On 26 Sep 2013, at 10:21, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
Is there cosmos without arithmetic?
It might depend how you define "cosmos". I can easily imagine some
poor cosmos, based only on real numbers, and without the arithmetic of
the natural number (which for a logician are more demanding than the
reals, as the first order theory of the real is NOT Turing complete).
But if your cosmos is rich enough to be Turing universal, then it will
contain arithmetic.
With comp, cosmos is a derived notion, and it has "only" physical
existence. The physical has become a machine's "illusion", in the same
sense that time is an illusion in Gödel's solution of Einstein's
equation.
Bruno
Richard
On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:41 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 25 Sep 2013, at 18:53, Richard Ruquist wrote:
You are saying there is no cosmos without people???
?
I do not say that. I say that there is no people without cosmos
(and that there is no arithmetic without people).
Well anyway you pointed out the arithmetic and logic
necessary for the cosmos to evolve people
and I thank you for that.
Thanks. You might cite the papers (It is much older than Tegmark,
btw, and tegmark is still missing the first person indeterminacy. I
suspect you to are not yet taking into account that indeterminacy.
You still link, like Tegmark, the mind to a machine, and the machine
to a mind, but mind is attached to infinities of machines and
computations. By machine I mean the immaterial mathematical one (as
always).
I will make other comments. You link Göel's theorem with arithmetic,
but Gödel's original theorem was done on a typed set theory, and
Gödel's theorem works for all rich mathematics (ZF, etc.). It is not
related to arithmetic per se. Your use of it is a bit obscure for
me, and alas, I don't know enough of string theory to evaluate some
other part of the paper.
If one day you can explain string theory for the dummy ... (I read
Kac's book on Vertex Algebra, and my knowledge of it is quite formal).
Your paper seems interesting, but still too much "physicalist" with
respect of the computationalist assumption.
Bruno
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
Hi Richard,
On 25 Sep 2013, at 16:29, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: "Imagined by people supported by infinities of
computations. But the imagination is reduced itself to
arithmetical relations (even finite one, now), so it is a monism."
Richard: Are you saying that without people there cannot be comp?
I would prefer a more cosmic machine as in http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194
Where does such cosmos come from? You start from what I show we
have to derive (from arithmetic, which you assume too).
Without people, there is no arithmetic, because arithmetic implies
(logically) the existence of people (and with comp they are
conscious).
Bruno
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal
<[email protected]> wrote:
On 25 Sep 2013, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:58:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, September 23, 2013 1:16:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
shape belongs to the category of numbers imagination, and with
comp this is given by arithmetical relations.
Numbers imagination seem like human imagination to me.
Nice. That is a reason for taking number's talk seriously.
I had more of 'numbers imagination = pathetic fallacy' meaning in
mind.
OK, but then you beg the question, and just repeat: I believe that
comp is wrong, without explaining why.
It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties on
other. To make clear what we assume.
That's what I am trying to do - make clear what you assume. If
you start out granting numbers imagination, then you have
already have consciousness, and have no need for comp.
Of course. Comp is an assumption concerning consciousness and
computations. Then the *conclusion* is that the theory of
everything is elementary arithmetic.
Buy everything that is not obviously elementary arithmetic can
just be presumed to be part of numbers imagination.
No, you have to do the math and verify that it predicts correctly
what we see. Up to now, comp predicts the MW, with a quantum
structure, and a core symmetrical structure (but we have not yet
really its linear aspect, nor the measure istelf, etc.).
Comp is not a theory of everything,
Indeed. It is a philosophical or theological principle or
assumption. Then, if we make that assumption, the theorem is that
the theory of everything is given by arithmetic or anything Turing
equivalent.
its a dualism of everything computational vs everything imagined
by computations.
Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But
the imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even
finite one, now), so it is a monism.
Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, but
why would they have a smell or sound?
Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to the
doctor.
Yes, you would.
Because you assume non-comp, but I still don't see why.
Because flavors exist, but comp has no reason to imagine them.
Well, the one saying "yes" to the doctor does have a reason to
hope for it, and he can hope that the evidences (the Turing
emulability of biophysical known object) are not misleading.
The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic.
I am interested only in the refutability of comp.
That may already be biasing the evaluation of comp beyond
repair. Consciousness is not about refutability,
Doing a precise theory is about making a refutable theory.
Depends if the theory is about consciousness or not.
Consciousness can only be a baseless assertion. It is the base of
all assertion and the assertion of all bases.
You assume consciousness to be fundamental, and matter. That is
coherent with your non-comp theory, but is not an argument against
comp.
it is about perceiving and participating. Refutability is a
second order logic derived from that. If you use the weak
standard of refutability, then you cannot be surprised when we
take a puppet for a person.
I can hardly be surprised, because that is mainly what I assume.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJRluXBa4e8
Cute, but not quite convincing for the present topic.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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