On 25 Sep 2013, at 23:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 10:16:45 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 25 Sep 2013, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:58:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, September 23, 2013 1:16:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
shape belongs to the category of numbers imagination, and with
comp this is given by arithmetical relations.
Numbers imagination seem like human imagination to me.
Nice. That is a reason for taking number's talk seriously.
I had more of 'numbers imagination = pathetic fallacy' meaning in
mind.
OK, but then you beg the question, and just repeat: I believe that
comp is wrong, without explaining why.
It's not that I believe comp is wrong, I just understand why it
would be wrong but seem like it is right. I've tried to explain why
many, many times - it's pretty straightforward I think: Computation
is, in all cases, a representation system which is used to automate
sensory-motive interactions rather than generate sensation itself.
It rides on the back of aesthetic experience as a figure, or set of
functional steps, but it has no aesthetic agenda of its own.
Nor could a brain or a body. That is a reason to move toward the idea
that consciousness is primitive, but this is "consciousness of the
gap". It does not satisfy me.
It's not a matter of belief, because I wouldn't care one way or
another about whether the beauty of mechanism or the beauty of
awareness is primary, it's just that over the course of developing
the hypothesis that I have put together, I have come to realize why
it happens to be the case that representation can only exist within
sensory presentation and not the other way around. This post I wrote
yesterday actually relates... http://multisenserealism.com/2013/09/24/diogenes-revenge-cynicism-semiotics-and-the-evaporating-standard/
You confuse "sensory presentation" as conceived by the humans, and
what we can reasonably infer as being primitive, and sharable by all
of us, like I think arithmetical truth is (and it is for most people).
It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties on
other. To make clear what we assume.
That's what I am trying to do - make clear what you assume. If you
start out granting numbers imagination, then you have already have
consciousness, and have no need for comp.
Of course. Comp is an assumption concerning consciousness and
computations. Then the *conclusion* is that the theory of
everything is elementary arithmetic.
Buy everything that is not obviously elementary arithmetic can just
be presumed to be part of numbers imagination.
No, you have to do the math and verify that it predicts correctly
what we see. Up to now, comp predicts the MW, with a quantum
structure, and a core symmetrical structure (but we have not yet
really its linear aspect, nor the measure istelf, etc.).
Whatever it predicts correctly would validate arithmetic
tautologically, while everything that it cannot predict (like
flavors and colors) can still just be categorized as numbers
imagination.
Not at all. The prediction must be based on the precise math of
number's imagination.
Comp is not a theory of everything,
Indeed. It is a philosophical or theological principle or
assumption. Then, if we make that assumption, the theorem is that
the theory of everything is given by arithmetic or anything Turing
equivalent.
It's still only a theory of Turing equivalence, which doesn't
include any epistemic access to the question of what lies beyond.
Epistemic access is explained by the self-reference ability of the
universal numbers.
its a dualism of everything computational vs everything imagined by
computations.
Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But the
imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite
one, now), so it is a monism.
If it could be reduced, then why wouldn't it be? It's still a
dualism of that which is computation and that which can be reduced
from computation. The question is, where does computation inflate
itself to in the first place?
Computations exist, like prime number exists. It is not dualism, it is
elementary math derivation. Then we get an octalism (and many dualism)
in the epistemology of the universal numbers.
Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, but why
would they have a smell or sound?
Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to the
doctor.
Yes, you would.
Because you assume non-comp, but I still don't see why.
Because flavors exist, but comp has no reason to imagine them.
Well, the one saying "yes" to the doctor does have a reason to hope
for it, and he can hope that the evidences (the Turing emulability
of biophysical known object) are not misleading.
But we already know they are misleading, otherwise there would be no
dualism concept to begin with.
?
The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic.
I am interested only in the refutability of comp.
That may already be biasing the evaluation of comp beyond repair.
Consciousness is not about refutability,
Doing a precise theory is about making a refutable theory.
Depends if the theory is about consciousness or not. Consciousness
can only be a baseless assertion. It is the base of all assertion
and the assertion of all bases.
You assume consciousness to be fundamental, and matter. That is
coherent with your non-comp theory, but is not an argument against
comp.
Comp can't have an argument against it because it is tautological.
My theory explains why that is. A sufficiently reductionist mindset
will fall prey to its own absolutism. Anthropomorphic and
mechanemorphic absolutism will both use their own toy models of the
universe which reflect back the bias that goes into it. If you put
the universe into a mathematical box, then you will get a response
from the universe as it describes itself on that level. To argue
against comp, you must poke out your eyes and try to prove to the
blind man that sight exists.
it is about perceiving and participating. Refutability is a second
order logic derived from that. If you use the weak standard of
refutability, then you cannot be surprised when we take a puppet
for a person.
I can hardly be surprised, because that is mainly what I assume.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJRluXBa4e8
Cute, but not quite convincing for the present topic.
Hehe
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
