On 25 Dec 2013, at 16:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, December 25, 2013 5:07:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 24 Dec 2013, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It's straighforward I think. What you are saying is that "this
semantic trick prevents us from seeing that the truth does not
agree with the theory".
? (sorry but I still fail to see the connection). I am just saying
that the discovery of the many non computable attribute of machine
makes invalid the reasoning against comp invoking non computable
aspect of the human mind.
What I'm saying is that the reference to non-computable phenomena
means that they are not likely to be attributes of machines.
Yes, that is what you were saying, and my point is that this is not
Most machine's or number's attributes are not computable.
In fact, it is the price of the consistency of Church thesis, as I
have often explained in detail. If interested I could show it to you.
Comp has no right to ever mention non computable attributes of
anything and still be comp.
Comp is "I am a machine" (3-I). This does not entail that everything
is computable. Worse, the price of universality entails that many
things *about* machine will necessarily be non-computable.
A large part of computability theory is really incomputability theory,
the studies of the complex hierarchies of non computability and non
solvability in arithmetic and computer science.
It would have to explain how non-computable phenomena are derived
from computation and what that can even mean.
I can do that. I can prove that if a universal number exists, then non
computable relation between numbers exists.
Löbian numbers can actually already prove that about themselves.
For comp to be consistent, it can only ask 'what do you mean 'non-
For finite to be consistent, it can only ask "what do you mean by
infinite"? Well, OK. But we can do that.
Even with the intuitive definition, we can do that.
A function (from N to N) is computable iff you can explain in a finite
numbers of words, in a non ambiguous grammar, to a reasonably dumb
fellow, how to compute it, in a finite time, for each of its finite
Now, a function is not computable, if you cannot do that, even
assuming you are immortal.
Church thesis say "the number LAMDDA is a universal number". This
simplifies non computability. A function is not computable if you
cannot program it in LAMBDA. The universal number LAMBDA cannot
simulate that function.
If I had a theory of autovehicularism in which cars drive
themselves, I can't then claim that these soft things that sit
behind the wheel inside the car are "non-vehicular attributes of
cars". If there can be non-vehicular attributes of cars then any
autovehicular theory of cars is false.
It means also that most proposition *about* machine, cannot be
found in a mechanical way.
The simplest examples are that no machine can decide if some
arbitrary machine will stop not, or no machine can decide if two
arbitrary machine compute or not the same function, etc.
If there is no complete theories for machines and/or numbers, it
makes harder to defend non-comp, etc.
How can computationalism support the idea of there being a non-
mechanical way though? What other way is there?
Computation with oracle for non computable arithmetical truth, or
just some non computable arithmetical truth. Arithmetic is full of
You are telling me that arithmetic is full of non-arithmetic,
No. Full of non computable relations between number.
If they are not computable, how do you know they are part of
arithmetic rather than physics or sense?
Because I work in arithmetic. I use Gödel's arithmetization of meta-
arithmetic. In AUDA, I never leave arithmetic.
Most of arithmetic is not computable. Truth escapes proof, and many
computations do not stop, without us able to prove this in advance in
any specific way.
I'm afraid you are unaware of computer science. I told you to be
cautious with machines and numbers, because since Gödel we know that
we know about nothing on them.
so therefore your computationalism - the idea that consciousness
and physics develop from unconscious computation, includes
(unspecified, unknowable) non-computationalism too.
I don't see what you mean by includes non-computationalism.
I can try to make sense. yes, the arithmetical reality is 99,999...%
non computable. But computationalism is not the thesis that
everything is computable. It is the thesis that the working of my
brain can be imitate enough closely by a digital machine so that my
first person experience will not see any difference.
If only 0.000...1% of arithmetic truth is computable, why would a
digital computation be enough to imitate anything other than another
It can't, indeed. Computation and imitation or simulation, or
emulation, are absolute notions. But thinking, proving, imaginaing,
conceiving, feeling, observing are relative notions.
Don't do "Searle error". It is not because a machine can imitate
another machine, that the first machine has any understanding of the
machine that it imitates.
The working of a brain has no more chance of being computable than
any other arithmetic truth.
If the working of the brain is not computable, then evolution theory
will go awry.
Thinking being are computable, but they live in a non computable
reality. Arithmetic is a non computable reality, and with comp,
physics, inherit a part of that non computability.
How is that better than eliminative materialism?
It eliminates nothing but a notion of primitive matter, or the idea
that physics is the fundamental science on which we can base all the
I think that quantum mechanics has already done that?
Not really. QM still assumes QM. With comp, "QM" has to be a theorem.
We can't assume QM, nor anything physical, to respect the comp
formulation of the mind body problem.
> The issue though is whether that non-enumerablity is a symptom of
> the inadequacy of Noùs to contain Psyche, or a symptom of Noùs
> so undefinable that it can easily contain Psyche as well as
The Noùs is the intelligible reality. It is not computable, but
definable. Unlike truth and knowledge or first person experience.
The Noùs is intelligible, but why is it necessarily reality?
It is the world of ideas, and with comp it is the world of
universal numbers' idea, which rise up as a consequences of
addition and multiplication. It splits into G and G* (but you need
to study a bit of math for this).
It's not reality then. A dream can be true, or believable, or self-
referential, but that doesn't make it real.
The dream is true, but its content might not be true.
The dream is identical to its content. Truth within the dream or
between the dream and waking life does not make the dream into
waking life. The dream is a real dream, but it is not an experience
in the publicly real world.
The dream is not an 3p experience, but still a real 1p experience,
related or not to a publicly "real world", if that exist or could be
You cannot tell that you are dreaming or not while you are dreaming,
but under normal conditions you *can* in fact tell when you are not
It is the exact contrary. You can tell in some dream that you are
dreaming (CF the lucid dreaming notion. Hearne, Laberge, Dement, ...
this has been tested).
But you are not dreaming, you can't tell if you are dreaming or not
(due to the existence of contra-lucid dreams, where you dream that you
know very well that you are not dreaming).
This is not derived logically or rationally but directly through the
conductivity or transparency of sense. There is a ring of truth and
a weight of reality which is not available to any 1p experience or
theoretical abstraction. The presence of concrete realism is
concretely real, though the contents of that reality is plastic and
perspective-relativistic at the edges.
You continue to be very coherent. Non-comp is needed to believe that
you can "know" that you are awake, indeed.
Then with comp, "physical reality" is the obtained from the true
interference between all computations. It is trully emerging.
Something can be true, yet not primitive.
Brute emergence is Santa Claus. Without a logical reason
It is given in the UDA.
Why does UDA cause emergence?
"it is given in the UD Argument" means: look at the UD Argument.
In a nutshell, it is due to the internal statistics made by universal
numbers on their possible computations, or universal numbers computing
And here the emergence is pourely logico-arithmetical, climbing in the
hierarchy of the arithmetical predicates (ExP(x), AxP(x),
ExAyP(x,y), .... AxEyAzEtAaEuAkErAsEd P(x,y,z,t,a,u,k,s,d) ....
Above ExP(x), we escape the computable.
to expect that 'realism' should 'emerge' from interference of
computations, or an empirical example, I think it's a dead end. The
internet has a lot of computations interfering. Is it becoming more
real? Not in the slightest. If anything, the internet is making our
real lives more unreal.
They interact, but do not interfere.
Only quantum computation can make interfere computations, or the UD
(or sigma_1 arithmetic). Interference can change the probabilities of
accessing some comp states, but it does not change what happen "in"
each branch of the wave, or "in" the sheaf of computations.
Interference is a notion needing many worlds, or many computations.
Why pain enters through the modality Bp & Dt & p is explainable from
how the UDA is translated into arithmetic,
What is the UDA before it is arithmetic? You say that it is
explainable, but you don't explain it. The principle should not be
that hard to explain. Arithmetic is perceived as blue or coffee
Arithmetic is not perceived as blue. But a cup can be perceived to be
blue because of the existence of a computation emulating the relevant
brain at the right substitution level in arithmetic. (cf I work in
I have to go. Might comment more later.
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