On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 5:45:51 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > On 29 January 2014 05:39, Craig Weinberg <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > > > On Tuesday, January 28, 2014 8:37:04 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > >> > >> On 27 January 2014 16:07, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > >> >> Do you think Barack Obama is conscious? If you do, then in whatever > >> >> sense > >> >> you understand that, can the Chinese Room also be conscious? Or do > you > >> >> think > >> >> that is impossible? > >> > > >> > > >> > Yes, I think that Barack Obama is conscious, because he is different > >> > from a > >> > building or machine. Buildings and machines cannot be conscious, just > as > >> > pictures of people drinking pictures of water do no experience relief > >> > from > >> > thirst. > >> > >> If Barack Obama revealed that he was a machine, would that change your > >> view of whether machines could be conscious? > > > > > > If nobody ever survived a translation into machine simulation, would > that > > change your mind of whether consciousness can be simulated? > > Yes. But you didn't answer my question. >
Because the question presumes that my position is wrong. In theory, no, if some public figure revealed that they were a machine it would not affect my position, since all that it really means is that machines had become very sophisticated at imitating a person on TV. In practice, sure, it might make me think about it differently if I had no inkling that someone was a machine. > >> > The Chinese Room is not important. You are missing the whole point. > >> > Consciousness is beyond reason and cannot be discovered through > evidence > >> > or > >> > argument, but sensory experience alone. > >> > >> So the Chinese Room is conscious not through evidence or argument, but > >> through sensory experience alone. > > > > > > It would be if the Chinese Room had sensory experience. Our experience > of > > the Chinese Room doesn't matter. > > That's the question: could the Chinese Room have sensory experience? > No > For entities such as Barack Obama, you guess that they do based on > your observation of their behaviour. > Not necessarily. It might also have to do with my expectations plus aesthetic cues which are subconscious and superconscious. > >> What if it were revealed that John Wayne's body while he was asleep on > >> the night of his 40th birthday was annihilated and replaced by a copy? > >> Would you still say there can only be one John Wayne? > > > > > > What if you were annihilated at age 5, but you were replaced by a copy? > > Would you still say that the body using your name was you, even though > you > > are not using it? > > As a matter of fact, I was annihilated when I was 5. The atoms making > up my body then are long gone, dispersed throughout the Earth and > probably even beyond. > Yet you could still have a scar from when you were 4. If you lose an arm, it does not grow back. That's not really relevant to the question though. I was asking if it mattered or not whether your body was 'the same' if you yourself could not experience what it is like to be inside of it. > > >> Why couldn't we > >> make a John Wayne Mk3 long after his death, who would stand in > >> relation to John Wayne Mk2 as John Wayne Mk2 stood in relation to John > >> Wayne Mk1? > > > > > > For the same reason that we can't build a model of Paris out of clay and > > have it actually become Paris. It is because the publicly measurable end > of > > what we are is not sufficient to describe who we have been and who we > are > > becoming. > > Do you think it is impossible that John Wayne was replaced by a copy > at age 40 and nobody noticed? > Probably impossible, definitely outside of the range of realistic possibility. Why, do you think that people get replaced by dopplegangers sometimes? I find it hard to take that seriously, although the tendency of great artists and musicians to suddenly start producing crap at a certain point in their career makes me wonder sometimes. > > >> And he purports to do that by showing that despite external > >> appearances the Chinese Room cannot be conscious because the > >> components are not conscious, which you agree is not a valid argument. > > > > > > It's not because the components are not conscious, it is because the > > description of the Room or 'system' as a whole is consistent with the > > absence of consciousness. This is the double standard of functionalism > which > > makes the hard problem hard. Functionalism asserts on the one hand that > all > > functions of consciousness can be produced mechanically, but then the > effect > > of consciousness could not provide any additional functionality to the > > mechanism. The hard problem exposes the hypocrisy of 'We don't need > > consciousness to explain everything" when consciousness itself is what > needs > > to be explained. The machine's definition of itself does not include > > consciousness. Building machines based on that definition will therefore > not > > include consciousness. > > If the machine were conscious, then its definition of itself would > include consciousness. Functionalism asserts that consciousness > emerges from function, but it's a non sequitar to say that therefore > consciousness should provide additional functionality. > Why would functionalism produce non-functions? If it did, why would it be any different to say that non-functions produce illusions of function? > > >> > My hypotheses go further into the ontology of awareness, so > >> > that we are not limited to the blindness of measurable communication > in > >> > our > >> > empathy, and that our senses extend beyond their own accounts of each > >> > other. > >> > Our intuitive capacities can be more fallible than empirical views > can > >> > measure, but they can also be more veridical than information based > >> > methods > >> > can ever dream of. Intuition, serendipity, and imagination are > required > >> > to > >> > generate the perpetual denationalization of creators ahead of the > >> > created. > >> > This doesn't mean that some people cannot be fooled all of the time > or > >> > that > >> > all of the people can't be fooled some of the time, only that all of > the > >> > people cannot be fooled all of the time. > >> > >> You still haven't come up with any reason better than a vague > >> prejudice why, for example, the AI in the movie "Her" could not be > >> conscious. > > > > > > Because she doesn't need to be conscious. She could just as easily be > > programmed as a chameleon, which analyzes the profile of each user and > > builds an ad hoc identity to reflect some Bayesian extraction of their > > preferences. Would such a chameleon have to be all of the different > people > > that it pretends to be? > > Samantha in the film claims that she was based on the personalities of > the programmers, but then develops her own personality; much as > children may be shaped by the genes and personalities of their parents > but then use this as a basis to develop their own unique > personalities. > > Samantha is fictional, but do you think that if she existed and you > interacted with her over a long period you could maintain your > conviction that she could not possibly be conscious? > "If she existed" is the problem. If we are into the realm of pure fiction, then the responses of a fictional me would have nothing to do with the actual viability of strong AI. It is to say "If the simulation were more perfect than it could ever be, would you still think that it wasn't perfect?" Whether or not I or someone else was fooled in reality or in fantasy has no bearing on the hard problem. People believe in all kinds of people that aren't real, but I have no reason to believe that a hi-def interactive avatar is any more of a person than Mickey Mouse. Craig > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
