On 25 Dec 2013, at 16:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, December 25, 2013 5:07:22 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Dec 2013, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote:

It's straighforward I think. What you are saying is that "this semantic trick prevents us from seeing that the truth does not agree with the theory".

? (sorry but I still fail to see the connection). I am just saying that the discovery of the many non computable attribute of machine makes invalid the reasoning against comp invoking non computable aspect of the human mind.

What I'm saying is that the reference to non-computable phenomena means that they are not likely to be attributes of machines.

Yes, that is what you were saying, and my point is that this is not valid.

Most machine's or number's attributes are not computable.

In fact, it is the price of the consistency of Church thesis, as I have often explained in detail. If interested I could show it to you.

Comp has no right to ever mention non computable attributes of anything and still be comp.

Comp is "I am a machine" (3-I). This does not entail that everything is computable. Worse, the price of universality entails that many things *about* machine will necessarily be non-computable. A large part of computability theory is really incomputability theory, the studies of the complex hierarchies of non computability and non solvability in arithmetic and computer science.

It would have to explain how non-computable phenomena are derived from computation and what that can even mean.

I can do that. I can prove that if a universal number exists, then non computable relation between numbers exists.
Löbian numbers can actually already prove that about themselves.

For comp to be consistent, it can only ask 'what do you mean 'non- computable?'.

For finite to be consistent, it can only ask "what do you mean by infinite"? Well, OK. But we can do that.

Even with the intuitive definition, we can do that.
A function (from N to N) is computable iff you can explain in a finite numbers of words, in a non ambiguous grammar, to a reasonably dumb fellow, how to compute it, in a finite time, for each of its finite argument.

Now, a function is not computable, if you cannot do that, even assuming you are immortal.

Church thesis say "the number LAMDDA is a universal number". This simplifies non computability. A function is not computable if you cannot program it in LAMBDA. The universal number LAMBDA cannot simulate that function.

If I had a theory of autovehicularism in which cars drive themselves, I can't then claim that these soft things that sit behind the wheel inside the car are "non-vehicular attributes of cars". If there can be non-vehicular attributes of cars then any autovehicular theory of cars is false.

It means also that most proposition *about* machine, cannot be found in a mechanical way. The simplest examples are that no machine can decide if some arbitrary machine will stop not, or no machine can decide if two arbitrary machine compute or not the same function, etc. If there is no complete theories for machines and/or numbers, it makes harder to defend non-comp, etc.

How can computationalism support the idea of there being a non- mechanical way though? What other way is there?

Computation with oracle for non computable arithmetical truth, or just some non computable arithmetical truth. Arithmetic is full of them.

You are telling me that arithmetic is full of non-arithmetic,

No. Full of non computable relations between number.

If they are not computable, how do you know they are part of arithmetic rather than physics or sense?

Because I work in arithmetic. I use Gödel's arithmetization of meta- arithmetic. In AUDA, I never leave arithmetic.

Most of arithmetic is not computable. Truth escapes proof, and many computations do not stop, without us able to prove this in advance in any specific way. I'm afraid you are unaware of computer science. I told you to be cautious with machines and numbers, because since Gödel we know that we know about nothing on them.

so therefore your computationalism - the idea that consciousness and physics develop from unconscious computation, includes (unspecified, unknowable) non-computationalism too.

I don't see what you mean by includes non-computationalism.
I can try to make sense. yes, the arithmetical reality is 99,999...% non computable. But computationalism is not the thesis that everything is computable. It is the thesis that the working of my brain can be imitate enough closely by a digital machine so that my first person experience will not see any difference.

If only 0.000...1% of arithmetic truth is computable, why would a digital computation be enough to imitate anything other than another digital computation?

It can't, indeed. Computation and imitation or simulation, or emulation, are absolute notions. But thinking, proving, imaginaing, conceiving, feeling, observing are relative notions.

Don't do "Searle error". It is not because a machine can imitate another machine, that the first machine has any understanding of the machine that it imitates.

The working of a brain has no more chance of being computable than any other arithmetic truth.

If the working of the brain is not computable, then evolution theory will go awry.

Thinking being are computable, but they live in a non computable reality. Arithmetic is a non computable reality, and with comp, physics, inherit a part of that non computability.

How is that better than eliminative materialism?

It eliminates nothing but a notion of primitive matter, or the idea that physics is the fundamental science on which we can base all the sciences.

I think that quantum mechanics has already done that?

Not really. QM still assumes QM. With comp, "QM" has to be a theorem. We can't assume QM, nor anything physical, to respect the comp formulation of the mind body problem.

> The issue though is whether that non-enumerablity is a symptom of
> the inadequacy of Noùs to contain Psyche, or a symptom of Noùs being > so undefinable that it can easily contain Psyche as well as Physics.

The Noùs is the intelligible reality. It is not computable, but it is
definable. Unlike truth and knowledge or first person experience.

 The Noùs is intelligible, but why is it necessarily reality?

It is the world of ideas, and with comp it is the world of universal numbers' idea, which rise up as a consequences of addition and multiplication. It splits into G and G* (but you need to study a bit of math for this).

It's not reality then. A dream can be true, or believable, or self- referential, but that doesn't make it real.

The dream is true, but its content might not be true.

The dream is identical to its content. Truth within the dream or between the dream and waking life does not make the dream into waking life. The dream is a real dream, but it is not an experience in the publicly real world.

The dream is not an 3p experience, but still a real 1p experience, related or not to a publicly "real world", if that exist or could be defined.

You cannot tell that you are dreaming or not while you are dreaming, but under normal conditions you *can* in fact tell when you are not dreaming.

It is the exact contrary. You can tell in some dream that you are dreaming (CF the lucid dreaming notion. Hearne, Laberge, Dement, ... this has been tested). But you are not dreaming, you can't tell if you are dreaming or not (due to the existence of contra-lucid dreams, where you dream that you know very well that you are not dreaming).

This is not derived logically or rationally but directly through the conductivity or transparency of sense. There is a ring of truth and a weight of reality which is not available to any 1p experience or theoretical abstraction. The presence of concrete realism is concretely real, though the contents of that reality is plastic and perspective-relativistic at the edges.

You continue to be very coherent. Non-comp is needed to believe that you can "know" that you are awake, indeed.

Then with comp, "physical reality" is the obtained from the true interference between all computations. It is trully emerging. Something can be true, yet not primitive.

Brute emergence is Santa Claus. Without a logical reason

It is given in the UDA.

Why does UDA cause emergence?

"it is given in the UD Argument" means: look at the UD Argument.

In a nutshell, it is due to the internal statistics made by universal numbers on their possible computations, or universal numbers computing them.

And here the emergence is pourely logico-arithmetical, climbing in the hierarchy of the arithmetical predicates (ExP(x), AxP(x), ExAyP(x,y), .... AxEyAzEtAaEuAkErAsEd P(x,y,z,t,a,u,k,s,d) ....

Above ExP(x), we escape the computable.

to expect that 'realism' should 'emerge' from interference of computations, or an empirical example, I think it's a dead end. The internet has a lot of computations interfering. Is it becoming more real? Not in the slightest. If anything, the internet is making our real lives more unreal.

They interact, but do not interfere.


Only quantum computation can make interfere computations, or the UD (or sigma_1 arithmetic). Interference can change the probabilities of accessing some comp states, but it does not change what happen "in" each branch of the wave, or "in" the sheaf of computations. Interference is a notion needing many worlds, or many computations.


Why pain enters through the modality Bp & Dt & p is explainable from how the UDA is translated into arithmetic,

What is the UDA before it is arithmetic? You say that it is explainable, but you don't explain it. The principle should not be that hard to explain. Arithmetic is perceived as blue or coffee flavored because:________________

Arithmetic is not perceived as blue. But a cup can be perceived to be blue because of the existence of a computation emulating the relevant brain at the right substitution level in arithmetic. (cf I work in comp).

I have to go. Might comment more later.



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