On Wednesday, December 25, 2013 2:09:07 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 25 Dec 2013, at 16:18, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, December 25, 2013 5:07:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 24 Dec 2013, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> It's straighforward I think. What you are saying is that "this semantic >> trick prevents us from seeing that the truth does not agree with the >> theory". >> >> >> ? (sorry but I still fail to see the connection). I am just saying that >> the discovery of the many non computable attribute of machine makes invalid >> the reasoning against comp invoking non computable aspect of the human mind. >> > > What I'm saying is that the reference to non-computable phenomena means > that they are not likely to be attributes of machines. > > > Yes, that is what you were saying, and my point is that this is not valid. > > Most machine's or number's attributes are not computable. >

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Then how do you know that they are attributes of the number? If I count that I have five fingers, I don't assume that the fingers are attributes of the number five. > > In fact, it is the price of the consistency of Church thesis, as I have > often explained in detail. If interested I could show it to you. > The consistency may come at the expense of reality. > > > > > Comp has no right to ever mention non computable attributes of anything > and still be comp. > > > > ? > Comp is "I am a machine" (3-I). This does not entail that everything is > computable. > Then how do you know that what you are has anything to do with machines? If some things are not computable, what are they, and why would they have anything to do with computation? > Worse, the price of universality entails that many things *about* machine > will necessarily be non-computable. > A large part of computability theory is really incomputability theory, the > studies of the complex hierarchies of non computability and non solvability > in arithmetic and computer science. > Have you considered that they be non computable and non solvable because they aren't directly related to mathematics? > > > > It would have to explain how non-computable phenomena are derived from > computation and what that can even mean. > > > I can do that. I can prove that if a universal number exists, then non > computable relation between numbers exists. > Löbian numbers can actually already prove that about themselves. > How do you know that the numbers aren't just the computable relations between experiences instead? > > > > For comp to be consistent, it can only ask 'what do you mean > 'non-computable?'. > > > For finite to be consistent, it can only ask "what do you mean by > infinite"? Well, OK. But we can do that. > We can ask, but if we say that something is infinite, then our theory of finite can't be complete. > > Even with the intuitive definition, we can do that. > A function (from N to N) is computable iff you can explain in a finite > numbers of words, in a non ambiguous grammar, to a reasonably dumb fellow, > how to compute it, in a finite time, for each of its finite argument. > > Now, a function is not computable, if you cannot do that, even assuming > you are immortal. > > Church thesis say "the number LAMDDA is a universal number". This > simplifies non computability. A function is not computable if you cannot > program it in LAMBDA. The universal number LAMBDA cannot simulate that > function. > > > If LAMBDA is all that you have, how do you know that what it can't program is a number at all? > > > > > If I had a theory of autovehicularism in which cars drive themselves, I > can't then claim that these soft things that sit behind the wheel inside > the car are "non-vehicular attributes of cars". If there can be > non-vehicular attributes of cars then any autovehicular theory of cars is > false. > > >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> It means also that most proposition *about* machine, cannot be found in >>>> a mechanical way. >>>> The simplest examples are that no machine can decide if some arbitrary >>>> machine will stop not, or no machine can decide if two arbitrary machine >>>> compute or not the same function, etc. >>>> If there is no complete theories for machines and/or numbers, it makes >>>> harder to defend non-comp, etc. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> How can computationalism support the idea of there being a >>> non-mechanical way though? What other way is there? >>> >>> >>> Computation with oracle for non computable arithmetical truth, or just >>> some non computable arithmetical truth. Arithmetic is full of them. >>> >> >> >> You are telling me that arithmetic is full of non-arithmetic, >> >> >> No. Full of non computable relations between number. >> > > If they are not computable, how do you know they are part of arithmetic > rather than physics or sense? > > > > Because I work in arithmetic. I use Gödel's arithmetization of > meta-arithmetic. In AUDA, I never leave arithmetic. > Then how do you know that you aren't suffering from the fallacy of the instrument? > > Most of arithmetic is not computable. Truth escapes proof, and many > computations do not stop, without us able to prove this in advance in any > specific way. > I'm afraid you are unaware of computer science. I told you to be cautious > with machines and numbers, because since Gödel we know that we know about > nothing on them. > Except that you don't admit that part of what we might not know about them is that they are unconscious. > > > > > >> >> >> >> so therefore your computationalism - the idea that consciousness and >> physics develop from unconscious computation, includes (unspecified, >> unknowable) non-computationalism too. >> >> >> I don't see what you mean by includes non-computationalism. >> I can try to make sense. yes, the arithmetical reality is 99,999...% non >> computable. But computationalism is not the thesis that everything is >> computable. It is the thesis that the working of my brain can be imitate >> enough closely by a digital machine so that my first person experience will >> not see any difference. >> > > If only 0.000...1% of arithmetic truth is computable, why would a digital > computation be enough to imitate anything other than another digital > computation? > > > It can't, indeed. Computation and imitation or simulation, or emulation, > are absolute notions. But thinking, proving, imaginaing, conceiving, > feeling, observing are relative notions. > I think just the opposite. Simulation is in the eye of the beholder. A shadow can simulate a person, or a mannequin, or a spam bot...emulation is a work of fiction. Thinking, probing etc, are direct experiences, so from the absolute perspective, are part of the only reality. > Don't do "Searle error". It is not because a machine can imitate another > machine, that the first machine has any understanding of the machine that > it imitates. > I don't think machines understand anything. > > > > > The working of a brain has no more chance of being computable than any > other arithmetic truth. > > > If the working of the brain is not computable, then evolution theory will > go awry. > > Thinking being are computable, but they live in a non computable reality. > Arithmetic is a non computable reality, and with comp, physics, inherit a > part of that non computability. > Just because the syntax of communicable thought is computable doesn't mean that the experience behind both the thought and the perception of the brain is computable. > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> How is that better than eliminative materialism? >> >> >> It eliminates nothing but a notion of primitive matter, or the idea that >> physics is the fundamental science on which we can base all the sciences. >> > > I think that quantum mechanics has already done that? > > > Not really. QM still assumes QM. With comp, "QM" has to be a theorem. We > can't assume QM, nor anything physical, to respect the comp formulation of > the mind body problem. > Ok > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> > >>>>> > The issue though is whether that non-enumerablity is a symptom of >>>>> > the inadequacy of Noùs to contain Psyche, or a symptom of Noùs being >>>>> >>>>> > so undefinable that it can easily contain Psyche as well as Physics. >>>>> >>>>> The Noùs is the intelligible reality. It is not computable, but it is >>>>> >>>>> definable. Unlike truth and knowledge or first person experience. >>>>> >>>> >>>> The Noùs is intelligible, but why is it necessarily reality? >>>> >>>> >>>> It is the world of ideas, and with comp it is the world of universal >>>> numbers' idea, which rise up as a consequences of addition and >>>> multiplication. It splits into G and G* (but you need to study a bit of >>>> math for this). >>>> >>> >>> It's not reality then. A dream can be true, or believable, or >>> self-referential, but that doesn't make it real. >>> >>> >>> The dream is true, but its content might not be true. >>> >> >> The dream is identical to its content. Truth within the dream or between >> the dream and waking life does not make the dream into waking life. The >> dream is a real dream, but it is not an experience in the publicly real >> world. >> >> >> The dream is not an 3p experience, but still a real 1p experience, >> related or not to a publicly "real world", if that exist or could be >> defined. >> > > You cannot tell that you are dreaming or not while you are dreaming, but > under normal conditions you *can* in fact tell when you are not dreaming. > > > > It is the exact contrary. You can tell in some dream that you are dreaming > (CF the lucid dreaming notion. Hearne, Laberge, Dement, ... this has been > tested). > But you can be wrong about it. I have had lucid dreams in which I wake up and don't realize that I am just in another dream. When you are awake though - clear headed, sane, and sober, you cannot mistake the world for a dream. > But you are not dreaming, you can't tell if you are dreaming or not (due > to the existence of contra-lucid dreams, where you dream that you know very > well that you are not dreaming). > That's because in the contra-lucid dream, you are still dreaming. There is no contra-contra-lucid state while you are awake. Being awake is unambiguous connection to public experience. > > > > > > > > This is not derived logically or rationally but directly through the > conductivity or transparency of sense. There is a ring of truth and a > weight of reality which is not available to any 1p experience or > theoretical abstraction. The presence of concrete realism is concretely > real, though the contents of that reality is plastic and > perspective-relativistic at the edges. > > > You continue to be very coherent. Non-comp is needed to believe that you > can "know" that you are awake, indeed. > Yes, knowing we are awake is a further fact about experience than can be derived from computation, because computation is metaphor. It has no grounding in experience, but rather is a commentary about experience, within an experience. You can have an experience without a commentary, but there is no commentary without experience. > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >>> Then with comp, "physical reality" is the obtained from the true >>> interference between all computations. It is trully emerging. Something can >>> be true, yet not primitive. >>> >> >> Brute emergence is Santa Claus. Without a logical reason >> >> >> It is given in the UDA. >> > > Why does UDA cause emergence? > > > "it is given in the UD Argument" means: look at the UD Argument. > > In a nutshell, it is due to the internal statistics made by universal > numbers on their possible computations, or universal numbers computing them. > > And here the emergence is pourely logico-arithmetical, climbing in the > hierarchy of the arithmetical predicates (ExP(x), AxP(x), ExAyP(x,y), .... > AxEyAzEtAaEuAkErAsEd P(x,y,z,t,a,u,k,s,d) .... > > Above ExP(x), we escape the computable. > But escaping the computable doesn't mean that we are escaping into feeling or qualia. > > > > >> >> >> to expect that 'realism' should 'emerge' from interference of >> computations, or an empirical example, I think it's a dead end. The >> internet has a lot of computations interfering. Is it becoming more real? >> Not in the slightest. If anything, the internet is making our real lives >> more unreal. >> >> >> They interact, but do not interfere. >> > > ? > > > Only quantum computation can make interfere computations, or the UD (or > sigma_1 arithmetic). Interference can change the probabilities of accessing > some comp states, but it does not change what happen "in" each branch of > the wave, or "in" the sheaf of computations. Interference is a notion > needing many worlds, or many computations. > Not really sure what that means, but it sounds like we are talking about two different things. I'm looking at a general sense of why we should assume that any kind of mathematical interaction can result in realism. > > > > > snip > > > >> Why pain enters through the modality Bp & Dt & p is explainable from how >> the UDA is translated into arithmetic, >> > > What is the UDA before it is arithmetic? You say that it is explainable, > but you don't explain it. The principle should not be that hard to explain. > Arithmetic is perceived as blue or coffee flavored because:________________ > > > > Arithmetic is not perceived as blue. But a cup can be perceived to be blue > because of the existence of a computation emulating the relevant brain at > the right substitution level in arithmetic. (cf I work in comp). > That assumes brains perceive blue, or that blue exists. > > I have to go. Might comment more later. > Ok, sounds good. Craig > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.