Stathis and List: from time to time it is useful to recall what we are thinking behind 'words'. Is the *'brain'* as used in this exchange indeed* 'brainfunction'*? (ref. to "functionalism vs computationalism") To 'preserve *mind*' begs the question how it is differentiated in this exchange? Then again* 'intelligence'* is a flexible item (I start from "inter" - "lego" = to read between the lines, not to stick to the (written?) words proper). The *'non-computable physics'* in Penrose's brain begs the question: *"STILL" or "NOT AT ALL"?* Is the acceptance of the* NEW* a *mind*function only, (increasing the knowledge-base), or can be done by a hypercomputer as well (without proper programming for the so far unknowables' input???) And I hate the references to *'zombies',* whatever one thinks about them. I stick to my common sense* in my agnosticism*.
John Mikes On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 7:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>wrote: > On 16 January 2014 23:08, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > >> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >>> > >>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the > Intel > >>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense > that > >>> a > >>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost > >>> certainly > >>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather, that > a > >>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or > >>> entire planet and all the people on it. > >>> > >>> Jason > >> > >> > >> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational > >> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain > >> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a > >> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of > >> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable), > >> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means > >> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie > >> using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if > >> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable. > >> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely > >> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there > >> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates > >> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism. > > > > > > OK. But in a non standard sense of functionalism, as in the philosophy of > > mind, functionalism is used for a subset of computationalism. > Functionalism > > is computationalism with some (unclear) susbtitution level in mind > (usually > > the neurons). > > > > Now, I would like to see a precise definition of "your" functionalism. If > > you take *all* functions, it becomes trivially true, I think. But any > > restriction on the accepted functions, can perhaps lead to some > interesting > > thesis. For example, the functions computable with this or that oracles, > the > > continuous functions, etc. > > Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain > with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not > be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain, as for > example Penrose proposes. But in that case, you could replace the > brain with whatever other type of device is needed, such as a > hypercomputer, and still preserve the mind. I would say that is > consistent with functionalism but not computationalism. The idea that > replicating the function of the brain by whatever means would not > preserve the mind, i.e. would result in a philosophical zombie, is > inconsistent with functionalism. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
