On 17 February 2014 02:34, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> On 16 February 2014 17:42, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>> I don't disagree, but I think this formulation leaves "meaning" as
>> mysterious and one may ask why consciousness creates meaning.  I think
>> meaning comes from being able to act in the world to realize values.  And it
>> doesn't require consciousness, at least not human like consciousness.  The
>> Mars Rover acts to fulfill a mission plan and so rocks and hills have
>> meaning for it.
>
>
> Unfortunately this seems to me to beg the questions it seeks to answer. The
> Mars Rover certainly acts in a manner consistent with rocks and hills having
> meaning for it (based on our empathic identification with its situation) but
> its behaviour can equally be attributed to physics alone (as indeed can
> ours, under the same physicalist assumptions). But I agree that meaning is
> related to value and hence cries out for an explanation of value that
> resists elimination by reduction to an account in purely physical terms.
> This requirement probably implies some necessary relation between meaning
> and consciousness, or at least self-reference. It may be that the
> ramifications of computational reference may ultimately lead to such an
> explanation, but that is beyond my competence to assess. Right now I don't
> have any other suggestions.
>
> David

I think Brent feels he has the answer to the question of what is
needed to give rise to meaning/feeling/consciousness etc. His position
is quite attractive and consistent, but I am not sure how to convince
myself that it is true.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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