On 26 Sep 2013, at 10:21, Richard Ruquist wrote:

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Bruno, Is there cosmos without arithmetic?

`It might depend how you define "cosmos". I can easily imagine some`

`poor cosmos, based only on real numbers, and without the arithmetic of`

`the natural number (which for a logician are more demanding than the`

`reals, as the first order theory of the real is NOT Turing complete).`

`But if your cosmos is rich enough to be Turing universal, then it will`

`contain arithmetic.`

`With comp, cosmos is a derived notion, and it has "only" physical`

`existence. The physical has become a machine's "illusion", in the same`

`sense that time is an illusion in Gödel's solution of Einstein's`

`equation.`

Bruno

RichardOn Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:41 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 25 Sep 2013, at 18:53, Richard Ruquist wrote:You are saying there is no cosmos without people????I do not say that. I say that there is no people without cosmos(and that there is no arithmetic without people).Well anyway you pointed out the arithmetic and logic necessary for the cosmos to evolve people and I thank you for that.Thanks. You might cite the papers (It is much older than Tegmark,btw, and tegmark is still missing the first person indeterminacy. Isuspect you to are not yet taking into account that indeterminacy.You still link, like Tegmark, the mind to a machine, and the machineto a mind, but mind is attached to infinities of machines andcomputations. By machine I mean the immaterial mathematical one (asalways).I will make other comments. You link Göel's theorem with arithmetic,but Gödel's original theorem was done on a typed set theory, andGödel's theorem works for all rich mathematics (ZF, etc.). It is notrelated to arithmetic per se. Your use of it is a bit obscure forme, and alas, I don't know enough of string theory to evaluate someother part of the paper.If one day you can explain string theory for the dummy ... (I readKac's book on Vertex Algebra, and my knowledge of it is quite formal).Your paper seems interesting, but still too much "physicalist" withrespect of the computationalist assumption.BrunoOn Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:Hi Richard, On 25 Sep 2013, at 16:29, Richard Ruquist wrote:Bruno: "Imagined by people supported by infinities ofcomputations. But the imagination is reduced itself toarithmetical relations (even finite one, now), so it is a monism."Richard: Are you saying that without people there cannot be comp?I would prefer a more cosmic machine as in http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194Where does such cosmos come from? You start from what I show wehave to derive (from arithmetic, which you assume too).Without people, there is no arithmetic, because arithmetic implies(logically) the existence of people (and with comp they areconscious).BrunoOn Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 25 Sep 2013, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:58:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchalwrote:On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:On Monday, September 23, 2013 1:16:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchalwrote:shape belongs to the category of numbers imagination, and withcomp this is given by arithmetical relations.Numbers imagination seem like human imagination to me.Nice. That is a reason for taking number's talk seriously.I had more of 'numbers imagination = pathetic fallacy' meaning inmind.OK, but then you beg the question, and just repeat: I believe thatcomp is wrong, without explaining why.It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties onother. To make clear what we assume.That's what I am trying to do - make clear what you assume. Ifyou start out granting numbers imagination, then you havealready have consciousness, and have no need for comp.Of course. Comp is an assumption concerning consciousness andcomputations. Then the *conclusion* is that the theory ofeverything is elementary arithmetic.Buy everything that is not obviously elementary arithmetic canjust be presumed to be part of numbers imagination.No, you have to do the math and verify that it predicts correctlywhat we see. Up to now, comp predicts the MW, with a quantumstructure, and a core symmetrical structure (but we have not yetreally its linear aspect, nor the measure istelf, etc.).Comp is not a theory of everything,Indeed. It is a philosophical or theological principle orassumption. Then, if we make that assumption, the theorem is thatthe theory of everything is given by arithmetic or anything Turingequivalent.its a dualism of everything computational vs everything imaginedby computations.Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. Butthe imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (evenfinite one, now), so it is a monism.Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, butwhy would they have a smell or sound?Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to thedoctor.Yes, you would.Because you assume non-comp, but I still don't see why. Because flavors exist, but comp has no reason to imagine them.Well, the one saying "yes" to the doctor does have a reason tohope for it, and he can hope that the evidences (the Turingemulability of biophysical known object) are not misleading.The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic. I am interested only in the refutability of comp.That may already be biasing the evaluation of comp beyondrepair. Consciousness is not about refutability,Doing a precise theory is about making a refutable theory.Depends if the theory is about consciousness or not.Consciousness can only be a baseless assertion. It is the base ofall assertion and the assertion of all bases.You assume consciousness to be fundamental, and matter. That iscoherent with your non-comp theory, but is not an argument againstcomp.it is about perceiving and participating. Refutability is asecond order logic derived from that. If you use the weakstandard of refutability, then you cannot be surprised when wetake a puppet for a person.I can hardly be surprised, because that is mainly what I assume. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJRluXBa4e8Cute, but not quite convincing for the present topic. BrunoCraig BrunoCraig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to theGoogle Groups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails fromit, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to theGoogle Groups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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