2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark <[email protected]>: > On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>wrote: > > > Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the >> argument that you can't meet your doppelganger, >> > > So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic > in doing so. No can do. >
That's not what I was asking, I was asking that if you use your meet doppelganger argument, ==> read the next quote. > > > or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability >> calculus meaningless. >> > > If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with > both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be > meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum > Mechanics works as well as it does. > The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI case you accept probability calculus. > But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works, that's > already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self, > He does not, and certainly does not at step 3. > and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works > He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists under MWI) > or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with that; > It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question asked. > as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because you > remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason. > As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question. > > And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent. > They are from the probability POV. > According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever > interacting with your doppelganger > And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ? > and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no > problem; > They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. So I'll try one last time, and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no questions and explanation from your part. So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument that what we will do (duplicating you) is possible. So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly identical room), the only difference in each room is that one has the left door open and one has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll press the button ? 1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No 2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you* expect to see both event simultaneously ? If you answer 'Yes' at the 2nd question, do you think you can put a probability to see the left door opened (or reversely the right door) ? Yes/No If you answer 'No', why can't you assign a probability to see each door ? As I see it, there are 2 possible events, so each as a 0.5 probability of occurence... If not why not ? Why in the MWI case, you accept the 0.5 probability ? If you follow strictly the protocol, MWI and this experiment are equivalent, and are not about your personal identity... If you answer both No to the 1st and 2nd question, please develop what you will expect to see when you press the button ? Quentin > but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact with your > doppelganger and that turns personal pronouns, which work fine in our > everyday world without duplicating chambers, into a chaotic mass of ASCII > characters with no clear meaning. > > > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain >> > > I loved Blade Runner too, one of the few things we can agree on. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
