Dear Stephen,

Dear Bruno,

I would like to see more remarks from you on how you expect 'the physical laws' to be defined. I have tried to suggest a method, but it requires a way to define a means by which numbers can determine both a quantity of similarity and difference between themselves. I suggest that the notion of bisimulation between computations can be used...

That is the kind of thing I could only judge on piece (if this is english). Just do it, and then you can compare with what has been done already. The physical laws are defined by what is invariant, for the FPI, from the 1p-view of universal machines. Just take literally the consequence in the UDA step 7. This will be modeled by Bp & Dt, mainly, with p sigma_1, for reason that I will explain, probably, when we arrive to it. Bp will be equivalent with p is true in all consistent extension, and Dt will mean that there is a least one extension, which are reasonable for a probability "one" on them.

Bruno





On Mon, Jul 1, 2013 at 3:25 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 01 Jul 2013, at 21:00, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Mitch,

Great comments! I would only wonder why the BB concept is not seen, by Susskind et al, as equivalent to the Observer Moment (or Barborian Time Capsule) concept. My question is how do they justify the 'memory of a past state' of a BB; or do they ignore this? Additionally, it seems that we can easily stretch the BB idea into a "Last Thursdayism" concept.

I agree. And "physical BB" might not make computational sense, as some comp state needs long histories to appear and stay stable.

But it remains to be see, by the math, if deepness and linearity stabilize consciousness enough to get physical laws like the one we infer from observation.

(Cf my comment to Mitch)

Bruno



On Monday, July 1, 2013 12:25:27 PM UTC-4, spudb...@aol.com wrote:
You'll likely hate my comment, but Susskind and Raphael Bousso are or were pretty big on Boltzmann Brains. The more I look at the words of physicists speaking about this phenomena (pro and con) the more it seems to be an evolving theology. Bostrom might also be into this. Conway may not even be aware of BB, and I would guess that Tegmark would laugh it all off. Which maybe he should. I am amzed and sometimes inspired by the discussions regarding this. Questions arise and evolve such as-

In an infinite universe you'd produce more BB's them people
What about a smaller number of BB's?
Would these observers be as described? Having their own personal memories, and personalities, however false?
Being of human level intelligence or better.?
I asked Dr. Clough if a BB could be one of his Monads??
There has been a question asked out there internet-land, whether we exist as thoughs or ideas in one BB?
Finally, is our BB, God?
One Russian Physicist working in Peking wrote a paper that he saw BB's as likely, but that each cosmos would have it's own BB.

It's mind-numbing and perhaps not even worth discussing (?) I apologize if this is too crazy, but it's what I have been interneting about the last couple of weeks. If Our BB did write a program that eventually created us, that might do it for me. Other's would say no. At any rate, it might be a nice thing to be friendly to our universe's BB, if only to enjoy commincating (if possible?) with such a brilliant mind.

BB's were believed by Boltzmann to evolve from thermal differences in space. Sort of like Hitch Hikers Guide to the Galaxy drive producing a air borne whale, falling to the surface of the planet, Magarthea. Or it might be one way to simply arrive, via thermal fluctuations.

Well, string drink is called for.

Mitch


-----Original Message-----
From: Jason Resch <jason...@gmail.com>
To: Everything List <everyth...@googlegroups.com>; foar <fo...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sun, Jun 30, 2013 11:13 pm
Subject: Worth while video

On the subject of reality, featuring John Conway, Max Tegmark, Leonard Susskind, and Nick Bostrom:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oyH2D4-tzfM

Jason
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