On 19 Feb 2014, at 20:53, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-02-19 19:36 GMT+01:00 John Clark <[email protected]>:
On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux
<[email protected]> wrote:
> Be consistent reject MWI on the same ground... don't bother adding
the argument that you can't meet your doppelganger,
So you want me to defend my case but specifically ask me not to use
logic in doing so. No can do.
That's not what I was asking,
John seems to dialog with himself. He very often do that trick.
I was asking that if you use your meet doppelganger argument, ==>
read the next quote.
> or you have to explain why the possibility of meeting render
probability calculus meaningless.
If Everett's probability calculus produced figures that didn't agree
with both experiment and Quantum Mechanics then the MWI would indeed
be meaningless because the entire point of the MWI is to explain why
Quantum Mechanics works as well as it does.
The thing is to devise a though experiment matching MWI, in the MWI
case you accept probability calculus.
Yes.
But Bruno isn't trying to explain why Quantum Mechanics works,
that's already been done, he's trying to explain the nature of self,
He does not, and certainly does not at step 3.
Step 3 is just a simple step toward this. but I know we have to come
back on this.
and so I don't care if Bruno's probability calculus works
He does, that's what is showing FPI (which *of course* also exists
under MWI)
or not because probability and prediction have nothing to do with
that;
It has all to do with that because it is specifically the question
asked.
yes. there is no problem with the notion of self in which I use simple
definitions in UDA, and the standard notions in AUDA. Computer
science, thanks to the Dx = "xx" method, excels on the notion of self.
That is why I decide to be mathematicians, instead of biologist.
as I have said before, you feel like Quentin Anciaux today because
you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday and for no other reason.
As I have said before and before and before, that's not the question.
It is the not the question, and in fact, here John gives the minimal
correct account of the 1p-identity (memory, diary content) which leads
directly to the FPI.
And despite what you say above the situations are not equivalent.
They are from the probability POV.
Exactly. John fails completely in showing how possibly meeting the
doppelganger has any relevance on the probabilities.
It is a well known rhetorical trick. Introduce something non relevant
and accusing someone to not take it into account, without showing the
relevance. But it is just plainly obvious that it cannot be relevant
without adding magic connections between the doppelgangers, which are
already sufficiently well separated in Moscow and Washington.
According to Everett the very laws of physics forbid you from ever
interacting with your doppelganger
And what does it have to do with frequency and probability ?
and so Bruno's favorite type of words, personal pronouns, cause no
problem;
They don't pose problem in this experiment and in the question
asked. So I'll try one last time, and will try à la Jesse, with
simple yes/no questions and explanation from your part.
So I will first describe the setup and will suppose for the argument
that what we will do (duplicating you) is possible.
So you (John Clark reading this email or the one from tomorrow or
whatever, so I'll use *you*) are in front of a button that is in a
room with two doors. When *you* will press the button, *you* will be
duplicated (by destroying you in the room and recreating you two
times in two exactly identical room), the only difference in each
room is that one has the left door open and one has the right door
open... what do *you* expect to see when you'll press the button ?
1- Do you expect to see the left and the right doors opened ? Yes/No
2- Do you expect to see the left or the right doors opened ? Yes/No
If you answer 'Yes' at the 1st question, do you really mean *you*
expect to see both event simultaneously ?
If you answer 'Yes' at the 2nd question, do you think you can put a
probability to see the left door opened (or reversely the right
door) ? Yes/No
If you answer 'No', why can't you assign a probability to see each
door ? As I see it, there are 2 possible events, so each as a 0.5
probability of occurence... If not why not ? Why in the MWI case,
you accept the 0.5 probability ? If you follow strictly the
protocol, MWI and this experiment are equivalent, and are not about
your personal identity... If you answer both No to the 1st and 2nd
question, please develop what you will expect to see when you press
the button ?
The worst is that we can imagine easily the type of rhetoric that John
will use to evade the questioning.
Bruno
Quentin
but in Bruno's thought experiment you can interact with your
doppelganger and that turns personal pronouns, which work fine in
our everyday world without duplicating chambers, into a chaotic mass
of ASCII characters with no clear meaning.
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain
I loved Blade Runner too, one of the few things we can agree on.
John K Clark
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