On 17 Jan 2014, at 23:04, LizR wrote:
On 17 January 2014 18:03, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain
with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not
be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain,
Just to clarify, as I understand Bruno's theory, there is non-
computable physics in the brain. In fact physics is non-computable
in general, BUT the mind is computable, i.e. the level of
substitution that preserves the person is above the fundamental
physics level. I actually think this last is dubious.
I also find it unlikely that the subst level is above the quantum
level. Or at least I think that if it's at the quantum level then we
can guarantee that the duplication arguments would work (assuming we
could duplicate objects at that level, which we can't due to a
fundamental principle...!)
It can, just above that level. And also below, because the UD does not
need to duplicate your body, only the part of the body doing the
computations, and so the UD needs only to prepeare the multiple
copies, so the UD argument go through at step seven, even if the subst
level is below the quantum uncertainty level.
I doubt it, but that is still consistent with comp and its consequence.
Actually Brent, your comment above reads like a refutation of comp,
which I suspect isn't the intention.
Or is it? I read it as
1 Comp says fundamental physics is non-computable.
Partially not computable.
2 Comp says the mind is the result of a computation.
Roughly speaking.
3 Hence if the subst level is at the level of fundamental physics, 2
can't be correct
OK
4 I think it IS at the quantum level, so 2 is wrong, so comp is
wrong - QED :)
?
Bruno
However, surely comp says the mind is the result of computations in
Platonia, rather than in the brain? In fact it says that the brain
doesn't exist (along with everything else, apart from Platonia).
I feel as though my own brain is about to boggle, or would if it
existed. Maybe I should write everything "under erasure" to be on
the safe side!
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