Dear Bruno,
On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 4:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 22 Jan 2014, at 23:16, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Dear Bruno, > > On Tuesday, January 21, 2014 1:11:16 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 21 Jan 2014, at 15:45, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >> >> > It is a phisical definition of computation in the physical world, to >> > distinguish what physical phenomena are computations and what are not. >> > I don´t care about mathematical oddities. >> >> But nobody has found such a definition. Physical computation are only >> recognized as computation in machine that we can build, from subset of >> physical laws, to implement the mathematical definition. >> > > Why not? The solution is staring us in the face. We have to recognize that > the class of Physical systems have related a class of Representations: all > of the possible measurement data of a physical system. We can examine the > measurement data and generate simulations of the physical system in order > to predict its behavior. We call this Physics. > > > I don't see how this could make sense. But if it did, why don't you use it > and provide that definition of "physical computation"? > A computation is any transformation of information. Information is any distinction between two things that makes a difference to a third. What happens when the ability to make distinctions vanishes? > > > > >> >> Then it is a theorem that we cannot recognize something as being a >> computation, even in the arithmetical reality. > > > Sure, but that assumes that one is dealing with an infinite set. The set > of measurable data of a physical system is not infinite. > > > In which theory? As long as we don't have the theory we can't say. I > assume comp, and I show the TOE does not have to axiom anything infinite. > Elementary arithmetic don't assume infinite set. > Elementary Arithmetic does not assume the Integers, implicitly? Take the empty set, put it in a set, put the result in a set, repeat infinitely. Infinity. > > > > > >> We can build one and >> recognize those we built, or we can bet that some process computes, >> like when saying "yes" to a doctor. But there is no general means to >> see if something is a computation or not, and this will depends in >> part of we look at it. >> > > This remark seems to have an interesting implication: that if I examine > some string of code that might happen to be a simulation of a physical > system, I will not be able to know which physical system it is. We get > universality of computation this way? > > >> >> Computability is a notion discovered in math. It is related to the key >> discovery of Turing (also some others) of the universal (Turing) >> machine. >> > > But this universality comes with a great price. It abstracts away time and > space and all the rest of our local reality. > > > But we have discovered it, and it does not abstract space and time away, > it explains the persistent illusion with all possible details. It says only > that adding an axiom at that level cannot work. > > Nature does not need axioms. Donald Hoffman has changed my thinking. > > > > >> >> You can defend naturalism, or physicalism, and you have the right to >> believe in a primitive physical universe. I am agnostic, and I have to >> be, if only because we have not yet decided between Plato and >> Aristotle. We are very ignorant, notably on the mind-body question. >> > > Umm, your agnosticism does not seem very strong. You defend AR very > strongly. > > > No. I debunk invalid argument against it, with some vigor, perhaps. > And yes, I do tend to believe that 17 is prime. > > > > I get that, you defend viridity. Nature does not. Nature evolves. > I have offered you a sketch of a solution to the mind-body problem and you > vigorously attack it with demands for formalism that I cannot write. > > > Only because you are using your informal and unclear ideas to criticize > the UDA's consequence. > > Umm, no. I criticize its assumptions: e.g. That numbers can exist independent of that which they reference. > > > What if both Plato and Aristotle are wrong? > > > What if you are wrong? > > > I am wrong. I try to correct the errors. > > > >> >> I do not defend computationalism. I just show that IF we assume it, >> then we get a constructive and testable platonic theology, which >> explains physics. And I have done a piece of the derivation and tested >> it. >> > > It does not take much to show examples of your defend, Bruno. You are > lying to yourself in claiming "I do not defend computationalism." You > will not consider any alternative. > > > I thought you defend computationalism also. > My case is different. I am agnostic on computationalism. But I study its > consequences. it is my job. > And, actually, I don't see any other way to even just conceive an > alternative. > That is a problem: You cannot imagine an alternative. Your mind is closed. :_( > > > > >> >> If you are right on metaphysical naturalism, with a real ontological >> universe, then comp is wrong. That is all what I say. >> > > > Pfft, that is a false dichotomy. > > > Then UDA is flawed. > > > It is not necessary to assume ontological primitives that have some set of > properties to the exclusion of others. > > > Then your ontology is amorphous. Nothing can emerge from it, without magic. > Magic is when Numbers can exist and have nothing to represent. > > > > You hold onto this dichotomy because it is your tool to defend AR. > > > > I need indeed that 2+2=4. > > > > >> >> > >> > Computation in this sense is a manifestation of teleological entities >> > capable of maintaining his internal structure. >> >> I can accept this as a putative truth about a notion of physical >> computation, but this has not yet been defined. > > > Why do we need a well founded definition? > > > We don't. > > > > I offer a non-well founded definition: Computation is any transformation > of Information. Information does not need to be of physical systems; it can > be of representational systems: like you favored Sigmas and PA. > > > You can't change the definition. Create a new concept if you want, but > computation, or the weaker notion of computability that I need, is well > defined by Church thesis. > > > > > >> "reducing entropy" was >> a good try, less wrong than "quantum computation" (despite here Turing >> universality is verifiable), but it does not work as nature can >> compute without dissipating energy (indeed quantum computers requite >> that). >> > > > Where do you get that rubbish idea? > > > If a quantum computer dissipates energy, the entanglement will propagate > from the environment, and the quantum information will be lost. It has been > shown (by Landauer and zurel, that only erasing information needs energy, > and logicians knows since some work by Hao Wang, in the 1950, (I think) > that universal computability can be obtained with machine which never erase > memory. > (You are Insulting. I take it that you have no argument). > Wrong! You are assuming an a priori existing infinite resource: memory. > > > > Quantum computation has been proven to require resources if it is to be > evaluated. > > > Locally. because you need to cut. But read and paste does not require it. > Only if there is infinite memory available. > > > > Sure, the evolution of the phase is Unitary, but this holds for QM systems > in isolation. The only real example of such is the Universe itself. > > > Which would be enough. > Good! > > > > We get the Wheeler-Dewitt equation with its vanishing of time. > > > This go in the comp direction, although a lot of work remains to have a > clearer view on this. > I use the isomorphism between the unitary evolution of the wavefunction and a computation. > > > >> >> >> > Math do not compute. >> >> That does not make a lot of sense. >> > > Math performs no actions on its own. > > > OK. Math is not even something that we can defined in math. > No self-reference? > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Moreover it is an >> > operational definition closer to everyday reality and includes all >> > that is traditionally called computer science and biology (and >> > sociology) within a wider physical framework. >> >> May be. You did not provide a definition of physical computation. Nor >> of "physical", which might help a skeptic like me. The only one you >> gave was "reducing entropy". But it does not work. It might work for >> life perhaps. It is certainly an interesting idea. But it is not >> "computation". You can't change definition at will, or we are talking >> about different things. The mathematical notion of computation is NOT >> controversial. The physical notion of computation is not even >> existing, and most attempts are controversial. > > > The existence of my desktop computer is obvious to me.... > > > OK. But that "obviousness" is the mystery we can explain in the comp > theory. "obvious" is 1p, and treated in the "& p" hypostases. > Umm, OK. > > Bruno > > > > > > >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > >> > 2014/1/21, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: >> >> >> >> On 20 Jan 2014, at 21:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >> >> >> >>> Computation is understood as whatever made by a digital computer or >> >>> something that can be emulated (or aproximated) by a digital >> >>> computer. >> >> >> >> OK. That's a good definition, and it is correct if ... we assume >> >> Church's thesis. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> So everything is a computation. >> >> >> >> Goddam! Why. Even just about what is true in arithmetic cannot be >> >> emulated by any computer. >> >> >> >> I am afraid you might not really grasp what a computer is, >> >> conceptually. See my answer to stephen yesterday, which shows wahy >> >> Church thesis entails that most attribute of *machines* cannot be >> >> computed by a machine. >> >> >> >> Or think about Cantor theorem. The set of functions from N top N is >> >> not enumerable, yet the set of *computable* functions is enumerable. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> That is a useless definition. because >> >>> it embrace everything. >> >> >> >> For a mathematician, the computable is only a very tiny part of the >> >> truth. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >>> Everything is legoland because everything can be emulated using lego >> >>> pieces? No, my dear legologist. >> >> >> >> Not veything can be emulated by a computer. few things actually in >> >> usual math. Some constructivist reduces math so that everything >> >> becomes computable, but even there, few agree. >> >> In Brouwer intuitionist analysis he uses the axiom "all function are >> >> continuous" or "all functions are computable", but this is very >> >> special approach, and not well suited to study computationalism >> >> (which >> >> becomes trivial somehow there). >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >>> What about this definition? Computation is whatever that reduces >> >>> entropy. >> >> >> >> It will not work, because all computation can be done in a way which >> >> does not change the entropy at all. See Landauer, Zurek, etc. >> >> >> >> Only erasing information change entropy, and you don't need to erase >> >> information to compute. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> In information terms, in the human context, computation is >> >>> whatever that reduces uncertainty producing useful information and >> >>> thus, in the environment of human society, a computer program is >> >>> used >> >>> ultimately to get that information and reduce entropy, that is to >> >>> increase order in society, or at least for the human that uses it. >> >> >> >> The UD generates uncertainty (from inside). >> >> >> >> >> >>> >> >>> A simulation is an special case of the latter. >> >>> >> >>> So there are things that are computations: what the living beings do >> >>> at the chemical, physiological or nervous levels (and rational, >> >>> social >> >>> and technological level in case of humans) . But there are things >> >>> that >> >>> are not computations: almost everything else. >> >> >> >> That is the case with the definition you started above, and which is >> >> the one used by theoretical computer scientist. >> >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> Groups >> >> "Everything List" group. >> >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> >> send an >> >> email to [email protected]. >> >> To post to this group, send email to everything- >> >> [email protected]. >> >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > >> > >> > -- >> > Alberto. >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> > send an email to [email protected]. >> > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/EGO37J5vmrQ/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 [email protected] http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. 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