The problem is the same with mwi. Your comment here is simply bad faith, guess I can't expect discussion. So long then. Le 20 févr. 2014 02:57, "chris peck" <[email protected]> a écrit :
> Hi Quentin > > > > > *>>They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. > So I'll try one last time, and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no > questions and explanation from your part.So I will first describe the setup > and will suppose for the argument that what we will do (duplicating you) is > possible.* > Quentin, that pronouns pose problems in the thoughtexperiment is clearly > illustrated by your need to distinguish between 'you' and '*you*'. > > *>> So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or > whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room > with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated > (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly > identical room),* > > Can you clarify. you say that when '*you*' is duplicated, 'you' is > destroyed and 'you' is recreated two times. Is 'you' who gets destroyed and > recreated '*you*' who presses the button? or someone different? Afterall, > you explicitly introduced the distinction to make things clear, so Im not > sure if you just made a typo. if not where did 'you' come from? I feel like > huge violence is being done to the pronoun "you" here. I say "you" so that > you can distinguish between you, 'you' and '*you*'. All are now in play. > when I say "you" rather than 'you' or '*you*' I will be meaning you. > > > *>> the only difference in each room is that one has the left door open > and one has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll > press the button ?* > > I thought '*you*' presses the button, but here you say : ' when you'll > press the button' Did '*you*' or 'you' press the button? ie. did you mean > 'when *you*'ll press the button'? > > > look at this bit: > > > > > *>>1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? > Yes/No>>2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? > Yes/No>>If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you* > expect to see both event simultaneously ?* > > In the questions 1 and 2 you are talking about what 'you' expect to see, > but then in the follow on question you ask about what '*you*' expect to > see. Are you asking about 'you', 'you' or '*you*' or all three? It seems to > me that 'you' can expect to see one room or the other, and 'you' (the other > 'you', there being two 'you' and one '*you*') can expect to see one room or > the other, and '*you*' can expect to see both if 'you','you' and '*you*' > bear the identity relation that is stipulated by the yes doctor assumption, > you see? > > Note that in predicting to see both, '*you*' is not predicting 'you' or > 'you' will see both. The result of the probability calculus ... actually, > lets not call it calculus because its just a way of bigging up what infact > is very little ... the result of the probability sum that '*you*' conducts > is different from the result of the sum 'you' and 'you' conduct, because > '*you*' is going to be duplicated but neither 'you' nor 'you' are. '*you*' > has to bear in mind that both 'you' and 'you' are '*you*' in some sense. > 'you' and 'you' don't need to worry about that. And infact to get any other > result than zero from the sum, this identity relation between '*you*', > 'you' and 'you' must stand, which brings us to another point: as Clark > points out, preservation of identity is central to this thought experiment. > > The other point that Clark often makes is that step 3 is worthless, and if > the intention of step 3 is to hammer home that duplicated people would only > ever have a single POV, then step 3 is indeed worthless. Does Bruno really > need to advertise an inability to conduct simple probability sums to > convince you that individuals only have a single pov? > > But I don't think that is all step 3 is really about. Its also about > trying to maintain 'indeterminacy' in the mistaken belief that it has a > legitimate place in Everettian MWI. > > All the best > > Chris. > > ------------------------------ > From: [email protected] > Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2014 20:53:46 +0100 > Subject: Re: 3-1 views (was: Re: Better Than the Chinese Room) > To: [email protected] > > > > > 2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark <[email protected]>: > > On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>wrote: > > > Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding the > argument that you can't meet your doppelganger, > > > So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use logic > in doing so. No can do. > > > That's not what I was asking, I was asking that if you use your meet > doppelganger argument, ==> read the next quote. > > > > or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render probability > calculus meaningless. > > > If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree with > both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed be > meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why Quantum > Mechanics works as well as it does. > > > The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI case > you accept probability calculus. > > > But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works, that's > already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self, > > > He does not, and certainly does not at step 3. > > > and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works > > > He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists under > MWI) > > > or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with that; > > > It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question asked. > > > as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because you > remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason. > > > As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question. > > > And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent. > > > They are from the probability POV. > > > According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever > interacting with your doppelganger > > > And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ? > > > and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no > problem; > > > They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question asked. So > I'll try one last time, and will try à la Jesse, with simple yes/no > questions and explanation from your part. > > So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument that > what we will do (duplicating you) is possible. > > So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or > whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a room > with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be duplicated > (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two times in two exactly > identical room), the only difference in each room is that one has the left > door open and one has the right door open... what do *you* expect to see > when you'll press the button ? > > 1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No > 2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No > > If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you* expect > to see both event simultaneously ? > > If you answer 'Yes' at the 2nd question, do you think you can put a > probability to see the left door opened (or reversely the right door) ? > Yes/No > > If you answer 'No', why can't you assign a probability to see each door ? > As I see it, there are 2 possible events, so each as a 0.5 probability of > occurence... If not why not ? Why in the MWI case, you accept the 0.5 > probability ? If you follow strictly the protocol, MWI and this experiment > are equivalent, and are not about your personal identity... If you answer > both No to the 1st and 2nd question, please develop what you will expect to > see when you press the button ? > > Quentin > > > > > but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact with your > doppelganger and that turns personal pronouns, which work fine in our > everyday world without duplicating chambers, into a chaotic mass of ASCII > characters with no clear meaning. > > > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain > > > I loved Blade Runner too, one of the few things we can agree on. > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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