On 20 Feb 2014, at 02:57, chris peck wrote:
Hi Quentin
>>They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question
asked. So I'll try one last time, and will try à la Jesse, with
simple yes/no questions and explanation from your part.
So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument
that what we will do (duplicating you) is possible.
Quentin, that pronouns pose problems in the thoughtexperiment is
clearly illustrated by your need to distinguish between 'you' and
'*you*'.
>> So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or
whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a
room with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be
duplicated (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two
times in two exactly identical room),
Can you clarify. you say that when '*you*' is duplicated, 'you' is
destroyed and 'you' is recreated two times. Is 'you' who gets
destroyed and recreated '*you*' who presses the button? or someone
different? Afterall, you explicitly introduced the distinction to
make things clear, so Im not sure if you just made a typo. if not
where did 'you' come from? I feel like huge violence is being done
to the pronoun "you" here. I say "you" so that you can distinguish
between you, 'you' and '*you*'. All are now in play. when I say
"you" rather than 'you' or '*you*' I will be meaning you.
When you are in Helsinki, before pushing the button, we describe
everything from outside, so it is the non ambiguous 3-you, or 1-you,
which are co-extensional before the duplication.
Then, as we know there is a duplication of the 3-you, and as we know
the copies will feel to be unique in only one city, by comp, we are
forced to realize that from their 1p perspective, one outcome among
both will be selected, and that by contradicting any specific
prediction.
>> the only difference in each room is that one has the left door
open and one has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see
when you'll press the button ?
I thought '*you*' presses the button, but here you say : ' when
you'll press the button' Did '*you*' or 'you' press the button? ie.
did you mean 'when *you*'ll press the button'?
Just before. Even one week before, if you want.
look at this bit:
>>1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No
>>2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No
>>If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you*
expect to see both event simultaneously ?
In the questions 1 and 2 you are talking about what 'you' expect to
see, but then in the follow on question you ask about what '*you*'
expect to see. Are you asking about 'you', 'you' or '*you*' or all
three? It seems to me that 'you' can expect to see one room or the
other,
Exclusive "or". this shows that you grasped the FPI. You can move on
step 4.
and 'you' (the other 'you', there being two 'you' and one '*you*')
can expect to see one room or the other, and '*you*' can expect to
see both if 'you','you' and '*you*' bear the identity relation that
is stipulated by the yes doctor assumption, you see?
So from the FPI, you can infer which "you" notion was involved. It is
asked to the 1-you in Helsinki, coexistencial with the 3-you in
Helsinki. And the question bears on which next 1-you H-you will feel
to be, or equivalently, which city you will feel to be reconstituted
in. The 3-you == 1-you in Helsinki knows that there will be only one,
from his future pov.
Note that in predicting to see both, '*you*' is not predicting 'you'
or 'you' will see both. The result of the probability calculus ...
actually, lets not call it calculus because its just a way of
bigging up what infact is very little ...
Sure. It is a simple and obvious step. yet, if you proceed, you will
grasp that it entails we cannot know in which computations we are,
among an infinity existing (in arithmetic), and that physics will be
recovered by that "innocent" probability calculus.
the result of the probability sum that '*you*' conducts is different
from the result of the sum 'you' and 'you' conduct, because '*you*'
is going to be duplicated but neither 'you' nor 'you' are.
Exactly. This is a point on which I insist in many post to Clark but
that he simply fail to take into account. The 1p is simply not
duplicable *from his 1p perspective". Like in Everett, we can't feel
the split.
'*you*' has to bear in mind that both 'you' and 'you' are '*you*' in
some sense.
Exactly.
'you' and 'you' don't need to worry about that. And infact to get
any other result than zero from the sum, this identity relation
between '*you*', 'you' and 'you' must stand, which brings us to
another point: as Clark points out, preservation of identity is
central to this thought experiment.
OK. But only the notion of identity already clarified when comp is
assumed. This involves only the personal content of the diaries,
entering, or not, in the teleboxes.
The other point that Clark often makes is that step 3 is worthless,
and if the intention of step 3 is to hammer home that duplicated
people would only ever have a single POV, then step 3 is indeed
worthless.
But of course, that is not the point of step 3, as this is the point
of step 2. Step 3 is the FPI point. It shows that in a context of pure
3p comp determinacy, the 1p are confronted to a string form of
indeterminacy, and this without invoking QM.
Does Bruno really need to advertise an inability to conduct simple
probability sums to convince you that individuals only have a single
pov?
I do the contrary. By definition of the 1p, it is just obvious that
individuals only have a single pov, and this is used to lead to the
probabilities.
But I don't think that is all step 3 is really about.
Good, as you put it in the wrong direction.
Its also about trying to maintain 'indeterminacy' in the mistaken
belief that it has a legitimate place in Everettian MWI.
In the Everettian MWI, the probabilities are the same as in the non-
everett setting, but are reduced implicitly to the comp FPI, although
this could be the object of another debate, as UDA importantly does
not assume QM.
Bruno
From: [email protected]
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 20:53:46 +0100
Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room)
To: [email protected]
2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark <[email protected]>:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<[email protected]> wrote:
> Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding
the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,
So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use
logic in doing so. No can do.
That's not what I was asking, I was asking that if you use your meet
doppelganger argument, ==> read the next quote.
> or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render
probability calculus meaningless.
If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree
with both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed
be meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why
Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does.
The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI
case you accept probability calculus.
But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works,
that's already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self,
He does not, and certainly does not at step 3.
and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works
He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists
under MWI)
or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with
that;
It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question
asked.
as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because
you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason.
As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question.
And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent.
They are from the probability POV.
According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever
interacting with your doppelganger
And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ?
and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no
problem;
They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question
asked. So I'll try one last time, and will try à la Jesse, with
simple yes/no questions and explanation from your part.
So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument
that what we will do (duplicating you) is possible.
So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or
whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a
room with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be
duplicated (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two
times in two exactly identical room), the only difference in each
room is that one has the left door open and one has the right door
open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll press the button ?
1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No
2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No
If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you*
expect to see both event simultaneously ?
If you answer 'Yes' at the 2nd question, do you think you can put a
probability to see the left door opened (or reversely the right
door) ? Yes/No
If you answer 'No', why can't you assign a probability to see each
door ? As I see it, there are 2 possible events, so each as a 0.5
probability of occurence... If not why not ? Why in the MWI case,
you accept the 0.5 probability ? If you follow strictly the
protocol, MWI and this experiment are equivalent, and are not about
your personal identity... If you answer both No to the 1st and 2nd
question, please develop what you will expect to see when you press
the button ?
Quentin
but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact with your
doppelganger and that turns personal pronouns, which work fine in
our everyday world without duplicating chambers, into a chaotic mass
of ASCII characters with no clear meaning.
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain
I loved Blade Runner too, one of the few things we can agree on.
John K Clark
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