On 30 Jan 2014, at 22:08, David Nyman wrote:
On 30 January 2014 16:33, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Not really. Somehow, you conflate levels and points of view. It is a
sin of reductionism :)
You do the "mistake" of those who deny compatibilistic free-will.
Of course we are at the crux of the mind-body problem.
Bruno, my dear and much-valued correspondent, you exasperate me
sometimes by commenting a mere step in my argument as if it were the
conclusion.
Sorry.
I was attempting here to articulate the Paradox of Phenomenal
Judgement in its default form (i.e. assuming a primitively-physical
basis) because this is how it typically arises in the first place.
OK.
Hence I meant this step of the argument to be a kind of reductio of
this position.
OK.
Later in my post I went on to say how that I think comp may avoid
the paradox, which you also commented. If you could perhaps restrain
your enthusiasm and read the post to the end before commenting, you
might occasionally save yourself some typing! Don't mean to scold,
just help :)
OK. But you could also start by saying something like the POPJ assumes
by default a primitively-physical basis).
Especially that it is certainly arguable that comp does not solve it
to our *entire* satisfaction yet.
BTW, although you say that Craig can perhaps avoid the POPJ by
appealing to a non-comp theory, ISTM that the problem of reference
is still there so long as his "fundamental-sense" theory relies on
causally-closed extrinsic *appearances".
I think Craig does not believe that his fundamental sense relies on
causally-closed extrinsic *appearance*. he would say that sense makes
those causally-closed extrinsic appearance, which makes sense in comp,
actually (to bad he believes only non comp guaranties that).
Of course his theory does not explain mind, consciousness or sense, as
it assumes it.
And I fail to see how it relates to the *appearances*, except by
making a sort of naive identification of sense with some matter (up to
some "convolution" which he does not describe in any precise way).
However, under questioning he's so far been rather unclear about
this aspect of his theory.
That's clear. He assumes sense, and try to make it into a form of
matter, sometimes. May be the last reference to tTegmark might help
him. It seems to be a form of panpsychism.
Are such appearances causally closed? Do we not rely on such
"physical" consistency? Maybe, sometimes, who knows, whatever. I
might go so far as to say that he's been dodging the question.
By assuming sense, he dodges the mind. And by being unclear of matter,
well he might dodge the issue of matter too.
It is still better than the person elimination of the materialists.
That said, if I'm even approximately right about this fundamental
problem of reference, then of theories known to me, only comp
confronts the POPJ directly.
Well, I agree. Even more for the math part. I hope I will be able to
give the ideas behind the formulas.
The plausible resolution of the paradox, if I've understood you,
lies in the capability of the machine to refer to non-shareable but
incorrigible truths beyond formal proof and demonstration.
Yes.
In more than one sense, and those sense are related.
One sense can be attributed to Gunderson, and is very simple. Once you
have build some numbers of robots, having enough cognitive abilities
to recognize themselves and name the other robots, it will recognize
some basic difference between itself and the other, just by the virtue
of being itself.
Like "not seeing his own neck".
UDA does not need more than that simple assymetry. It provides the
comp solution of the problem why am I the W person and not the M
person. A negative solution, as it says "nobody could have predicted
that".
Here appears already a stock of 1-truth, or 1-1 truth, which are non
logically justifiable and sometimes unexpressible (having non definite
name or description).
But formally, we get more senses for this, all deriving directly or
indirectly from incompleteness.
If you want the usual boolean logic of any extrinsic 3p, enough rich
to describe itself (like we could ask for an explanatively close
physics) extends into a modal logic, naturally, when that 3p self is
taken into account. That's the modal logic G. G is the logic of the 3p
self in a 3p reality.
But by incompleteness, some truth about that 3p self cannot be
logically justifiable by that 3p self, and Solovay theorems gives the
precious gift of a modal logic of the whole self-referential truth
(whole at the propositional modal logic level: it is not the whole
truth!). That is the logic G*.
To give the simple but important example, the consistency, that it is
the non provability of the false (<>t = ~[]f) is an example of true
statement (trivially if we limit ourself to sound machines), which is
not provable by the machine (by the 3p self about its 3p self, at the
right level of descriotion: here by construction).
G* is decidable, and so a correct machine can "produce" a lot of truth
about itself that she cannot justify logically.
G and G* still operate purely in the extrinsic (to use your term for
the 3p, if you don't mind).
If the machine can grasp G and in a different way G*, she might decide
to pick up some truth in G*, and bring them back on earth, by adding
them to G. (and later, comp will be something like that, somehow).
This can be done in many ways. Adding the truth "<>t" at the bottom
level makes the machine inconsistent. Adding it slightly higher, makes
the machine more competent, more relatively speedy.
But instead of adding them, the difference between rational belief, or
proof, or justification, with truth, entails that we can apply the
definition of the knower, that is the first person, by Theaetetus. We
add "<>t" to the definition of a new modal box, like []p & <>t.
We can define, in arithmetical terms, a knowledge notion, by defining
to "know p", by "to believe p" together with the truth of p, and the
weaker notion above ([]p & <>t)
It works, and this define, in arithmetical terms, a notion of knower,
(and observer) and the knower obeys a temporal logic of subjective
state of knowledge close to Brouwer theory of the subject (an
intuitionist logic). It is S4Grz.
Then - if we are machines - our own incontrovertible faith in, and
ability to refer to, such indexical "facts" may serve as the warrant
that also delivers our fellow machines from zombie-hood.
Yes.
Not only that. It makes also the rational machines open to the idea
that humans are non zombie *too*.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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