to borrow them from arithmetical truth.
>>>
>>
>> Then why would your son in law's computer brain provide him with
>> consciousness?
>>
>>
>> It is not the computer brain which provides him consciousness. The
>> computer brain provides him a way to manifest his consciousness in your
>> restaurant, and to get pleasant qualia of some good food (I hope). What
>> provides the consciousness is God, or (arithmetical) truth. Nobody can
>> program that, in the same sense than nobody can program the number one. But
>> we can write program making possible to manifest the number one, or to make
>> some consciousness manifest relatively to you.
>>
>
> Ok, but why assume that it is arithmetical truth which is God rather than
> feeling?
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> To avoid solipsism, and be able to believe in other people's feeling.
>

What does that have to do with arithmetic though? We can see how others
feel by looking at their face and gestures, hearing their voice,
understanding their words, and perhaps intuitively as well. Our lives are
positively saturated with impressions of other people's feelings. Why would
an arithmetic model be superior to a sensory-motor model at explaining that?

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> Feeling and being are an Art. Doing and knowing are a science. Science
> makes sense as a derivative of art,
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> Hmm... Why not. It is a bit vague. My agreement is by default.
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> but art makes no sense as a function of science.
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> Why? Without some amount of science, you have no art.
>

I don't think that's true. It is true of human experience and culture,
certainly, but the principle of art, i.e. aesthetic appreciation, cannot be
justified scientifically. Science is about finding the shortest distance
between two points, not calculating the most scenic route. If we tell a
machine to take the day off, what will it do? A computer has no need for
art.

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> It isn't necessary, and arithmetic truth is about the necessary.
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> Arithmetic truth is beyond the necessary. Far beyond. And its internal
> views define necessities and contingencies.
>

Ok, contingencies, but aren't contingencies just second order extensions of
necessities? No amount of contingencies would entail an aesthetic
appreciation of itself.

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> Even if we say that arithmetic truth is art, it is certainly only one kind
> of art among many.
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> If I'm right, and I think I have every reason to guess that I am, then
> arithmetic is a feeling about doing which is one step removed from both
> feeling and moving - a step which can provides a clarity and universality
> that is unavailable in any other form of understanding, but it is precisely
> that precision, that clarity and universality which comes at the cost of
> intimacy with all that feels and does.
>
>
> You must distinguish arithmetic truth (which is very big and far beyond
> humans and machines), and its many internal views, where things can get
> unclear, fuzzy, and where intimate relations can develop.
>

My view is that you have it inside out. Arithmetic truth is an internal
view of fuzzy experience. It is an abstracted meta-pattern of hyper-clarity
arising from reductive interaction among public objects and space.
Arithmetic is a simulation. Arithmetic is every simulation. Only the
unmeasured ideopathic qualia is genuine and whole. Wholes cannot be
assembled from parts, they can only divide themselves from wholes
intentionally.

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> Arithmetic is detachment from physics and psyche, not the source.
> Multisense realism is the idea that your view, the Platonic view, which
> places arithmetic at the top, or the Idealist view which places psyche at
> the top, or the Materialist view are all three valid almost entirely, and
> that through each of them, a self-consistent truthful view of the universe
> can be validated. Any of these three views can be used to explain the other
> two, but only the view which explains all three in terms of sensory-motor
> participation, aka being-doing or sense can explain all three at once
> without over-signifying one and under-signifying the other. God cannot be a
> number system that has feeling, it can only be a feeling that has number
> systems.
>
>
> I can agree with all this, except I feel you say this with the idea that
> machines cannot support consciousness.
>

Machines can support and extend the motives of consciousness as technology,
and that could become quite fantastic as we bring more machines into
ourselves and more of ourselves out into machines, but without something
conscious there in the first place, machines can't generate consciousness.
Re-quoting myself from FB: "The only thing that computation doesn't relate
to is how consciousness itself is generated...because it isn't generated,
it's diffracted from eternity, from the inside out."

>
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> The reason why this is a problem for machines is that it begins from the
> outside and tries to work inward, hoping that 'the rain follows the plow'.
> Our every experience with machines however, be they mere baby machines in
> the scheme of mechanical evolution, are that they are not loving bundles of
> joy and wretched upset.
>
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> If you don't listen to them, and try to forget your prejudices, you will
> never know, and be stuck in your superiority complex.
>

Who said superiority? I only say that machines are unconscious. If that is
intuitively inferior, then that might be a clue as to the proper place of
sense in the cosmos. What matters to me is only the truthful categorization
of the big picture. Machines can do much that we can't, but they can't
appreciate it, so it doesn't matter.

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> They are not sometimes loving and other times aloof.
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> That might be true about my fridge.
>

Heh.

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> They are not once in a while loving.
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> With comp, you are a machine (or you are supported by a machine),
>

As a human being, I am supported by a brain and body, (and civilization,
species). I use machines, and even "I", Craig Weinberg, could be a machine
in a sense, but my awareness is not only not a machine, it is the exact
opposite of a machine.

> so anything you say, is said through some machine. If you keep this in
> mind, you can marvel about what machines can do, just by looking at
> yourself.
> That it is hard for a machine to believe that she is a machine is already
> well explained by actual machine.
> Your talk is given by the Bp & p in the machine. The machine's inner God
> already say "I am not a machine" until she get the point that the correct
> phrasing is "If I am a machine, then I can't believe that I am machine".
>

Except that some machines, like Bruno, can believe that they are machine.
So it can go either way. Maybe it's you who has a superiority complex...to
be better than the machines who can't believe that they are machine?

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> They are *never* ever emotional in any way. Their functions are 100%
> anesthetic and can be ported to any physical medium or aesthetic output.
> This makes perfect sense to me, since living creatures are build themselves
> from the inside out. The entire lifetime of an organism can and should be
> understood as a single "strike" as you say, with each "moment" an episode
> of relative duration...at the moment I am middle aged. At the moment I am
> 45. At the moment I am living in the United States.
>
> A machine has no such relativistic 'real number' kinds of moments.
>
>
> You talk about the actual machines. I might agree with you for the
> material one, but not for the mathematical one that we can already
> interview. if your point is that my fridge cannot think, I might be with
> you (but don't tell him as he is a bit emotional nowadays :)
> machines.
>

Then it could be the case that the theoretical attributes which you are
assuming for machines might actually belong to sense.

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> It has discrete instants - clock ticks, program steps...recursive
> enumerations.
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> The Bp & p, has not that. It justifies why when looking inward, machines
> are bound to discover continuous and non enumerable things, non computable
> things.
>

They may be non-computable, but that doesn't mean that they are aesthetic
or give rise to aesthetic presentations.

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> Computation comes out of counting rather than being or feeling, so that
> using very detailed counting, we can count all of the little aesthetic cues
> which we interpret through our bodies of other people's bodies behaviors
> and infer a skeletal description of the mind. An impressive and useful
> trick, but it is only a description of a generic mind's behaviors in the
> outside world, not an actual reproduction of the feelings which give rise
> to a particular person's mind. It is like those averaged faces (
> http://couscousqueen.tumblr.com/post/48604405522/awkwardsituationist-world-of-averages)
>
> - nobody lives behind those faces, but it is not difficult to think that
> someone could.
>
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> Such type of argument does not bear on the fundamental question.
>

Why not? Counting is a kind of feeling, but feeling cannot be generated by
counting.

Craig

>
> Bruno
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> Craig
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>> Bruno
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>> Craig
>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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