On 31 Jan 2014, at 20:24, David Nyman wrote:
On 31 January 2014 18:30, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
<snip>
OK. But you could also start by saying something like the POPJ
assumes by default a primitively-physical basis).
Especially that it is certainly arguable that comp does not solve it
to our *entire* satisfaction yet.
OK. Actually, I'm trying to persuade Craig that it still applies on
a primitively-sensory basis. But not in comp. Hopefully.
BTW, although you say that Craig can perhaps avoid the POPJ by
appealing to a non-comp theory, ISTM that the problem of reference
is still there so long as his "fundamental-sense" theory relies on
causally-closed extrinsic *appearances".
I think Craig does not believe that his fundamental sense relies on
causally-closed extrinsic *appearance*. he would say that sense
makes those causally-closed extrinsic appearance, which makes sense
in comp, actually (to bad he believes only non comp guaranties that).
Of course his theory does not explain mind, consciousness or sense,
as it assumes it.
And I fail to see how it relates to the *appearances*, except by
making a sort of naive identification of sense with some matter (up
to some "convolution" which he does not describe in any precise way).
But if he makes that naive identification (modulo any convolution,
which I've offered him the opportunity to explain) the POPJ can
still bite him.
However, under questioning he's so far been rather unclear about
this aspect of his theory.
That's clear. He assumes sense, and try to make it into a form of
matter, sometimes. May be the last reference to tTegmark might help
him. It seems to be a form of panpsychism.
It would seem so. But POPJ can still bite panpsychism, I think,
although this doesn't seem to be widely recognised. My post to Craig
elaborates on this.
I am afraid he is too much vague to be really bitten. but you can put
him in the corner, if patient enough, but then he might change the
subject, or something.
The eventual contradiction is probably in the fact that he needs
extrinsic causality to have "machines zombies", but he needs the
absence of extrinsic causality (like in comp, somehow) to escape the
POPJ.
So I think you are right. Panpsychism can be bitten by POPJ when "Pan"
contains non psychic things, as Craig alludes often (but unclearly) to
those non psychic things, like zombies bodies.
Are such appearances causally closed? Do we not rely on such
"physical" consistency? Maybe, sometimes, who knows, whatever. I
might go so far as to say that he's been dodging the question.
By assuming sense, he dodges the mind. And by being unclear of
matter, well he might dodge the issue of matter too.
It is still better than the person elimination of the materialists.
I agree.
<snip>
The plausible resolution of the paradox, if I've understood you,
lies in the capability of the machine to refer to non-shareable but
incorrigible truths beyond formal proof and demonstration.
Yes.
In more than one sense, and those sense are related.
One sense can be attributed to Gunderson, and is very simple. Once
you have build some numbers of robots, having enough cognitive
abilities to recognize themselves and name the other robots, it will
recognize some basic difference between itself and the other, just
by the virtue of being itself.
Like "not seeing his own neck".
UDA does not need more than that simple assymetry. It provides the
comp solution of the problem why am I the W person and not the M
person. A negative solution, as it says "nobody could have predicted
that".
Here appears already a stock of 1-truth, or 1-1 truth, which are non
logically justifiable and sometimes unexpressible (having non
definite name or description).
But formally, we get more senses for this, all deriving directly or
indirectly from incompleteness.
If you want the usual boolean logic of any extrinsic 3p, enough rich
to describe itself (like we could ask for an explanatively close
physics) extends into a modal logic, naturally, when that 3p self is
taken into account. That's the modal logic G. G is the logic of the
3p self in a 3p reality.
OK.
But by incompleteness, some truth about that 3p self cannot be
logically justifiable by that 3p self, and Solovay theorems gives
the precious gift of a modal logic of the whole self-referential
truth (whole at the propositional modal logic level: it is not the
whole truth!). That is the logic G*.
OK.
To give the simple but important example, the consistency, that it
is the non provability of the false (<>t = ~[]f) is an example of
true statement (trivially if we limit ourself to sound machines),
which is not provable by the machine (by the 3p self about its 3p
self, at the right level of descriotion: here by construction).
G* is decidable, and so a correct machine can "produce" a lot of
truth about itself that she cannot justify logically.
G and G* still operate purely in the extrinsic (to use your term for
the 3p, if you don't mind).
OK.
If the machine can grasp G and in a different way G*, she might
decide to pick up some truth in G*, and bring them back on earth, by
adding them to G. (and later, comp will be something like that,
somehow).
This can be done in many ways. Adding the truth "<>t" at the bottom
level makes the machine inconsistent. Adding it slightly higher,
makes the machine more competent, more relatively speedy.
Is the acceleration achieved by using this truth as a "bet" on a
reality?
Yes. You will see that <>t is a sort of bet on the existence of some
reality (satisfying it). Note that all reality satisfy t, so <>t is a
bet on reality, in general.
If so this, reminds me of Daniel Kahneman's "system 1" (intuitive
decision making), described in his book Thinking Fast and Slow.
System 1 is faster than rational evaluation (system 2), but at the
risk of error if used outside its domain of application. In any
case, the whole notion makes sense, ISTM, in the context of the
requirement to survive in an unknowable "extrinsic" environment that
can only be approximated "intrinsically". We are forced to bet in
order to survive, but at the risk of annihilation if we bet wrongly.
No guarantees.
<>t -> <>[]f (read: "If consistent("0=0") then
consistent("provable("0=1")")" )
(if there is a reality, there is a reality in which I am wrong on it).
But instead of adding them, the difference between rational belief,
or proof, or justification, with truth, entails that we can apply
the definition of the knower, that is the first person, by
Theaetetus. We add "<>t" to the definition of a new modal box, like
[]p & <>t.
We can define, in arithmetical terms, a knowledge notion, by
defining to "know p", by "to believe p" together with the truth of
p, and the weaker notion above ([]p & <>t)
It works, and this define, in arithmetical terms, a notion of
knower, (and observer) and the knower obeys a temporal logic of
subjective state of knowledge close to Brouwer theory of the subject
(an intuitionist logic). It is S4Grz.
That these different logics already exist is amazing.
Yes. They would all collapse into CPL (classical propositional logic)
without incompleteness.
Then - if we are machines - our own incontrovertible faith in, and
ability to refer to, such indexical "facts" may serve as the
warrant that also delivers our fellow machines from zombie-hood.
Yes.
Not only that. It makes also the rational machines open to the idea
that humans are non zombie *too*.
That's a relief!
Well, not so much when you are confronted to irrational machines or
humans, alas ...
Even if it is false that nazis believed that jewish or homosexual are
p-zombies, they were able to treat them as such, and transforming them
to make them into Dario Argento sort of zombies.
Never underestimate the irrationality of the humans.
Bruno
David
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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