On 22 January 2014 15:04, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> Computation is the nested, recursive enumeration of uniform symbolic > bodies. The effectiveness of computation derives from its metaphorical > application to material bodies, which can, through physical properties, be > manipulated to deliver results which satisfy our expectations. > Sorry to be dense but what *is* "the nested, recursive enumeration of uniform symbolic bodies" ? > > Computation is not consciousness or sensation. It has no qualities of its > own, and a computer would be just as happy producing Mandelbrot sets as > noise, just as abacus beads are just as happy in a pattern that we might > find meaningful versus one which seems random. > I'm not sure if you are trying to imply something about the nature of the brain and consciousness here, or not. Presumably brain cells "would be just as happy" recognising granny or solving equations - that is, brain cells take in signals from other brain cells, and if the sum of these exceeds some threshold, they send out a signal of their own. This seems fairly similar to what NAND gates do inside a computer. (Or what the cogs in a difference engine do, or the floating weights in the Olympia computer do, etc.) So one could equally well say, "what brain cells do is not consciousness or sensation". Yes presumably brain cells, when lumped together into a brain, manage to *produce* consciousness and sensation, and apparently they do this through a process that is at least somewhat similar to what the logic gates inside computers do. So, to clarify, are you claiming that consciousness *cannot be produced by*computation, or just making the observation that the process of computation is not the same thing as consciousness or sensation, much as my brain isn't the same thing as my thoughts? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
