On 03 Feb 2014, at 21:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, February 3, 2014 3:21:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Feb 2014, at 20:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I have no problem with (what I understand of) Bruno's schema,
except that like all computational or information-theoretic
schemas, it places logical objects before sensory subjects and
fails to identify the aesthetic monism beneath the two. I see that
functionalism cannot work because consciousness cannot have a
function. Instead, the universe develops function to extend the
aesthetic depths of its contents - the kinds of sense and the
degrees of sense making within them.
If you put sense at the base, and still have no function for
consciousness, then your theory dismiss the only reason why I can
prefer sense at the base.
The function of consciousness is to intensify the range and
intensity of aesthetic qualities. That's the point of the sense
primitive. There is no further function, just as function itself has
no function.
OK. So consciousness has a function.
Then, yes, for the ontology I want something understandable in the
3p way, like numbers or programs. That is why I appreciate comp, it
makes that possible. Then we can test the consequences.
I have no problem with that, I just suggest that it is inside out
from the absolute perspective, so that where we seek to approach the
absolute (consciousness itself), our expectations about physics and
computation need to be inverted.
That's the consequence of comp. Non-comp has to be invented to prevent
that reversion.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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