A first draft that I posted over the weekend. *

*I. Trailing Dovetail Argument (TDA)*

*A. Computationalism makes two ontological assumptions which have not been 
properly challenged:*

   - *The universality of recursive cardinality*
   - *Complexity driven novelty*.

Both of these, I intend to show, are intrinsically related to consciousness 
in a non-obvious way.

*B. Universal Recursive Cardinality*

Mathematics, I suggest is defined by the assumption of universal 
cardinality: The universe is reducible to a multiplicity of discretely 
quantifiable units. The origin of cardinality, I suggest, is the 
partitioning or multiplication of a single, original unit, so that every 
subsequent unit is a recursive copy of the original.

Because recursiveness is assumed to be fundamental through math, the idea 
of a new ‘one’ is impossible. Every instance of one is a recurrence of the 
identical and self-same ‘one’, or an inevitable permutation derived from 
it. By overlooking the possibility of absolute uniqueness, computationalism 
must conceive of all events as local reproductions of stereotypes from a 
Platonic template rather than ‘true originals’.

A ‘true original’ is that which has no possible precedent. The number one 
would be a true original, but then all other integers represent multiple 
copies of one. All rational numbers represent partial copies of one. All 
prime numbers are still divisible by one, so not truly “prime”, but 
pseudo-prime in comparison to one. One, by contrast, is prime, relative to 
mathematics, but no number can be a true original since it is divisible and 
repeatable and therefore non-unique. A true original must be indivisible 
and unrepeatable, like an experience, or a person. Even an experience which 
is part of an experiential chain that is highly repetitive is, on some 
level unique in the history of the universe, unlike a mathematical 
expression such as 5 x 4 = 20, which is never any different than 5 x 4 = 
20, regardless of the context.

I think that when we assert a universe of recursive recombinations that 
know no true originality, we should not disregard the fact that this 
strongly contradicts our intuitions about the proprietary nature of 
identity.  A generic universe would seem to counterfactually predict a very 
low interest in qualities such as individuality and originality, and 
identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course, what we see 
the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by some suggestion 
unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the 
most prolific and successful feature of consumerism.

If the experienced universe were strictly an outcropping of a machine that 
by definition can create only trivially ‘new’ combinations of copies, why 
would those kinds of quantitatively recombined differences such as that 
between 456098209093457976534 and 45609420909345797353 seem insignificant 
to us, but the difference between a belt worn by Elvis and a copy of that 
belt to be demonstrably significant to many people?

*C. Complexity Driven Novelty*

Because computationalism assumes *finite* simplicity,  that is, it provides 
only a pseudo-uniqueness by virtue of the relatively low statistical 
probability of large numbers overlapping each other precisely. There is no 
irreducible originality to the original Mona Lisa, only the vastness of the 
physical painting’s microstructure prevents it from being exactly 
reproduced very easily.  Such a perfect reproduction, under 
computationalism is indistinguishable from the original and therefore 
neither can be more original than the other (or if there are unavoidable 
differences due to uncertainty and incompleteness, they would be noise 
differences which we would be of no consequence).

*This is where information theory departs from realism, since reality 
provides memories and evidence of which Mona Lisa is new and which one was 
painted by Leonardo da Vinci at the beginning of the 16th century in 
Florence, Italy, Earth, Sol, Milky Way Galaxy*.*

Mathematics can be said to allow for the possibility of novelty only in one 
direction; that of higher complexity. New qualities, by computationalism, 
must arise on the event horizons of something like the Universal 
Dovetailer. If that is the case, it seems odd that the language of qualia 
is one of rich simplicity rather than cumbersome computables. With comp, 
there can be no new ‘one’, but in reality, every human experience is 
exactly that – a new day, a new experience, even if it often seems much 
like the one before. *Numbers don’t work that way. Each mechanical result 
is identical. A = A.  A does not ‘seem much like the A before, yet in a new 
way‘*. This is a huge problem with mathematics and theoretical physics. 
They don’t get the connection between novelty and simplicity, so they hope 
to find it out in the vastness of super-human complexity.

*II. Computation as Puppetry*

I think that even David Chalmers, who I respect immensely for his 
contributions to philosophy of mind and in communicating the Hard Problem 
missed the a subtle but important distinction. The difference between a 
puppet and a zombie, while superficially innocuous, has profound 
implications for the formulation of a realistic critique of Strong AI. When 
Chalmers introduced or popularized the term zombie in reference to 
hypothetical perfect human duplicates which lack qualia and subjective 
experience, he inadvertently let an unscientific assumption leak in.

A zombie is supernatural because it implies the *presence of an absence*. 
It is an animated, un-dead cadaver in which a living person is no longer 
present. The unconsciousness of a puppet, however, is merely tautological – 
it is the natural *absence of presence* of consciousness which is the case 
with any symbolic representation of a character, such as a doll, cartoon, 
or emoticon.  A symbolic representation, such as Bugs Bunny, can be mass 
produced using any suitable material substance or communication media. Even 
though Bugs is treated as a unique intellectual property, in reality, the 
title to that property is not unique and can be transferred, sold, shared, 

The reason that Intellectual Property law is such a problem is because 
anyone can take some ordinary piece of junk, put a Bugs Bunny picture on 
it, and sell more of it than they would have otherwise. Bugs can’t object 
to having his good name sullied by hack counterfeiters, so the image of 
Bugs Bunny is used both to falsely endorse an inferior product and to 
falsely impugn the reputation of a brand. The problem is, any reasonable 
facsimile of Bugs Bunny is just as authentic, in an Absolute sense, as any 
other. The only true original Bugs Bunny is the one we experience through 
our imagination and the imagination of Mel Blanc and the Looney Tunes 

The impulse to reify the legitimacy of intellectual property into law is 
related to the impulse to project agency and awareness onto machines. As a 
branch of the “pathetic fallacy” which takes literally those human 
qualities which have been applied to non-humans as figurative conveniences 
of language, the computationalistic fallacy projects an assumed 
character-hood on the machine as a whole. Reasoning (falsely, I think) that 
since all that our body can see of ourselves is a body, it is the body 
which is the original object from which the subject is produced through its 
functions. Such a conclusion, when we begin from mechanism, seems 
unavoidable at first.

*III. Hypothesis*

I propose that we reverse the two assumptions of mathematics above, so that

   - *Recursion is assumed to be derived from primordial spontaneity rather 
   than the other way around.*
   - *Novelty can only be meaningful if it re-asserts simplicity in 
   addition to complexity.*This would mean:
   - *The expanding event horizon of the Universal Dovetailer would have to 
   be composed of recordings of sensed experiences after the fact, rather than 
   precursors to subjective simulation of the computation.*
   - *Comp is untrue by virtue of diagonalization of immeasurable novelty 
   against incompleteness.*
   - *Sense out-incompletes arithmetic truth, and therefore leaves it 
   frozen in stasis by comparison in every instant, and in eternity.*
   - *Computation cannot animate anything except through susceptibility to 
   the pathetic fallacy. *

This may seem like an unfair or insulting to the many great minds who have 
been pioneering AI theory and development, but that is not my intent. By 
assertively pointing out the need to move from a model of consciousness 
which hinges on simulated spontaneity to a model in which spontaneity can 
never*, by definition *be simulated,  I am trying to express the importance 
and urgency of this shift.  If I am right, the future of human 
understanding depends ultimately on our ability to graduate from the 
cul-de-sac of mechanistic supremacy to the more profound truth of 
rehabilitated animism. Feeling does compute because computation is how the 
masking of feeling into a localized unfeeling becomes possible.

IV. Reversing the Dovetailer*

By uncovering the intrinsic antagonism between the above mathematical 
assumptions and the authentic nature of consciousness, it might be possible 
to ascertain a truer model of consciousness by reversing the order of the 
Universal Dovetailer (machine that builds the multiverse out of programs).

   - *The universality of recursive cardinality reverses as the 
   Diagonalization of the Unique
   - *Complexity driven novelty can be reversed by Pushing the UD*.

the Unique

Under the hypothesis that computation *lags behind* experience*, no 
simulation of a brain can ever catch up to what a natural person can feel 
through that brain, since the natural person is constantly consuming the 
uniqueness of their experience before it can be measured by anything 
else*.*Since the uniqueness of subjectivity is immeasurable and unprecedented 
within its own inertial frame, no instrument from outside of that frame can 
capture it before it decoheres into cascades of increasingly generic public 

PIP flips the presumption of Universal Recursive Cardinality inherent in 
mathematics so that all novelty exists as truly original simplicity, as 
well as a relatively new complex recombination, such that the continuum of 
novelty extends in both directions. This, if properly understood, should be 
a lightning bolt that recontextualizes the whole of mathematics. It is like 
discovering a new kind of negative number. Things like color and human 
feeling may exploit the addressing scheme that complex computation offers, 
but the important part of color or feeling is not in that address, but in 
the hyper-simplicity and absolute novelty that ‘now’ corresponds to that 
address. The incardinality of sense means that all feelings are more 
primitive than even the number one or the concept of singularity. They are 
rooted in the eternal ‘becoming of one’; before and after cardinality. 
Under PIP, computation is a public repetition of what is irreducibly 
unrepeatable and private. Computation can never get ahead of experience, 
because computation is an a posteriori measurement of it.

For example, a computer model of what an athlete will do on the field that 
is based on their past performance will always fail to account for the 
possibility that the next performance will be the first time that athlete 
does something that they never have done before and that they *could not 
have done before*. Natural identities (not characters, puppets, etc) are 
not only self-diagonalizing, natural identity itself is 
self-diagonalization. We are that which has not yet experienced the 
totality of its lifetime, and that incompleteness infuses our entire 
experience. The emergence of the unique always cheats prediction, since all 
prediction belongs to the measurements of an expired world which did not 
yet contain the next novelty.

*B. Pushing the UD* – If the UD is a program which pulls the experienced 
universe behind it as it extends, the computed realm, faster than light, 
ahead of local appearances. It assumes all phenomena are built bottom up 
from generic, interchangeable bits. The hypothesis under PIP is that if 
there were a UD, it would be pushed by experience from the top down, as 
well as recollecting fragments of previous experiences from the bottom up.  
Each experience decays from immeasurable private qualia that is unique into 
public reflections that are generic recombinations of fixed elements. 
Reversing the Dovetailer puts universality on the defense so that it 
becomes a storage device rather than a pseudo-primitive mechina ex deus.

The primacy of sense is corroborated by the intuition that every measure 
requires a ruler. Some example which is presented as an index for 
comparison. The uniqueness comes first, and the computability follows by 
imitation. The un-numbered Great War becomes World War II only in 
retrospect. The second war does not follow the rule of world wars, it 
creates the rule by virtue of its similarities. The second war is 
unprecedented in its own right, as an original second world war, but unlike 
the number two, it is not literally another World War I. In short, 
experiences do not follow from rules; rules follow from experience.

*V. Conclusions*

If we extrapolate the assumptions of Compuationalism out, I think that they 
would predict that the painting of the Mona Lisa is what always happens 
under the mathematical conditions posed by a combination of celestial 
motions, cells, bodies, brains, etc. There can be no truly original 
artwork, as all art works are inevitable under some computable probability, 
even if the the particular work is not predictable specifically by 
computation. Comp makes all originals derivatives of duplication. I suggest 
that it makes more sense that the primordial identity of sense experience 
is a fundamental originality from which duplication is derived. The number 
one is a generic copy – a one-ness which comments on an aspect of what is 
ultimately boundaryless inclusion rather than naming originality itself.

Under Multisense Realism (MSR), the sense-first view ultimately makes the 
most sense but it allows that the counter perspective, in which sense 
follows computation or physics, would appear to be true in another way, one 
which yields meaningful insights that could not be accessed otherwise.

When we shift our attention from the figure of comp in the background of 
sense to the figure of sense in the background of comp, the relation of 
originality shifts also. With sense first, true originality makes all 
computations into imposters. With computation first, arithmetic truth makes 
local appearances of originality artifacts of machine self-reference. Both 
are trivially true, but if the comp-first view were Absolutely true, there 
would be no plausible justification for such appearances of originality as 
qualitatively significant. A copy and an original should have no greater 
difference than a fifteenth copy and a sixteenth copy, and being the first 
person to discover America should have no more import than being the 
1,588,237th person to discover America. The title of this post as 
2013/10/13/2562 would be as good of a title as any other referenceable 

*This is *not* to suggest that *human* experience lags behind neurological 
computation. MSR proposes a model called eigenmorphism to clarify the 
personal/sub-personal distinction in which neurological-level computation 
corresponds to sub-personal experience rather than personal level 
experience. This explains the disappearance of free will in neuroscientific 
experiments such as Libet, et. al. Human personhood is a simple but deep. 
Simultaneity is relative, and nowhere is that more true than along the 
continuum between the microphysical and the macrophenomenal. What can be 
experimented on publicly is, under MSR, a combination of near isomorphic 
and near contra-isomorphic to private experience.

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