On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote:
On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote:
>
> You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-)
>
> (Sorry!)
>
> I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's
> likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory
> retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive
> result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently...
>
I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable
facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM.
I said "apparently" because I have no idea how he does it.
I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate
consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and
consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is
the bet of "saying yes to the doctor".
With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only simulate
the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is
that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be
simulated or emulated.
But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those have
a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we
simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So
simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we
can't simulate it. Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not
be anything physical;
It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical.
So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness. But I think we can still
produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover.
it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths. This explains why aspects of
consciousness are ineffable. It's because conscious processes can prove Goedel's
theorem and so know that some truths are unprovable. Bruno takes "qualia are
ineffable" and "some arithmetical truths are unprovable" and postulates
"ineffable=unprovable".
Not really.
I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion, but some logician
did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases. Qualia are related to non
communicable, but only *indirectly* through G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and
S4Grz1),
Don't understand that.
which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for the UD measure, due
to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need []p & p, or []p & Dt, or []p & Dt & p.
This allows him to identify specifically what makes some computer program conscious:
it's the ability to do induction and diagnoalization and prove Goedel's theorems.
OK. But it is not a computable identification. We cannot recognize, neither from code,
nor from computational activity, is an entity is Löbian or not.
I think you mean "we cannot *prove*". We can recognize intelligent behavior
and infer Lobian.
We can just prove non constructively that such programs and computations exists in a non
computable distribution.
My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in the sense
required for this argument.
Then you have to find me two numbers a and b contradicting the axioms of RA.
I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just
about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the
"ineffable=unprovable" identification is gratuitous.
This lowers the level only, unless you add something non computable in the local
environment.
There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable.
That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?)
Once you accept comp, it is standard computer science to show that *all* dreams are
emulated in Arithmetic.
?? But the argument proposes emulating dreams by a physical (but inert) computer - not
Arithmetic.
are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way, I think to
make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate a whole world in which
the consciousness would then exist *relative* to that world.
I guess we will need to come back on step 8, soon or later. Not sure what you mean by
"inert computation"? re you alluding to the "inert" device in Maudlin and MGA,
Yes.
Brent
or to the static computations which exist in arithmetic. In that case it is the usual
argument against block-time or block-universe, and this has been debunked repeatedly.
Time and activity are indexicals (indeed translated into *variants* of G*).
Bruno
Brent
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