On 30 Jan 2014, at 06:00, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/29/2014 5:06 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>
wrote:
The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is
that any and all behaviour associated with consciousness -
including, crucially, the articulation of our very thoughts and
beliefs about conscious phenomena - can at least in principle be
exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if this be so, it is very
difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic behaviours could
possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even were its
existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder
would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that
it is hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be
accessible in principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed)
extrinsic system of reference in the first place.
Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of
causal closure.
But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is
NOT in fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent
response to John Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the
extrinsic account (and which of us does not?) then we commit
ourselves to the view that there must be such an account, at some
level, of any behaviour to which we might otherwise wish to impute
a conscious origin. However, my point above is that the problem is
in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a paradox.
The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to
the view that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own -
that purport to refer to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also
be fully explicable extrinsically. But how then could
any such sequence of extrinsic events possibly be linked to
anything outside its causally-closed circle of explanation? To put
this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute certainty "the
fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept that
this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly,
cannot have anything to do) with the fact that I am conscious!
I take no credit for being the originator of this insight,
But you have explained it well. And it's not at all clear to me
that Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox.
Thanks for precising this. I do think that both UDA and AUDA put
(different) light on this. I hope you will follow enough of the "modal
logic". The explanations should be provided by the very existence of
the arithmetical "hypostases".
It seems there will still, in the UD computation, be a closed
account of the physical processes. No doubt it will be
computationally linked with some provable sentences, which Bruno
wants to then identify with beliefs. But this still leaves beliefs
as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp explains
them both.
You are two quick. It is primitive matter which would become
epiphenomenal, but we can just abandon the idea.
Consciousness will be justified by semantical (related with the
arithmetical truth) fixed point for machine having enough belief
(where an explicit belief is made of accessible self-representation).
The Bp and Bp & p views on oneself are in conflict, for all self-
referentially correct machine. Then life teaches this in the hard way.
The same reappears between Bp & Dt and Bp & Dt & p.
Consciousness is close to an instinctive belief in *some* truth,
together with the fact that a part of that truth is true. It is a form
of unconscious and unavoidable faith. It is the zeroth state of the
mystical states.
Bruno
Brent
although it isn't IMO acknowledged as often as it should be,
perhaps because of its very intractability. It's sometimes referred
to as the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement. David Chalmers, for
example, acknowledges it in passing in The Conscious Mind, fails to
offer any solution and then proceeds to ignore it. Gregg Rosenberg
- who if you haven't read perhaps you should - deals with it a
little more explicitly in A Place for Consciousness, but IMO
ultimately also fails to square this particular circle. In fact I
know of no mind-body theory, other than comp, that confronts it
head-on and suggests at least the shape of a possible solution.
That said, do you see what the paradox is and if you do, how
specifically does your theory deal with it?
David
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