I invite your comment on a statement and question: *There is not
observable difference between "X is non-computable" and "there does not
exist sufficient resources to complete the computation of Y".*
Are X and Y effectively the same thing, everything else being equal? If
there is a difference that makes a difference, what might it be?
On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 5:24 PM, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Stathis and List:
> from time to time it is useful to recall what we are thinking behind
> 'words'. Is the *'brain'* as used in this exchange indeed*
> 'brainfunction'*? (ref. to "functionalism vs computationalism")
> To 'preserve *mind*' begs the question how it is differentiated in this
> Then again* 'intelligence'* is a flexible item (I start from "inter" -
> "lego" = to read between the lines, not to stick to the (written?) words
> The *'non-computable physics'* in Penrose's brain begs the question: *"STILL"
> or "NOT AT ALL"?*
> Is the acceptance of the* NEW* a *mind*function only, (increasing the
> knowledge-base), or can be done by a hypercomputer as well (without proper
> programming for the so far unknowables' input???)
> And I hate the references to *'zombies',* whatever one thinks about them.
> I stick to my common sense* in my agnosticism*.
> John Mikes
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 7:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou
>> On 16 January 2014 23:08, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> > On 16 Jan 2014, at 09:11, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> >> On 16 January 2014 16:26, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>> The computational metaphor in the sense of the brain works like the
>> >>> CPU inside the box on your desk is clearly misleading, but the sense
>> >>> a
>> >>> computer can in theory do everything your brain can do is almost
>> >>> certainly
>> >>> correct. It is not that the brain is like a computer, but rather,
>> that a
>> >>> computer can be like almost anything, including your brain or body, or
>> >>> entire planet and all the people on it.
>> >>> Jason
>> >> I think neuroscientists have, over decades, used the computational
>> >> metaphor in too literal a way. It is obviously not true that the brain
>> >> is a digital computer, just as it is not true that the weather is a
>> >> digital computer. But a digital computer can simulate the behaviour of
>> >> any physical process in the universe (if physics is computable),
>> >> including the behaviour of weather or the human brain. That means
>> >> that, at least, it would be possible to make a philosophical zombie
>> >> using a computer. The only way to avoid this conclusion would be if
>> >> physics, and specifically the physics in the brain, is not computable.
>> >> Pointing out where the non-computable physics is in the brain rarely
>> >> figures on the agenda of the anti-computationalists. And even if there
>> >> is non-computational physics in the brain, that invalidates
>> >> computationalism, but not its superset, functionalism.
>> > OK. But in a non standard sense of functionalism, as in the philosophy
>> > mind, functionalism is used for a subset of computationalism.
>> > is computationalism with some (unclear) susbtitution level in mind
>> > the neurons).
>> > Now, I would like to see a precise definition of "your" functionalism.
>> > you take *all* functions, it becomes trivially true, I think. But any
>> > restriction on the accepted functions, can perhaps lead to some
>> > thesis. For example, the functions computable with this or that
>> oracles, the
>> > continuous functions, etc.
>> Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the brain
>> with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not
>> be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain, as for
>> example Penrose proposes. But in that case, you could replace the
>> brain with whatever other type of device is needed, such as a
>> hypercomputer, and still preserve the mind. I would say that is
>> consistent with functionalism but not computationalism. The idea that
>> replicating the function of the brain by whatever means would not
>> preserve the mind, i.e. would result in a philosophical zombie, is
>> inconsistent with functionalism.
>> Stathis Papaioannou
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