On 11 Feb 2014, at 01:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/10/2014 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2014, at 06:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/9/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Even on his argument, that nobody understand but him, against
step 3? Then I invite you to attempt to explain it to us.
I think I understand it. Asking the question "which will you be"
in the MW experiment is ambiguous because "you" is duplicated.
But that question is John Clark's invention. I never ask it. The
question asked is about your FIRST PERSON expectation about 1-your
future. It cannot be ambiguous when we assume comp.
Sure it is. What does "your first person expectation" refer to.
It refers to the two possible consistent extensions {W, M}. With W
(resp. M) describes the experience of pushing a button in Helsinki,
opening a reconstitution box door in W, (resp. M), and noting W,
(resp. M), in the personal diary.
Does it ask what will your 1-p experience be?
Or does it ask what is your 1-p feeling about where you will be?
It asks to the H-guy, "what do expect to live".
To see in ambiguity here consists in being ambiguous about "you".
But I have explicitely introduced the 1p/3p distinction to make
this non ambiguous. Comp says that in the 3p view you will be at
both place, and that in the 1-view, you will (with probability 1)
feel to be at only one place.
I could equally say you will feel to be both places.
By changing the meaning of the word. "you will feel to be in both
places" is correct in the 3-1p, but incorrect in the 1p of the
experiencer. if not he will say "Ah! Extraordinary, I can write (still
in Helsinki): "I will feel to be both places!". then he pushes on the
button, and both write "Shit, I was wrong, I feel to be in only one
place, and I guess that the question was about that place". Then I get
the correct meaning, and we, I mean John Clark, can move on step 4.
Either "you" is ambiguous and refers to either the M-man or the W-
man, but we don't know which. Or "you" refers to anyone who was the
H-man, i.e. both the M-man and the W-man.
There is no ambiguity at all. Before the duplication, there is a 1-you
= 3-you in Helsinki, after the duplication, there are two 1-you, and
two 3-you, from the 3p. And only one 1-you and one 3p-you (the
doppelganger) from both 1p-views. The question is which one you expect
to be, and with what chance.
The experience can be iterated, and it is simple to show that it is
equivalent to a Bernouilli distribution, with a normal limit.
There is no ambiguity at all. Only uncertainty or indeterminacy.
That is the point.
One can quite reasonably say that neither the M-man or the W-man
is the H-man, the H-man has been destroyed.
The original brain is also destroyed, and if the H-man died here,
the guy who accepted an artificial brain dies too, and comp is false.
But that's the confusing point. So what if they guy receiving the
artificial brain dies, he might still say yes to the doctor since
the alternative is to certainly die in some other way. Why should he
not care about someone who is not biological continuous with him but
has the same memories, personality, etc.?
Why not. But that is no more the comp hypothesis. It is the impostor
theory. It entails too the reversal, but with a complex rephrasing at
each line, and I guess it predicts, like the machine, that we are
truly dying at each instant. To stop smoking appears here as a true
compassionate act for the poor guy who inherit your body in some
instants.
This is exactly the position taken by a professor of philosophy I
happen to know.
He should publish.
This makes the probability questions trivial: What is the
probability the M-man sees Moscow? It's 1.
But the probability is never asked to the M-man. It is always asked
to the H-man. Of course, if he dies, then the probability is 0. But
then comp is false, and this shows that comp implies the
indeterminacy.
The difference between John and me is that I accepted the thought
experiment as a model of Everett's wave function splitting in
order to see where it would lead.
If the Everett indeterminacy can be explained by the comp
indeterminacy, then how could the comp indeterminacy not make sense?
You lost me, here.
Even if it doesn't make sense it can illustrate how to think about
indeterminacy due to worlds splitting.
If it can illustrate something, it means that it makes sense.
If the transport booth were set to send its occupant to either
Moscow or Washington according to spin measurement then in the
Everett model the |M>+|W> is a superposition which decoherence
quickly turns into a mixture.
And the comp-indeterminacy can be used, in some form, to explain how
this happens without any collapse, but the relative realities (me in
M) and (me in W) coexists.
There is nothing ambiguous, and if someone doubt between different
meaning, the next steps can only help them to make the disambiguation
by themselves.
You did assert once that you got the UDA1-7, didn't you? Why do you
suddenly use Clark's ambiguous reformulation which makes things
ambiguous by his abstraction from the definition I gave for the 1p-3p
distinction?
If you grasp the 3p definitions of both the 1p and 3p views, the FPI
seems to me to be almost trivial to grasp.
To refute it, you have to provide an algorithm of prediction, or an
argument that such an algorithm can exist in principle. By definition,
all copies must agree with the output of that algorithm. If not, you
consider all of them, but one, as zombie or impostors, which is not-
comp (Clark has made clear that he agrees with this: both the M and W
guys are as much genuine continuations of the H-guy).
Bruno
Brent
Please, don't quote Clarks fake and ambiguous reformulation of step
3. Reason from what I say, and not on what some people deforms
(apparently to avoid the question asked). never use "you". Always
use 1-you or 3-you, or 3-1-you, etc.
Bruno
Brent
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