On Sunday, February 16, 2014 9:58:24 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 16 Feb 2014, at 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, February 16, 2014 5:29:09 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 16 Feb 2014, at 00:06, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Saturday, February 15, 2014 3:43:29 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: > > On 15 February 2014 18:32, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > You can't copy awareness. Awareness is what is uncopyable, not just > because awareness is special, but because it is ontologically perpendicular > to the possibility of simulation. All attempts to copy awareness result in > a doll. > > > Does that then entail that if a conscious amoeba were to fission, the > resulting two amoebae would be unconscious? Or only one of them? > > > That's not a copy of an amoeba, reproducing its body is part of what an > amoeba does. > > > But the evidences we have is that amoeba use the Dx = "xx" method for the > self-copy (indeed I discovered it by looking at amoeba and reading book on > molecular biology, before finding the logicians got it). > > > That makes sense to me because the amoeba's body will look like a copy to > our body's senses. A 3p view of 3p is truncated and filled in generically. > The 1p amoeba is the localized subset of the entire history of amoeba-like > experience, not just the isolated maintainer of the 3p amoeba body. When we > look for 3p evidence, we will not necessarily see 1p authenticity as > certain evidence. The authenticity has to be felt through the feeling as > semi-describable aesthetic qualities...which is where we get a lot of > unscientific sounding terms like life force, kundalini, prana, xi, etc. > These kind of numinous qualities apply not just to living beings, but to > works of art, sacred places, etc, if you are subjectively receptive to > their authenticity. They do not give us infallible proof of originality, > but they are reminders that there is an important difference between > 'something' and *the real thing*. > > > You are just saying that you are not subjectively receptive to the > machines" 1p. >
No, I'm saying that I am receptive to the absence of machine 1p (and I'm not by any means alone in that sensitivity). The uncanny valley is not merely the failure to detect the presence of subjectivity it is the positive detection of the failed attempt of an object disguised as a subject. > > > > > > > Copy and self-copy are different, for machines too, but in the case under > study, this does not entail any observable difference, and if you are > right, it means that the copy doll will be a zombie. > > > The reproduction of the amoeba's body is an approximate copy from our 3p > perspective, but the Xp copier itself cannot be copied. It is not only > unique, but it is uniqueness itself - meta-unique if you like. The Xp > copier is consciousness, who provides both the meaning and the method of > copying. > > > I can understand that consciousness is a selector, but it makes no sense > for me to say it is the copier. > Why? The phenomenon of perceptual fill-in is a pretty vivid example of how copying is part of how consciousness produces representation. > > > > > All arithmetic truth relates only to the 3p view of Xp copying language. > > > Why? I illustrate that this is not the case, already with the most known > definition of knowledge. > Knowledge and definition are both 3p expectations also. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > Craig > > > Bruno > > > > > > > David > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > <span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse > ... -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
