# Re: Rationals vs Reals in Comp

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On 25 Apr 2013, at 00:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:```
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On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 8:49:00 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Apr 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:

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On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:11:06 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 22 Apr 2013, at 19:14, Craig Weinberg wrote:

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```A quote from someone on Facebook. Any comments?

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"Computers can only do computations for rational numbers, not for real numbers. Every number in a computer is represented as rational. No computer can represent pi or any other real number... So even when consciousness can be explained by computations, no computer can actually simulate it."
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You can represent many real numbers by the program computing their approximation. You can fan constructively on all real numbers (like the UD does notably).
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Only if a brain uses some non computable real number as an oracle, with all decimals given in one "strike", then we cannot simulate it with Turing machine, but this needs to make the mind actually infinite.
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If the mind is what is real, then there are no decimals.
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But there are decimal, and so if you are correct, the mind is not real. But the mind is real, so you are not correct.
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How do you know that the mind uses decimals?
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I just said that decimal exists. Then the mind of mathematician uses decimal because they are handy.
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It seems that our natural understanding is primarily in ratios and real number type concepts.
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Real numbers can be seen as a terrible simplification of reality.

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Decimals could be a notion derived from stepping down experience through the body, but the native experiential fabric of all has no decimal content.
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I can agree. With comp you don't need to put real numbers and decimals in the ontology.
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The brain is the public representation of the history, and as such, it can only be observed from the reduced 3p set of qualia. The 3p reduction may rationalize the appearance. From an absolute perspective, all phenomena are temporary partitions within the one "strike" of eternity.
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OK.

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So the statement above is just a statement of non-comp, not an argument for non comp, as it fails to give us what is that non computable real playing a role in cognition.
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What does the machine say when we ask it why it can't understand pi without approximating it?
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One machine can answer "It seems that I can understand PI without approximating it. PI is the ratio of the length of a circle divided by its perimeter, and a circle is the locus of the point in a plane which share the same distance with respect to some point." Then the machine drew a circle on the ground and said, look, it seems PI is about a tiny bigger than 3.
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Are there any machines that do as we do, and say 'pi is the unchanging ratio between the distance across the circle compared to the distance around it, and a circle is self evident pattern which manifests literally as [circle shape] and figuratively as any pattern of returning to the starting point repeatedly.
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Yes. You.
(I *assume* comp).
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For man made machine, it is far too early. I would say that PA could say that, but it might be long and tedious to prove, and you would be able to say "she does not really meant what she says", so you would not been convinced. You argument will conflate knowledge and knowledge theory, so I will not try.
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But there is something correct. A computer, nor a brain, can simulate consciousness. Nor can a computer simlulate the number one, or the number two. It has to borrow them from arithmetical truth.
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Then why would your son in law's computer brain provide him with consciousness?
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It is not the computer brain which provides him consciousness. The computer brain provides him a way to manifest his consciousness in your restaurant, and to get pleasant qualia of some good food (I hope). What provides the consciousness is God, or (arithmetical) truth. Nobody can program that, in the same sense than nobody can program the number one. But we can write program making possible to manifest the number one, or to make some consciousness manifest relatively to you.
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Ok, but why assume that it is arithmetical truth which is God rather than feeling?
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To avoid solipsism, and be able to believe in other people's feeling.

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Feeling and being are an Art. Doing and knowing are a science. Science makes sense as a derivative of art,
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Hmm... Why not. It is a bit vague. My agreement is by default.

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```but art makes no sense as a function of science.
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Why? Without some amount of science, you have no art.

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```It isn't necessary, and arithmetic truth is about the necessary.
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Arithmetic truth is beyond the necessary. Far beyond. And its internal views define necessities and contingencies.
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Even if we say that arithmetic truth is art, it is certainly only one kind of art among many.
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If I'm right, and I think I have every reason to guess that I am, then arithmetic is a feeling about doing which is one step removed from both feeling and moving - a step which can provides a clarity and universality that is unavailable in any other form of understanding, but it is precisely that precision, that clarity and universality which comes at the cost of intimacy with all that feels and does.
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You must distinguish arithmetic truth (which is very big and far beyond humans and machines), and its many internal views, where things can get unclear, fuzzy, and where intimate relations can develop.
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Arithmetic is detachment from physics and psyche, not the source. Multisense realism is the idea that your view, the Platonic view, which places arithmetic at the top, or the Idealist view which places psyche at the top, or the Materialist view are all three valid almost entirely, and that through each of them, a self- consistent truthful view of the universe can be validated. Any of these three views can be used to explain the other two, but only the view which explains all three in terms of sensory-motor participation, aka being-doing or sense can explain all three at once without over-signifying one and under-signifying the other. God cannot be a number system that has feeling, it can only be a feeling that has number systems.
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I can agree with all this, except I feel you say this with the idea that machines cannot support consciousness.
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The reason why this is a problem for machines is that it begins from the outside and tries to work inward, hoping that 'the rain follows the plow'. Our every experience with machines however, be they mere baby machines in the scheme of mechanical evolution, are that they are not loving bundles of joy and wretched upset.
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If you don't listen to them, and try to forget your prejudices, you will never know, and be stuck in your superiority complex.
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```They are not sometimes loving and other times aloof.
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That might be true about my fridge.

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```They are not once in a while loving.
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With comp, you are a machine (or you are supported by a machine), so anything you say, is said through some machine. If you keep this in mind, you can marvel about what machines can do, just by looking at yourself. That it is hard for a machine to believe that she is a machine is already well explained by actual machine. Your talk is given by the Bp & p in the machine. The machine's inner God already say "I am not a machine" until she get the point that the correct phrasing is "If I am a machine, then I can't believe that I am machine".
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They are *never* ever emotional in any way. Their functions are 100% anesthetic and can be ported to any physical medium or aesthetic output. This makes perfect sense to me, since living creatures are build themselves from the inside out. The entire lifetime of an organism can and should be understood as a single "strike" as you say, with each "moment" an episode of relative duration...at the moment I am middle aged. At the moment I am 45. At the moment I am living in the United States.
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A machine has no such relativistic 'real number' kinds of moments.
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You talk about the actual machines. I might agree with you for the material one, but not for the mathematical one that we can already interview. if your point is that my fridge cannot think, I might be with you (but don't tell him as he is a bit emotional nowadays :) I talk about machine as defined in a theory. Not about current man- made machines.
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It has discrete instants - clock ticks, program steps...recursive enumerations.
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The Bp & p, has not that. It justifies why when looking inward, machines are bound to discover continuous and non enumerable things, non computable things.
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Computation comes out of counting rather than being or feeling, so that using very detailed counting, we can count all of the little aesthetic cues which we interpret through our bodies of other people's bodies behaviors and infer a skeletal description of the mind. An impressive and useful trick, but it is only a description of a generic mind's behaviors in the outside world, not an actual reproduction of the feelings which give rise to a particular person's mind. It is like those averaged faces (http://couscousqueen.tumblr.com/post/48604405522/awkwardsituationist-world-of-averages ) - nobody lives behind those faces, but it is not difficult to think that someone could.
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Such type of argument does not bear on the fundamental question.

Bruno

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Craig

Bruno

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Craig

Bruno

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