On Thursday, September 26, 2013 3:55:00 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Sep 2013, at 22:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 12:53:19 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> You are saying there is no cosmos without people??? >> >> Well anyway you pointed out the arithmetic and logic >> necessary for the cosmos to evolve people >> and I thank you for that. >> > > I think that Bruno uses 'people' in a futuristic sense, which assumes comp > is true and that we collectively understand that we ourselves as 'people' > are defined by infinite computations, therefore all incidences of infinite > computation are 'people', even if they are non-biological. > > > > Almost. people are more higher level than that. They appear through the > infinite computations, but people are not infinite computation, no more > than they are brains, or bodies. >
That doesn't really seem like it can claim to be Comp though. People are not Turing emulable, they are meta-computational essences which are granted by grace. Craig > > Bruno > > > > Craig > > >> >> >> On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Hi Richard, >>> >>> >>> On 25 Sep 2013, at 16:29, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>> >>> Bruno: "Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But >>> the imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite >>> one, now), so it is a monism." >>> >>> Richard: Are you saying that without people there cannot be comp? I >>> would prefer a more cosmic machine as in http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Where does such cosmos come from? You start from what I show we have to >>> derive (from arithmetic, which you assume too). >>> >>> Without people, there is no arithmetic, because arithmetic implies >>> (logically) the existence of people (and with comp they are conscious). >>> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 25 Sep 2013, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:58:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, September 23, 2013 1:16:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> shape belongs to the category of numbers imagination, and with comp >>>>>> this is given by arithmetical relations. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Numbers imagination seem like human imagination to me. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Nice. That is a reason for taking number's talk seriously. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I had more of 'numbers imagination = pathetic fallacy' meaning in mind. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> OK, but then you beg the question, and just repeat: I believe that comp >>>> is wrong, without explaining why. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties on other. >>>>>> To make clear what we assume. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That's what I am trying to do - make clear what you assume. If you >>>>> start out granting numbers imagination, then you have already have >>>>> consciousness, and have no need for comp. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Of course. Comp is an assumption concerning consciousness and >>>>> computations. Then the *conclusion* is that the theory of everything is >>>>> elementary arithmetic. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Buy everything that is not obviously elementary arithmetic can just be >>>> presumed to be part of numbers imagination. >>>> >>>> >>>> No, you have to do the math and verify that it predicts correctly what >>>> we see. Up to now, comp predicts the MW, with a quantum structure, and a >>>> core symmetrical structure (but we have not yet really its linear aspect, >>>> nor the measure istelf, etc.). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Comp is not a theory of everything, >>>> >>>> >>>> Indeed. It is a philosophical or theological principle or assumption. >>>> Then, if we make that assumption, the theorem is that the theory of >>>> everything is given by arithmetic or anything Turing equivalent. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> its a dualism of everything computational vs everything imagined by >>>> computations. >>>> >>>> >>>> Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But the >>>> imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite one, >>>> now), so it is a monism. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, but why >>>>>> would they have a smell or sound? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to the doctor. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes, you would. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Because you assume non-comp, but I still don't see why. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Because flavors exist, but comp has no reason to imagine them. >>>> >>>> >>>> Well, the one saying "yes" to the doctor does have a reason to hope for >>>> it, and he can hope that the evidences (the Turing emulability of >>>> biophysical known object) are not misleading. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am interested only in the refutability of comp. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That may already be biasing the evaluation of comp beyond repair. >>>>> Consciousness is not about refutability, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Doing a precise theory is about making a refutable theory. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Depends if the theory is about consciousness or not. Consciousness can >>>> only be a baseless assertion. It is the base of all assertion and the >>>> assertion of all bases. >>>> >>>> >>>> You assume consciousness to be fundamental, and matter. That is >>>> coherent with your non-comp theory, but is not an argument against comp. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> it is about perceiving and participating. Refutability is a second >>>>> order logic derived from that. If you use the weak standard of >>>>> refutability, then you cannot be surprised when we take a puppet for a >>>>> person. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I can hardly be surprised, because that is mainly what I assume. >>>>> >>>> >>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJRluXBa4e8 >>>> >>>> >>>> Cute, but not quite convincing for the present topic. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Craig >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Craig >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>>>> Visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >>>>> . >>>>> For more options, visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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