On 26 September 2013 08:14, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> You argue, I think, that >> computationalism escapes this by showing how computation and logic >> emerge naturally from arithmetic. > > And how this explains the appearance of discourse on consciousness and > matter
Yes, ISTM that this is where identity theories break down finally; the explanation of the self-referential discourses is perhaps the most persuasive aspect of comp. I was reflecting recently on "panpsychist matter" theories such as those proposed by Galen Strawson (or Chalmers in certain moods). ISTM that ideas like these run foul of the problem of how to attribute consciousness to some "intrinsic" aspect of matter whilst simultaneously justifying our ability to discourse about it. Since the discourse part is rather obviously relational in nature it is rather difficult to see how this could refer to any supposedly "intrinsic" aspect of the relata. Any such aspect, even if it existed, would be inaccessible to the relational level. After all, we don't expect the characters in TV dramas to start discussing the intrinsic qualities of the TV screen on which they are displayed! > Then I think there is a genuine concern due to the opposition between life > and afterlife. may be theology is not for everybody, a bit like salvia: it > asks for a genuine curiosity, and it can have some morbid aspect. I try to > understand why some machines indeed want to hold a contradictory > metaphysics, even up to the point of hiding obvious fact, like personal > consciousness. Yes, ISTM that there's also often a kind of reflexive self-abnegation, or a shrinking back from any idea that consciousness could have a role to play in the story, let alone a central one. This is perhaps understandable in the light of historically mistaken attempts to place humanity at the centre of the cosmos. Science is therefore seen as having finally defeated religion and superstition by taking the human perspective entirely out of the equation. But ironically, taken to extremes, such a one-eyed (or no-eyed) perspective may have the effect of leaving us even more blind to our true nature than we ever were before. David > > On 25 Sep 2013, at 20:51, David Nyman wrote: > >> On 25 September 2013 15:01, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> I agree. It is in that sense that we can say that modern biophysics makes >>> vitalism irrelevant. >>> >>> (I am actually arguing that computationalism makes materialism irrelevant >>> in that same sense). >> >> >> Yes, I see that. >> >>>> Of course the standard riposte to this riposte is indeed simply to >>>> deny that there are "really" any such further first-person facts at >>>> all >>> >>> >>> Which is or should be seen as contradictory by any non-zombie entity. >> >> >> True, but nevertheless they don't always admit to it. I'm trying to >> put my finger on just what it is that is so question-begging about >> such a position. >> >>>> (a position that Dennett has characterised as third person >>>> absolutism). >>> >>> >>> Despite this, and because it takes Matter for granted, he still slips >>> himself into it, alas. >> >> >> It's worse than that, alas; he seems to regard such absolutism as a >> badge of hard-nosed scientific rigour. > > > It is common with Aristotelian theologian, doubly so when they are not aware > of doing theology. > > > > > >> My point here is to undermine >> such a position by pointing out that, in simultaneously appropriating >> what it denies, it is in fact radically self-contradictory. > > > Yes. In fine it is like saying "I am a zombie, everyone are zombie, and let > me compute without annoying me with persons, and consciousness". > > > > >> In a fit >> of hyperbole I once called this "metaphysical grand larceny". > > > ... I think it explains why human sciences are so sick, and I think this is > exploited by politics at many levels, from religious institution, health > politics, 9/11 and the imaginary enemies. It is total obscurantism. > > > > >> >>>> it is central to reductionism that such >>>> emergent levels play no independent role in the fundamental machinery. >>> >>> >>> OK. Of course it can play a role in our discovering of that fundamental >>> reality. >> >> >> Sure, but then we must give an account of the emergent levels that has >> an explicit motivation and justification in terms of our theory. > > > OK. > > > > >> My >> point is that there is no such explicit motivation or justification in >> materialism, in which a maximally-reduced substrate has been >> hypothesised at the start to do all the work. > > > To be frank, I think it can be done by lowering the substitution level so > much that we can ecover some identity thesis. But doing that would prevent > the comp explanation, and reintroduce a mysterious "matter", and make > consciousness unexplainable. It introduces a "matter of the gap", so to > speak. > > > > > >> You argue, I think, that >> computationalism escapes this by showing how computation and logic >> emerge naturally from arithmetic. > > > And how this explains the appearance of discourse on consciousness and > matter, OK. Logic itself is a tool, and is basically assumed in the theory. > > > >> Insofar as this is the case, ISTM >> that your theory necessarily concedes (and of course tries to justify >> from internal considerations) a quite different order of reality to >> these derivatives of the fundamental arithmetical base. > > > Yes. there are only numbers (or combinators, programs), and all the rest > comes from an internal statistics on dreams made by them, and their > relations, or lack of relations, with arithmetical truth. > > > > > >> >> Reductive materialism has no business conceding any such ontological >> novelty to "composite entities", even though precisely such a >> concession is usually, and illicitly, assumed in order to conceal >> internal contradiction (aka "sweeping the first-person under the >> rug"). But in computationalism it cannot merely be a case of a >> third-personal arithmetical substrate "doing all the work" on its own. >> Not only has each emergent "level" an explicit constructive role but, >> in the final analysis, "reality" itself can only be recovered from a >> first-personal perspective (i.e as filtered through a myriad >> self-referential points-of-view). > > > Yes. > > > >> >>>> Nature, as we might say, seems to compute exclusively from the bottom >>>> up. >>> >>> >>> OK, and with comp the "bottom" is given by 0, its successor and + and *, >>> or >>> anything else Turing-Universal. >> >> >> OK. But as I argue above, we cannot merely propose the existence of a >> "bottom" and leave it at that; this is the often-overlooked Achilles' >> heel of reductive materialism. ISTM that comp's explicitly >> constructive approach to each of its theoretical entities is a >> distinctive advantage in this regard. > > > I can only agree. > > > >> >>>> If the foregoing point is fully taken on board, it should be apparent >>>> that our fundamental motivation for ascribing any truly independent >>>> "reality" to derivative or emergent phenomena is actually their >>>> appearance in some first-personal narrative. >>> >>> >>> Yes, but also our irresistible feeling that such narrative make sense, >>> and >>> that our words do indeed refer to something. >> >> >> A crucial point. >> >>>> Hence the primary >>>> "first-person fact" that demands something beyond a strictly reductive >>>> explanation is the peculiarly "non-derivative" status of a >>>> point-of-view >>> >>> >>> I would say, "non justifiable entirely" by the machine, unless she bet on >>> comp explicitly. >>> I mean, the first person points of view are derived, in comp (+ >>> Theaetetus) >>> by the machine inability to see that the points of view are ontologically >>> equivalent. In modal logic, it comes from the fact that the following >>> equivalence: >>> >>> Bp <-> Bp & p <-> Bp & Dt <-> Bp & Dt & p >>> >>> although provable by G* (and thus arithmetically true), are not provable >>> by >>> the machine, and indeed obeys quite different logics. >> >> >> This seems to me to be an extraordinarily subtle point (or perhaps I >> have simply been very slow in grasping it). > > > It is subtle, no doubt. It exploits incompleteness in a place where most > people collapse the different points of view. > > > >> When you say above that >> "the points of view are ontologically equivalent" you are justifying >> this in terms of arithmetical truth itself. If so, the ontology on >> which comp is based is not merely that of some simple arithmetical >> substrate tout court, but crucially that of all truths derivable from >> it, whether provable by any particular machine or not. > > > Yes. > (I would avoid the experession "arithmetical substrate", as some people can > believe that matter will be made of numbers, when there is only > psychological appearance of matter, supported by infinities of arithmetical > relations). > It is like in Mermin's Ithaca interpretation of QM: only relata, no real > objects per se.) > > > > >> The >> first-personal nuances then seem to depend on the particular >> distinctions between what is true and what is provable from the >> point-of-view of some particular machine. > > > Yes. + what is simply consistent (can be false). > > > > >> "What is true" from the >> point-of-view of a machine seems to be true in virtue of its >> constitution, as opposed to its operational (or logical) capabilities; >> i.e. first-personal truths are constitutive not demonstrative. > > > Well, the machine is platonist, that is believes that P is true, or NOT P is > true, so truth will become a sort of unnameable "God" for her, or unnameable > transcendant realm, independent of any of her beliefs. > > > > >> >>> We could write: >>> "That this may appear less than obvious to us is a consequence of >>> machine's >>> >>> inability even to frame the question, without the machine's assuming comp >>> and accepting the traditional account of knowledge (Bp & p, & Al.)" >> >> >> Indeed. But some machines seem curiously capable of holding to a >> reductively materialistic metaphysics without noticing how it cuts the >> very ground from under them. > > > > May be it is a fear of death in disguise, or a fear of the unknown, or a > difficulty to acknowledge ignorance, I don't know. > We have used authoritative arguments for so long in that field, that people > want to keep a sort of statu quo. > Then I think there is a genuine concern due to the opposition between life > and afterlife. may be theology is not for everybody, a bit like salvia: it > asks for a genuine curiosity, and it can have some morbid aspect. I try to > understand why some machines indeed want to hold a contradictory > metaphysics, even up to the point of hiding obvious fact, like personal > consciousness. > > Bruno > > > >> >> David >> >> >>> >>> On 25 Sep 2013, at 13:40, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>>> On 25 September 2013 05:03, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>>> >>>>> We will have learned what emotions and feelings >>>>> are at the level of sensors and computation and action. And when we >>>>> have >>>>> done that 'the hard problem' will be seen to have been an idle question >>>>> - >>>>> like "What is life." proved to be in the 20th century. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> David Chalmers has a good riposte to this, I think. He points out >>>> that, properly framed, the question "What is Life?" was always going to >>>> be answerable in terms of lower-level elements and processes of >>>> systems we regard as alive. >>> >>> >>> >>> I agree. It is in that sense that we can say that modern biophysics makes >>> vitalism irrelevant. >>> >>> (I am actually arguing that computationalism makes materialism irrelevant >>> in that same sense). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Consequently, once these had been fully >>>> elucidated (no matter how difficult this might turn out to be in >>>> practice) we simply would have no motivation to look for further kinds >>>> of explanation. There never really was any reason to anticipate there >>>> being some "hard problem" of Life. OTOH, he argues, even if we >>>> possessed a fully adequate account of the brain in terms of its >>>> relevant physical elements and processes, the question of why any >>>> fully adequate third-person characterisation might imply any further >>>> first-person facts would still remain. >>> >>> >>> >>> Exactly. That is why there *is* a mind-body problem at the start. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Of course the standard riposte to this riposte is indeed simply to >>>> deny that there are "really" any such further first-person facts at >>>> all >>> >>> >>> >>> Which is or should be seen as contradictory by any non-zombie entity. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> (a position that Dennett has characterised as third person >>>> absolutism). >>> >>> >>> >>> Despite this, and because it takes Matter for granted, he still slips >>> himself into it, alas. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> I wonder, however, whether this denial really makes any >>>> sense in its own terms. After all, if one takes the reductive >>>> enterprise as seriously as one ought, anything above the level of >>>> fundamental constituents and their relations is understood as being >>>> derivative or emergent. IOW, in a sense (and a strong sense for our >>>> present purposes) such derivative levels are not independently "real". >>>> It is easy to miss this point because of their explanatory >>>> indispensability (e.g. Deutsch's example of the alternative histories >>>> of the copper atom) but it is central to reductionism that such >>>> emergent levels play no independent role in the fundamental machinery. >>> >>> >>> >>> OK. Of course it can play a role in our discovering of that fundamental >>> reality. >>> >>> >>> >>>> Nature, as we might say, seems to compute exclusively from the bottom >>>> up. >>> >>> >>> >>> OK, and with comp the "bottom" is given by 0, its successor and + and *, >>> or >>> anything else Turing-Universal. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> If the foregoing point is fully taken on board, it should be apparent >>>> that our fundamental motivation for ascribing any truly independent >>>> "reality" to derivative or emergent phenomena is actually their >>>> appearance in some first-personal narrative. >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes, but also our irresistible feeling that such narrative make sense, >>> and >>> that our words do indeed refer to something. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> IOW, it makes no >>>> difference to Nature, conceived reductively, whether we choose to >>>> explain the current location of a copper atom in terms of nations and >>>> wars, or the evolution of the wave-function of the universe, or the >>>> structure of the Programmatic Library of Babel for that matter, >>>> because the presumed-to-be-fundamental reality is understood to >>>> subsist independently whatever the case. According to standard >>>> reductionist principles, nations and wars - and indeed atoms and >>>> molecules - are simply higher-order derivatives of more fundamental >>>> entities and their relations. Indeed, more accurately, they simply >>>> *are* those entities and their relations, without addition, in exactly >>>> the sense that football teams or societies simply *are* human beings >>>> in relation, without addition. >>> >>> >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> My point here is that these derivatives, in the end, are point-of-view >>>> dependent. >>> >>> >>> >>> Indeed, with comp they will be redefined by the logically possible points >>> of >>> view of the relative "numbers" (program, Turing machines, whatever). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> This is not to say, of course, that they are thereby simple >>>> or arbitrary; quite the contrary. >>> >>> >>> >>> Good to insist on that. For the ideally correct machines, they are >>> described >>> by precise infinities of number theoretical relations. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> But there would be no need to appeal >>>> to them at all were it not for the putative existence of >>>> points-of-view in the first place. Nature, conceived purely as a >>>> primary reality of fundamental entities and their relations, >>> >>> >>> >>> of course with comp, what you call "nature" here is just the arithmetic >>> of >>> the *natural* number (coincidentally). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> has no >>>> truck with explaining the history of any particular copper atom in >>>> terms of nations and wars or, for that matter, with distinguishing a >>>> "copper atom" as worthy of explanation. Hence the primary >>>> "first-person fact" that demands something beyond a strictly reductive >>>> explanation is the peculiarly "non-derivative" status of a >>>> point-of-view >>> >>> >>> >>> I would say, "non justifiable entirely" by the machine, unless she bet on >>> comp explicitly. >>> I mean, the first person points of view are derived, in comp (+ >>> Theaetetus) >>> by the machine inability to see that the points of view are ontologically >>> equivalent. In modal logic, it comes from the fact that the following >>> equivalence: >>> >>> Bp <-> Bp & p <-> Bp & Dt <-> Bp & Dt & p >>> >>> although provable by G* (and thus arithmetically true), are not provable >>> by >>> the machine, and indeed obeys quite different logics. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> and the "emergent" entities in which it apparently >>>> deals. That this may appear less than obvious to us is a consequence >>>> of our seeming inability even to frame the question without assuming >>>> the answer. >>> >>> >>> >>> yes, and I think the math shows indeed this being true with "our" >>> referring >>> to all universal (Löbian) machines, indeed. >>> We could write: >>> "That this may appear less than obvious to us is a consequence of >>> machine's >>> >>> inability even to frame the question, without the machine's assuming comp >>> and accepting the traditional account of knowledge (Bp & p, & Al.)" >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> >>>>> On 9/24/2013 8:44 PM, LizR wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 25 September 2013 15:41, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 9/24/2013 6:32 PM, LizR wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On 25 September 2013 13:38, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is also true of materialism. Whether you think this is a problem >>>>>>> or not depends on whether you think the "hard problem" is a problem >>>>>>> or >>>>>>> not. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Indeed. I was about to say something similar (to the effect that it's >>>>>> hard >>>>>> to imagine how "mere atoms" can have sights, sounds, smells etc >>>>>> either). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> As a rule, if you want to explain X you need to start from something >>>>>> without X. >>>>>> >>>>> Absolutely. >>>>> >>>>> If you know of such an explanation, or even the outlines of one, I'd be >>>>> interested to hear it. As Russell said, this is the so-called "hard >>>>> problem" >>>>> so any light (or sound, touch etc) on it would be welcome. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> My 'solution' to the hard problem is to prognosticate that when we have >>>>> built intelligent robots we will have learned the significance of >>>>> having >>>>> an >>>>> internal narrative memory. We will have learned what emotions and >>>>> feelings >>>>> are at the level of sensors and computation and action. And when we >>>>> have >>>>> done that 'the hard problem' will be seen to have been an idle question >>>>> - >>>>> like "What is life." proved to be in the 20th century. >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an >>>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an >>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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