Bruno, Is there cosmos without arithmetic?
Richard On Thu, Sep 26, 2013 at 2:41 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 25 Sep 2013, at 18:53, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > You are saying there is no cosmos without people??? > > > ? > I do not say that. I say that there is no people without cosmos (and that > there is no arithmetic without people). > > > > > Well anyway you pointed out the arithmetic and logic > necessary for the cosmos to evolve people > and I thank you for that. > > > Thanks. You might cite the papers (It is much older than Tegmark, btw, and > tegmark is still missing the first person indeterminacy. I suspect you to > are not yet taking into account that indeterminacy. You still link, like > Tegmark, the mind to a machine, and the machine to a mind, but mind is > attached to infinities of machines and computations. By machine I mean the > immaterial mathematical one (as always). > > I will make other comments. You link Göel's theorem with arithmetic, but > Gödel's original theorem was done on a typed set theory, and Gödel's > theorem works for all rich mathematics (ZF, etc.). It is not related to > arithmetic per se. Your use of it is a bit obscure for me, and alas, I > don't know enough of string theory to evaluate some other part of the paper. > If one day you can explain string theory for the dummy ... (I read Kac's > book on Vertex Algebra, and my knowledge of it is quite formal). > > Your paper seems interesting, but still too much "physicalist" with > respect of the computationalist assumption. > > Bruno > > > > > > > On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Hi Richard, >> >> >> On 25 Sep 2013, at 16:29, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> Bruno: "Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But >> the imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite >> one, now), so it is a monism." >> >> Richard: Are you saying that without people there cannot be comp? I would >> prefer a more cosmic machine as in http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194 >> >> >> >> >> Where does such cosmos come from? You start from what I show we have to >> derive (from arithmetic, which you assume too). >> >> Without people, there is no arithmetic, because arithmetic implies >> (logically) the existence of people (and with comp they are conscious). >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> >>> On 25 Sep 2013, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, September 25, 2013 2:58:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 24 Sep 2013, at 20:58, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, September 23, 2013 1:16:08 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> shape belongs to the category of numbers imagination, and with comp >>>>> this is given by arithmetical relations. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> Numbers imagination seem like human imagination to me. >>>> >>>> >>>> Nice. That is a reason for taking number's talk seriously. >>>> >>> >>> >>> I had more of 'numbers imagination = pathetic fallacy' meaning in mind. >>> >>> >>> >>> OK, but then you beg the question, and just repeat: I believe that comp >>> is wrong, without explaining why. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> It is not. What is important is to not impose certainties on other. To >>>>> make clear what we assume. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That's what I am trying to do - make clear what you assume. If you >>>> start out granting numbers imagination, then you have already have >>>> consciousness, and have no need for comp. >>>> >>>> >>>> Of course. Comp is an assumption concerning consciousness and >>>> computations. Then the *conclusion* is that the theory of everything is >>>> elementary arithmetic. >>>> >>> >>> >>> Buy everything that is not obviously elementary arithmetic can just be >>> presumed to be part of numbers imagination. >>> >>> >>> No, you have to do the math and verify that it predicts correctly what >>> we see. Up to now, comp predicts the MW, with a quantum structure, and a >>> core symmetrical structure (but we have not yet really its linear aspect, >>> nor the measure istelf, etc.). >>> >>> >>> >>> Comp is not a theory of everything, >>> >>> >>> Indeed. It is a philosophical or theological principle or assumption. >>> Then, if we make that assumption, the theorem is that the theory of >>> everything is given by arithmetic or anything Turing equivalent. >>> >>> >>> >>> its a dualism of everything computational vs everything imagined by >>> computations. >>> >>> >>> Imagined by people supported by infinities of computations. But the >>> imagination is reduced itself to arithmetical relations (even finite one, >>> now), so it is a monism. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Maybe you can get a set of variables with unknown values, but why >>>>> would they have a smell or sound? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Because if they didn't, you would die when saying "yes" to the doctor. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, you would. >>>> >>>> >>>> Because you assume non-comp, but I still don't see why. >>>> >>> >>> Because flavors exist, but comp has no reason to imagine them. >>> >>> >>> Well, the one saying "yes" to the doctor does have a reason to hope for >>> it, and he can hope that the evidences (the Turing emulability of >>> biophysical known object) are not misleading. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The truth or falsity of comp is out of my topic. >>>>> >>>>> I am interested only in the refutability of comp. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That may already be biasing the evaluation of comp beyond repair. >>>> Consciousness is not about refutability, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Doing a precise theory is about making a refutable theory. >>>> >>> >>> Depends if the theory is about consciousness or not. Consciousness can >>> only be a baseless assertion. It is the base of all assertion and the >>> assertion of all bases. >>> >>> >>> You assume consciousness to be fundamental, and matter. That is coherent >>> with your non-comp theory, but is not an argument against comp. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> it is about perceiving and participating. Refutability is a second >>>> order logic derived from that. If you use the weak standard of >>>> refutability, then you cannot be surprised when we take a puppet for a >>>> person. >>>> >>>> >>>> I can hardly be surprised, because that is mainly what I assume. >>>> >>> >>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJRluXBa4e8 >>> >>> >>> Cute, but not quite convincing for the present topic. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Craig >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit >>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>>> . >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
