On Sunday, December 22, 2013 7:21:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 Dec 2013, at 17:32, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Thursday, December 19, 2013 10:13:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 19 Dec 2013, at 15:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> On Thursday, December 19, 2013 5:23:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Hello Craig, > >> > >> > >> That is the very well known attempt by Lucas to use Gödel's theorem > >> to refute mechanism. He was not the only one. > >> > >> Most people thinking about this have found the argument, and > >> usually found the mistakes in it. > >> > >> To my knowledge Emil Post is the first to develop both that > >> argument, and to understand that not only that argument does not > >> work, but that the machines can already refute that argument, due > >> to the mechanizability of the diagonalization, made very general by > >> Church thesis. > >> > >> In fact either the argument is presented in an effective way, and > >> then machine can refute it precisely, or the argument is based on > >> some fuzziness, and then it proves nothing. > >> > >> If 'proof' is an inappropriate concept for first person physics, > >> then I would expect that fuzziness would be the only symptom we can > >> expect. The criticism of Lucas seems to not really understand the > >> spirit of Gödel's theorem, but only focus on the letter of its > >> application...which in the case of Gödel's theorem is precisely the > >> opposite of its meaning. > >> > >> The link that Stathis provided demonstrates that Gödel himself > >> understood this: > >> > >> So the following disjunctive conclusion is inevitable: Either > >> mathematics is incompletable in this sense, that its evident axioms > >> can never be comprised in a finite rule, that is to say, the human > >> mind (even within the realm of pure mathematics) infinitely > >> surpasses the powers of any finite machine, or else there exist > >> absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems of the type > >> specified . . . (Gödel 1995: 310). > >> > >> To me it's clear that Gödel means that incompleteness reveals that > >> mathematics is not completable > > > > OK. Even arithmetic. > > > > > > > >> in the sense that it is not enough to contain the reality of human > >> experience, > > > > ? > > > > He says the 'human mind', but I say human experience. > > Mathematics is not enough for the mind and experience of ... the > machines. >
i agree, of course, but how is that view compatible with computationalism? > > > > > > > > > > > > >> not that it proves that mathematics or arithmetic truth is > >> omniscient and omnipotent beyond our wildest dreams. > > > > Arithmetical truth is by definition arithmetically omniscient, but > > certainly not omniscient in general. Indeed to get the whole > > arithmetical "Noùs", Arithmetical truth is still too much weak. All > > what Gödel showed is that arithmetical truth (or any richer notion > > of truth, like set theoretical, group theoretical, etc.) cannot be > > enumerated by machines or effective sound theories. > > > > The issue though is whether that non-enumerablity is a symptom of > > the inadequacy of Noùs to contain Psyche, or a symptom of Noùs being > > so undefinable that it can easily contain Psyche as well as Physics. > > The Noùs is the intelligible reality. It is not computable, but it is > definable. Unlike truth and knowledge or first person experience. > The Noùs is intelligible, but why is it necessarily reality? > > > > I think that Gödel interpreted his own work in the former and you > > are interpreting it in the latter - doesn't mean you're wrong, but I > > agree with him if he thought the former, because Psyche doesn't make > > sense as a part of Noùs. > > That is too much ambiguous. The psyche is not really a part of the > Noùs, which is still purely 3p. > Cool, we agree. > > > > > I see Psyche and Physics as the personal and impersonal > > presentations of sense, > > Machine think the same, with "sense" replaced by arithmetical truth. > Except that the machine has to be confused and for her that truth is > beyond definability, like sense. > I don't think that Psyche can be strongly related to arithmetic truth. There are thematic associations, but I would say that they are by way of reflected Noùs. First person arithmetic truth is intuition of Noùs, and Noùs is alienated sense. The idea that confusion of truth would be necessary to transform quantitative rules into qualitative experiences seems to be a shaky premise at best. It smells like hasty reverse engineering to plug a major hole in comp. It creates an unacknowledged dualism between arithmetic truth/definitions and colorful/magic "confusion" of "definition". > > > > > and Noùs is the re-presentation of physics (meaning physics is re- > > personalized as abstract digital concepts). > > The Noùs has nothing to do with physics a priori. It is the world of > the eternal platonic ideas, or God's ideas. > I understand, yes. I place it here on the upper left (West) side: <http://multisenserealism.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/ouroclub3.jpg?w=504&h=792> > > keep in mind the 8 hypostases: > > - p (truth, not definable in arithmetic, but emulable in some > trivial sense) Instead of p being truth, I see truth as a narrow intellectual sensitivity, not primordial. The primordial capacity to experience, from which comparisons and discernments can self-diverge *must* be more primitive than the notion of right and wrong or is-ness and may-not-be-ness. Before anything can 'be', there must be a the potential for a difference between being and non-being to be experienced. That difference is a quality, not a logic. The logic of the discernment I think must be second order - the primary quality of discernment is a sense of obstruction, a fork in the road which interrupts peace/solitude. > - Bp (provable, believable, assumable, communicable). It splits into > a communicable and non communicable part (some fact about > communication are not communicable) > Instead of belief or proof being primitive or ontological, I see as way down the line and probably only relevant to animals. My Bp would be the split between qualities of experience. Bp's are sense which is qualitative, but pre-split to private and public. They are presences felt within any particular perspective which has diverged from p. Bp is p/*(=/=p), aka diffracted sense, aka Tzimtzum, Dreamtime, or primordial qualia. > - Bp & p (the soul, the knower, ... the psyche is here). It does not > split. > This again places human experience far too high in the schema for my taste. The most profound experiences of psyche are not ones in which a knower is present, but rather one in which notions of a defined self are are challenged or evaporated. For me, Bp & p is the juxtaposition of perspective between one Bp and another. It is Bp*/Bp. The inter-gap between (all) Bp's is reflected as Noùs (impersonal-public quanta) on one side of Bp and Psyche (personal-private qualia) on the other. Psyche then should be understood to be Bp(Bp) and Noùs to be Bp(pB) - the personal sense of the impersonal unsensed. > - Bp & Dt (the intelligible matter, ... matter and physics is here). > It splits in two. > Is Dt distance and time? I see physics without matter as a theory within Noùs. I would say that matter is Bp(pB(Bp)) - the qualia of the quanta-masked alienation of Psyche. > - Bp & Dt & p (the sensible matter. the physical experience, (pain, > pleasure, qualia) are here. It splits also in two parts. > > I don't think that it is possible for matter to be insensible. Matter is microphenomenal experiences seen from a distant perspective in which those experiences are deflated and tokenized through insensitivity, irrelevance, entropy, aesthetic derangement by scale , etc. > > > Physics is the commercialization of sense. Psyche is residential > > sense. Noùs is the hotel...commercialized residence. > > > > > > > > > > > >> > >> > >> An excellent book has been written on that subject by Judson Webb > >> (mechanism, mentalism and metamathematics, reference in the > >> bibliographies in my URL, or in any of my papers). > >> > >> In "conscience and mechanism", I show all the details of why the > >> argument of Lucas is already refuted by Löbian machines, and Lucas > >> main error is reduced to a confusion between Bp and Bp & p. It is > >> an implicit assumption, in the mind of Lucas and Penrose, of self- > >> correctness, or self-consistency. To be sure, I found 49 errors of > >> logic in Lucas' paper, but the main conceptual one is in that self- > >> correctness assertion. > >> > >> Penrose corrected his argument, and understood that it proves only > >> that if we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are, and > >> that gives the math of the 1-indeterminacy, exploited in the > >> arithmetical hypostases. Unfortunately, Penrose did not take that > >> correction into account. > >> > >> Gödel's theorem and Quantum Mechanics could not have been more > >> pleasing for the comp aficionado. > >> Gödel's theorem (+UDA) shows that machine have a rich non trivial > >> theology including physics, and QM confirms the most startling > >> points of the comp physics. > >> > >> > >> As far as QM goes, it would not surprise me in the least that a > >> formal system based on formal measurements is only able to consider > >> itself and fails to locate the sensory experience or the motive > >> 'power on' required to formalize them in the first place. > > > > They don't address that question. > > Formal systems are seen as mathematical object, even number, and > > they exist independently of us, if you still accept arithmetical > > realism. > > > > I accept the realism of arithmetic representation, and that they > > exist independently of us humans, but not that they exist > > independently of all experience or possibility of aesthetic > > presentation. I say no to theoretical realism. > > Realism is always defined with respect to some theory. > Why do you think so. I see realism as undefined and non-theoretical. Realism is the feeling of fact - the preponderance of sensory agreements. I think that no information or theory is necessary or sufficient to establish realism, however realism develops through significance, which does require information to have accumulated but not necessarily within the personal range of awareness. I doubt that molecules experience realism. Realism is the private physics equivalent of gravity, it takes a large accumulation of habits to lend enough inertial mass to be 'real'. > Arithmetical realism is not independent of experience, as arithmetic > produces them necessarily. They are concomitant. > That's one way to see it, but I don't see that arithmetic makes anything real, or that realism is dependent on arithmetic. Realism is more like consistency and depth of qualia. Forms remind us of realism but ultimately what gives the dream weight is that it finds us where we live and brings with it the opportunity to be a burden of conscience and commitment. Arithmetic overlooks realism entirely. It reflects absolute consistency, but as incompleteness shows, it is only an incomplete reflector, so that what it reflects can never be known to be complete. This to me is the exposed seam of Noùs, revealing its origin in alienated Dreamtime rather than Platonic Truth. Gödel Gödel > > > > > > > > > > >> > >> The consistency objections similarly fail to recognize the core > >> capacity to discern consistency from inconsistency. It is not > >> possible to doubt our own consistency without also doubting the > >> consistency of our doubt. > > > > On the contrary, we, and/or machines, cannot not doubt our > > consistency. > > > > But we can't doubt the consistency of doubt. > > Not sure what you mean. In fact we can doubt all assertion of > consistency. That is an assertion of consistency which cannot be doubted. We can doubt consistency, consistently. The doubter of sanity can only be sane on the level from which the doubt is cast. > We cannot doubt that we doubt, but we can doubt of the > consistency of all the proposition. That's a contradiction. If we can't doubt that we doubt, then we can't doubt the consistency of that proposition (that we can doubt). > G does not contain any sentence > beginning with a D, and G*, on the contrary is close from > possibilitation (p ====> Dp). > Lost me there. When I look at logic variables I see signs in another language that seem very rigid, incestuous, and uninteresting. Not that you should care, or that it's something I should be proud of, I'm just saying that unfortunately my experience of (p ====> Dp) is identical to (%^^^^^|| $%). > > > > We believe that it is within our power to disbelieve. > > > > What we cannot doubt is our raw consciousness "here-and-now", which > > might be the first person view of consistency. Consistency (Dt) and > > consciousness have many things in common, but incorrigibility works > > only for consciousness. A good first person description of > > consciousness would be Dt v t, making it non doubtable and trivial > > (which it is from the 1p view). But that is still only a sort of > > approximation. > > > > Eliminative physicalism is the embodiment of doubt of our raw > > consciousness. > > OK. Nice. > Cool > > > > Computationalism and emegentism is also used that way by many. > > Yes. Alas. But I think that this is specifically and definitely refute > with the UDA (and AUDA). Most people believe that comp is an ally to > materialism, but in fact comp is incompatible with most reasonable > form of materialism. of course primitve matter is a fuzzy notion, so > you can adapt it to be compatible with anything, and that's why in > step 8 we still need a bit of Occam, and that's normal as that has to > be the case when we apply a theory to "reality". > As the third wheel to the sensory-motive, matter-energy tricycle the information-theoretic primitive can be thought of as either parallel to the matter-energy or the antithesis of it, depending on where you view it from. Like matter, information is structured and anesthetic. Unlike matter is independent of spacetime. Physics has the same view of information but from the other end. Information to matter is spacetime itself. Spatial configurations in space and logical functions through time allow matter to define itself. All of this is consistent, however, with the absence of sensation and participation. Only the sensory-motive wheel makes no sense in terms of either information or physics, so we should, in my view, obviously assume that it is the fundamental wheel, as it cannot be explained or analyzed into simpler phenomena at all. From there, with the aesthetic wheel as the front end of the tricycle, the physical and mathematical wheels make perfect sense as orthogonal reflections of the front wheel after dividing itself in two. Craig > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
