2014-02-11 8:35 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>: > > > > 2014-02-11 3:59 GMT+01:00 meekerdb <[email protected]>: > > On 2/10/2014 5:35 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 11 February 2014 13:42, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 2/10/2014 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 10 Feb 2014, at 06:08, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 2/9/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Even on his argument, that nobody understand but him, against step 3? >>> Then I invite you to attempt to explain it to us. >>> >>> >>> >>> I think I understand it. Asking the question "which will you be" in the >>> MW experiment is ambiguous because "you" is duplicated. >>> >>> >>> But that question is John Clark's invention. I never ask it. The >>> question asked is about your FIRST PERSON expectation about 1-your future. >>> It cannot be ambiguous when we assume comp. >>> >>> Sure it is. What does "your first person expectation" refer to. Does >>> it ask what will your 1-p experience be? Or does it ask what is your 1-p >>> feeling about where you will be? >>> >> >> Consider a quantum measurement instead. Do we have an expectation of 1p >> experience when we check if a photon's been reflected or transmitted? We >> assign a probability to each outcome, surely? Why is Bruno's duplicator >> different? >> >> >> There are two different people you can ask, "How did the experiment come >> out." >> > > There is also two people with MWI... the fact that they can meet change > nothing (also we could setup the comp duplication experience to forbid > completely the hypothetical meaning >
read "meeting" not "meaning" > by reconstructing the W man 200 years later than the M man). Either the > question is meaningful under MWI and comp duplication, either it is not > meaningful in both case... what I see, is nobody is reluctant to use > probabilities with MWI, so should they under comp duplication... > > Quentin > >> >> >> (We seem to have been around in a loop on this about 100 times...) >> >> >> I agree and I'm willing to take it as hypothetical that it doesn't make a >> difference, at least till I understand the whole argument. But I suspect >> that it could. It might require that in step a whole world be created and >> that I think could make a difference. >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
