Craig: beutiful. I saved it for my closer understanding (if...).
One little intrusion though:

*you write: the first copy of something should not be different from the
15,347,498th copy (figure arbitrary)*.
 My 'agnosticism' objects:
The first copy is restricted to the techniques applicable for copting, not
necessarily including the 'totality' of the original (infinite complexity).
The later copies copy the first one.
Meaning: we CANNOT copy in toto, only in our human cpabilities.
(I extend such restriction to *'analytical'* - restricted to KNOWN parts,
to *'statistical'* dependent on the border-limits and the qualia we include
in identifying the counted items, to *'probability' *and some more.)

John Mikes

On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 11:46 AM, Craig Weinberg <>wrote:

> A first draft that I posted over the weekend. *
> *
> *I. Trailing Dovetail Argument (TDA)*
> *A. Computationalism makes two ontological assumptions which have not
> been properly challenged:*
>    - *The universality of recursive cardinality*
>    - *Complexity driven novelty*.
> Both of these, I intend to show, are intrinsically related to
> consciousness in a non-obvious way.
> *B. Universal Recursive Cardinality*
> Mathematics, I suggest is defined by the assumption of universal
> cardinality: The universe is reducible to a multiplicity of discretely
> quantifiable units. The origin of cardinality, I suggest, is the
> partitioning or multiplication of a single, original unit, so that every
> subsequent unit is a recursive copy of the original.
> Because recursiveness is assumed to be fundamental through math, the idea
> of a new ‘one’ is impossible. Every instance of one is a recurrence of the
> identical and self-same ‘one’, or an inevitable permutation derived from
> it. By overlooking the possibility of absolute uniqueness, computationalism
> must conceive of all events as local reproductions of stereotypes from a
> Platonic template rather than ‘true originals’.
> A ‘true original’ is that which has no possible precedent. The number one
> would be a true original, but then all other integers represent multiple
> copies of one. All rational numbers represent partial copies of one. All
> prime numbers are still divisible by one, so not truly “prime”, but
> pseudo-prime in comparison to one. One, by contrast, is prime, relative to
> mathematics, but no number can be a true original since it is divisible and
> repeatable and therefore non-unique. A true original must be indivisible
> and unrepeatable, like an experience, or a person. Even an experience which
> is part of an experiential chain that is highly repetitive is, on some
> level unique in the history of the universe, unlike a mathematical
> expression such as 5 x 4 = 20, which is never any different than 5 x 4 =
> 20, regardless of the context.
> I think that when we assert a universe of recursive recombinations that
> know no true originality, we should not disregard the fact that this
> strongly contradicts our intuitions about the proprietary nature of
> identity.  A generic universe would seem to counterfactually predict a very
> low interest in qualities such as individuality and originality, and
> identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course, what we see
> the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by some suggestion
> unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the
> most prolific and successful feature of consumerism.
> If the experienced universe were strictly an outcropping of a machine that
> by definition can create only trivially ‘new’ combinations of copies, why
> would those kinds of quantitatively recombined differences such as that
> between 456098209093457976534 and 45609420909345797353 seem insignificant
> to us, but the difference between a belt worn by Elvis and a copy of that
> belt to be demonstrably significant to many people?
> *C. Complexity Driven Novelty*
> Because computationalism assumes *finite* simplicity,  that is, it
> provides only a pseudo-uniqueness by virtue of the relatively low
> statistical probability of large numbers overlapping each other precisely.
> There is no irreducible originality to the original Mona Lisa, only the
> vastness of the physical painting’s microstructure prevents it from being
> exactly reproduced very easily.  Such a perfect reproduction, under
> computationalism is indistinguishable from the original and therefore
> neither can be more original than the other (or if there are unavoidable
> differences due to uncertainty and incompleteness, they would be noise
> differences which we would be of no consequence).
> *This is where information theory departs from realism, since reality
> provides memories and evidence of which Mona Lisa is new and which one was
> painted by Leonardo da Vinci at the beginning of the 16th century in
> Florence, Italy, Earth, Sol, Milky Way Galaxy*.*
> Mathematics can be said to allow for the possibility of novelty only in
> one direction; that of higher complexity. New qualities, by
> computationalism, must arise on the event horizons of something like the
> Universal Dovetailer. If that is the case, it seems odd that the language
> of qualia is one of rich simplicity rather than cumbersome computables.
> With comp, there can be no new ‘one’, but in reality, every human
> experience is exactly that – a new day, a new experience, even if it often
> seems much like the one before. *Numbers don’t work that way. Each
> mechanical result is identical. A = A.  A does not ‘seem much like the A
> before, yet in a new way‘*. This is a huge problem with mathematics and
> theoretical physics. They don’t get the connection between novelty and
> simplicity, so they hope to find it out in the vastness of super-human
> complexity.
> *II. Computation as Puppetry*
> I think that even David Chalmers, who I respect immensely for his
> contributions to philosophy of mind and in communicating the Hard Problem
> missed the a subtle but important distinction. The difference between a
> puppet and a zombie, while superficially innocuous, has profound
> implications for the formulation of a realistic critique of Strong AI. When
> Chalmers introduced or popularized the term zombie in reference to
> hypothetical perfect human duplicates which lack qualia and subjective
> experience, he inadvertently let an unscientific assumption leak in.
> A zombie is supernatural because it implies the *presence of an absence*.
> It is an animated, un-dead cadaver in which a living person is no longer
> present. The unconsciousness of a puppet, however, is merely tautological –
> it is the natural *absence of presence* of consciousness which is the
> case with any symbolic representation of a character, such as a doll,
> cartoon, or emoticon.  A symbolic representation, such as Bugs Bunny, can
> be mass produced using any suitable material substance or communication
> media. Even though Bugs is treated as a unique intellectual property, in
> reality, the title to that property is not unique and can be transferred,
> sold, shared, etc.
> The reason that Intellectual Property law is such a problem is because
> anyone can take some ordinary piece of junk, put a Bugs Bunny picture on
> it, and sell more of it than they would have otherwise. Bugs can’t object
> to having his good name sullied by hack counterfeiters, so the image of
> Bugs Bunny is used both to falsely endorse an inferior product and to
> falsely impugn the reputation of a brand. The problem is, any reasonable
> facsimile of Bugs Bunny is just as authentic, in an Absolute sense, as any
> other. The only true original Bugs Bunny is the one we experience through
> our imagination and the imagination of Mel Blanc and the Looney Tunes
> animators.
> The impulse to reify the legitimacy of intellectual property into law is
> related to the impulse to project agency and awareness onto machines. As a
> branch of the “pathetic fallacy” which takes literally those human
> qualities which have been applied to non-humans as figurative conveniences
> of language, the computationalistic fallacy projects an assumed
> character-hood on the machine as a whole. Reasoning (falsely, I think) that
> since all that our body can see of ourselves is a body, it is the body
> which is the original object from which the subject is produced through its
> functions. Such a conclusion, when we begin from mechanism, seems
> unavoidable at first.
> *III. Hypothesis*
> I propose that we reverse the two assumptions of mathematics above, so that
>    - *Recursion is assumed to be derived from primordial spontaneity
>    rather than the other way around.*
>    - *Novelty can only be meaningful if it re-asserts simplicity in
>    addition to complexity.*This would mean:
>    - *The expanding event horizon of the Universal Dovetailer would have
>    to be composed of recordings of sensed experiences after the fact, rather
>    than precursors to subjective simulation of the computation.*
>    - *Comp is untrue by virtue of diagonalization of immeasurable novelty
>    against incompleteness.*
>    - *Sense out-incompletes arithmetic truth, and therefore leaves it
>    frozen in stasis by comparison in every instant, and in eternity.*
>    - *Computation cannot animate anything except through susceptibility
>    to the pathetic fallacy. *
> This may seem like an unfair or insulting to the many great minds who have
> been pioneering AI theory and development, but that is not my intent. By
> assertively pointing out the need to move from a model of consciousness
> which hinges on simulated spontaneity to a model in which spontaneity can
> never*, by definition *be simulated,  I am trying to express the
> importance and urgency of this shift.  If I am right, the future of human
> understanding depends ultimately on our ability to graduate from the
> cul-de-sac of mechanistic supremacy to the more profound truth of
> rehabilitated animism. Feeling does compute because computation is how the
> masking of feeling into a localized unfeeling becomes possible.
> *
> IV. Reversing the Dovetailer*
> By uncovering the intrinsic antagonism between the above mathematical
> assumptions and the authentic nature of consciousness, it might be possible
> to ascertain a truer model of consciousness by reversing the order of the
> Universal Dovetailer (machine that builds the multiverse out of programs).
>    - *The universality of recursive cardinality reverses as the
>    Diagonalization of the Unique
>    *
>    - *Complexity driven novelty can be reversed by Pushing the UD*.
> *A. 
> Diagonalization<>of 
> the Unique
> *
> Under the hypothesis that computation *lags behind* experience*, no
> simulation of a brain can ever catch up to what a natural person can feel
> through that brain, since the natural person is constantly consuming the
> uniqueness of their experience before it can be measured by anything else*
> .* Since the uniqueness of subjectivity is immeasurable and unprecedented
> within its own inertial frame, no instrument from outside of that frame can
> capture it before it decoheres into cascades of increasingly generic public
> reflections.
> PIP flips the presumption of Universal Recursive Cardinality inherent in
> mathematics so that all novelty exists as truly original simplicity, as
> well as a relatively new complex recombination, such that the continuum of
> novelty extends in both directions. This, if properly understood, should be
> a lightning bolt that recontextualizes the whole of mathematics. It is like
> discovering a new kind of negative number. Things like color and human
> feeling may exploit the addressing scheme that complex computation offers,
> but the important part of color or feeling is not in that address, but in
> the hyper-simplicity and absolute novelty that ‘now’ corresponds to that
> address. The incardinality of sense means that all feelings are more
> primitive than even the number one or the concept of singularity. They are
> rooted in the eternal ‘becoming of one’; before and after cardinality.
> Under PIP, computation is a public repetition of what is irreducibly
> unrepeatable and private. Computation can never get ahead of experience,
> because computation is an a posteriori measurement of it.
> For example, a computer model of what an athlete will do on the field that
> is based on their past performance will always fail to account for the
> possibility that the next performance will be the first time that athlete
> does something that they never have done before and that they *could not
> have done before*. Natural identities (not characters, puppets, etc) are
> not only self-diagonalizing, natural identity itself is
> self-diagonalization. We are that which has not yet experienced the
> totality of its lifetime, and that incompleteness infuses our entire
> experience. The emergence of the unique always cheats prediction, since all
> prediction belongs to the measurements of an expired world which did not
> yet contain the next novelty.
> *B. Pushing the UD* – If the UD is a program which pulls the experienced
> universe behind it as it extends, the computed realm, faster than light,
> ahead of local appearances. It assumes all phenomena are built bottom up
> from generic, interchangeable bits. The hypothesis under PIP is that if
> there were a UD, it would be pushed by experience from the top down, as
> well as recollecting fragments of previous experiences from the bottom up.
> Each experience decays from immeasurable private qualia that is unique into
> public reflections that are generic recombinations of fixed elements.
> Reversing the Dovetailer puts universality on the defense so that it
> becomes a storage device rather than a pseudo-primitive mechina ex deus.
> The primacy of sense is corroborated by the intuition that every measure
> requires a ruler. Some example which is presented as an index for
> comparison. The uniqueness comes first, and the computability follows by
> imitation. The un-numbered Great War becomes World War II only in
> retrospect. The second war does not follow the rule of world wars, it
> creates the rule by virtue of its similarities. The second war is
> unprecedented in its own right, as an original second world war, but unlike
> the number two, it is not literally another World War I. In short,
> experiences do not follow from rules; rules follow from experience.
> *V. Conclusions*
> If we extrapolate the assumptions of Compuationalism out, I think that
> they would predict that the painting of the Mona Lisa is what always
> happens under the mathematical conditions posed by a combination of
> celestial motions, cells, bodies, brains, etc. There can be no truly
> original artwork, as all art works are inevitable under some computable
> probability, even if the the particular work is not predictable
> specifically by computation. Comp makes all originals derivatives of
> duplication. I suggest that it makes more sense that the primordial
> identity of sense experience is a fundamental originality from which
> duplication is derived. The number one is a generic copy – a one-ness which
> comments on an aspect of what is ultimately boundaryless inclusion rather
> than naming originality itself.
> Under Multisense Realism (MSR), the sense-first view ultimately makes the
> most sense but it allows that the counter perspective, in which sense
> follows computation or physics, would appear to be true in another way, one
> which yields meaningful insights that could not be accessed otherwise.
> When we shift our attention from the figure of comp in the background of
> sense to the figure of sense in the background of comp, the relation of
> originality shifts also. With sense first, true originality makes all
> computations into imposters. With computation first, arithmetic truth makes
> local appearances of originality artifacts of machine self-reference. Both
> are trivially true, but if the comp-first view were Absolutely true, there
> would be no plausible justification for such appearances of originality as
> qualitatively significant. A copy and an original should have no greater
> difference than a fifteenth copy and a sixteenth copy, and being the first
> person to discover America should have no more import than being the
> 1,588,237th person to discover America. The title of this post as
> 2013/10/13/2562 would be as good of a title as any other referenceable
> string.
> *This is *not* to suggest that *human* experience lags behind
> neurological computation. MSR proposes a model called eigenmorphism to
> clarify the personal/sub-personal distinction in which neurological-level
> computation corresponds to sub-personal experience rather than personal
> level experience. This explains the disappearance of free will in
> neuroscientific experiments such as Libet, et. al. Human personhood is a
> simple but deep. Simultaneity is relative, and nowhere is that more true
> than along the continuum between the microphysical and the macrophenomenal.
> What can be experimented on publicly is, under MSR, a combination of near
> isomorphic and near contra-isomorphic to private experience.
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