Mentioning comp poetry, if we are just conscious mathematical creatures and mathematics has existed long before us, perhaps other conscious math creatures have also existed long before us as Bruno describes.
On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 10:03 AM, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > On 30 January 2014 05:00, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > But you have explained it well. And it's not at all clear to me that >> Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox. It seems there will >> still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical >> processes. No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable >> sentences, which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs. But this still >> leaves beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp >> explains them both. > > > Well, this is the part I've been struggling for years to understand. > However I think I may be starting at least to see the shape of a possible > solution and I'm not sure that it's precisely what you say above. As well > as I can articulate it (which isn't saying much), "causation" in comp seems > to come from more than one direction. There is the trace of the UD, which > instantiates (platonically speaking) all possible computations and hence > constitutes a foundation (or cause) for any and all possibilities > whatsoever. Embedded within this is an infinity of self-referential > machines whose shared indexical "beliefs" effectively compete and > collaborate to filter out a self-consistent, 1p-plural physics from this > computational background. > > Of course, there is a lot of hand-waving going on here; showing precisely > by what measure "normal" indexical computations succeed in outnumbering > pathological competitors seems to be a major open problem with any such > view. But if we grant at least the possibility, then - unlike Borges's > endlessly useless stacks of books - what we have is a "Library of > Programmatic Babel" where self-consistent entities effectively *find > themselves* in the context of a self-selected consistent physics. There is > a sort of multiple-causation in play here, in terms of which it doesn't > perhaps make much sense to think of either the physics or the beliefs as > "epiphenomena" of the other. > > Were this the limit of the scope of the theory, however, the dreaded > Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement would still rear its ugly head. The most we > might appear to lay claim to, up to this point, is a bunch of logical > self-references instantiated in arithmetic. Even were we able to interpret > these references as having something to do with consciousness, this needn't > necessarily amount to "consciousness itself" nor would is it obvious that > extrinsically-defined computational "beliefs" could possibly have access to > (and hence truly refer to) any such intrinsic "dual". This is where we seem > to need a gap to open up that we aren't willing (or able) to grant in the > physical account. > > And the gap that offers itself (following Bruno) is that between the > assertion of an arithmetical belief and its truth. To put it shortly, if a > computational machine asserts an indexical belief of the incorrigible type > that distinguishes, we are to understand, unshareable from shareable > beliefs, then either that belief is true (i.e. truly refers) or it fails to > refer. But if this be the case, then - if we are indeed "machines" in this > sense - we are forced to the conclusion that either our own beliefs and > assertions of this type truly refer, or that we too fail to refer (i.e. we > are zombies). Since this latter conclusion must seem to us to be untenable, > we may conclude that, for machines at least, unshareable ("conscious") > phenomena and arithmetical truth are co-terminous. So the POPJ would seem > to be effectively side-stepped because "extrinsic" beliefs, defined in this > particular way, turn out in fact to be capable of referring truly to an > "intrinsic" dual (i.e. the "inside view" of arithmetical truth). This > strikes me as a neat trick. > > Bruno sometimes poetically describes the comp view as conceiving "life, > the universe and everything" as a sort of multi-player video game, in which > an infinity of indexical filtrations compete and collaborate (through the > FPI) to resolve what the "game physics" will be turn out to be from the > point-of-view of the players. If so, it would seem to encapsulate one of > those virtuous circles that you talk about. Each level contributes > something not fully present in the others and it isn't quite right to say > that there is a bottom turtle that is the ultimate "cause" of everything > else; hence nothing is truly "epiphenomenal". > > David > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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