On 20 Feb 2014, at 11:55, David Nyman wrote:
On 20 February 2014 09:58, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 20 Feb 2014, at 05:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/18/2014 7:10 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, Feb 19, 2014 at 02:34:57PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 19/02/2014, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote:
Which ones? How can unobserved facts exist?
You can observe their consequences without observing the facts. E.g.
millions of people have observed that the sun shines without
understanding or knowing about nuclear fusion.
Yes - but obviously nuclear fusion is an observed fact (somewhere in
the Multiverse).
No, it's part of our best theory of the world.
But maybe you mean how can facts exist that are not grounded in
observation at some point?
Yes, that is what I mean. But Brent talked about unobserved facts, so
we'd better let him elaborate what he means.
Facts are often inferred, as who murdered Nicole Simpson, it's hard
to even say what constitutes a fact without invoking a theory. So
sure there are, on the same theory that allows us to infer facts,
facts that are not observed.
I think we're talking past one another. You're talking about
ontology as the ur-stuff that's really real. I'm talking about the
stuff that is assumed as fundamental in a theory.
That's how I define "primitive". It is the intended meaning of the
primitive object assumed in the theory.
I suspect that this is one of the things that leads to the constant
confusion in the discussions with Craig. He seems to feel that the
ontological postulate can only be the really real thing as distinct
to a primitive theoretical object. And the consequence is, in
effect, that he thinks he can dismiss both the theoretical object
and anything derivable from it as not really real from the outset. I
don't (really) know how to resolve this confusion in our discussions.
Yes. Craig confuses regularly a theory of qualia with a qualia. He
would dismiss "E = mc^2" by arguing that you cannot boil water with
"m", "c" and "2" and multiplication, and exponentiation.
Of course, in comp, the artificial brain is not a metaphor, and so
Craig's confusion here does not simplify the matter in the extreme.
here S4Grz and the X logics, should help him, if he did the work, as
the confusion is not possible. S4grz literally talk about something
which cannot be captured in any 3p way, except by God. Unfortunately
he uses his prejudicial theory to avoid that kind of work at the start.
That definition allows some unimportant convention. For example, we
might say, with PA, that the primitive object is just 0. And
consider that s(0), s(s(0)), ... are already "emergent". Of we can
assume all numbers, and then say that the notion of prime number is
emergent, or we can accept as primitive all notions definable by a
first order arithmetical formula, in which case "'[]p" itself is
primitive, and yet []p & p is still emergent. By default I prefer to
see 0, s(0), etc. as primitive, and the rest as emergent.
But note this: physicalism or materialism usually assumes some UR
matter as primitive in this sense.
In that case, the two notions referred in your paragraph coincide.
I am not sure what Russell means by a fact needing to be observed to
be a fact. "111...1" (very long but definite) is either prime or
not, despite I will, plausibly, never been able to know or observe
which it is.
Even with comp, there might be entire physical universe without any
self-aware or conscious observers in them, and despite the fact that
matter arise from machine self-reference in arithmetic.
I would like to ask something here that is stimulated by my recent
discussions with Craig and Stathis. It is clear that any viable
theory must be able to resolve what would otherwise lead to
paradoxes of reference and and indeed of "causal" relations.
OK.
If matter, or its appearance, manifests to us as a consequence of
self-reference wherein lies the *specific* justification, in the
comp theory, for our ability to refer to and apparently interact
with those appearances? It occurs to me here that the usual
understanding of CTM is that thought is computed by the brain, which
I note you avoid by stipulating rather that consciousness will be
invariant for a digital substitution. One who studies the UDA might
be tempted to suppose that the reversal of physics-machine
psychology necessitated to retain CTM also salvages the notion that
thought is computed by the brain, but this move doesn't seem capable
of avoiding the paradoxes.
Rather, when you say that "if we are a machine we cannot know which
machine we are" this seems to imply that a brain, or any
computations it might be supposed to instantiate, cannot directly
represent the machine that we are.
Actually, it can, at the relevant local level. But we cannot justify
this. That's why we need some irredcatibla act of faith in front of
the doctor. I think.
It is related with G* proves []p <-> []p & p, and the fact that G
cannot justify this.
Rather we find expression through the FPI filtration of the
statistics of computations that are capable of reconciling both the
appearance of matter, including brains and bodies, and our causal
and ostensive relations with it. IOW the brain and the body, as you
sometimes say, are the means by which the person is able to manifest
with respect to a particular reality. So I guess my question,
assuming I haven't got hold of the wrong end of the stick entirely,
is which aspects of the hypostases address these extraordinarily
complex and subtle referential issues?
OK. Very shortly, as this is the goal of the modal thread, but very
quickly, as I will try to justify, the hypostases come from the 3p
machine's "body" or code (at a correct level, by construction), that
the "[]p" of Gödel.
Then to get 1p, we just conjuncted it to the "& p", creating an
ombilic chird between the machine beliefs and truth. This works as it
give a knower, (an S4 logic), even close to Brouwer's intuitionist
"creative subject". []p ===> []p & p corresponds to the 3p ===> 1p.
To get matter and first plural person construct, we add <>t, which is
equivalent with assuming an accessible reality, and avoiding the
vacuous probability arising in the cul-de-sac world. In that case "P =
1" will correspond as true in all accesible worlds, and there is at
least one. This give a "probability" logic, which will get quantum
like, when restricted to the "UD-sentences" (sigma_1 sentences).
Then it happens that we can do both (that is the "& p" and "& <>t"
moves), which is handy for a notion of physical sensibility, that we
get freely from incompleteness too. The X logics.
<snip>
Our own computations can be very mong and eep with martge "period"
of non presence of observers.
I have to say that these are some of your most delightful
unintentional malapropisms - they read almost like Edward Lear :) I
think I can intuit what "mong" and "eep" may be (actually they sound
a bit like the Siamese Twins) but what is martge?
I learned at school dactilography. So I type without looking at the
keyboard. But then a bird makes a sound hereby, and I will type entire
gibberish text, just because my hands moves a little bit, and are no
more in the relevant correspondence with the keyboard.
Just replace "z" by "a" or "e", "e" by "z" or "r", "r" by "e" or "t",
etc. :)
OK, "mong" should be read "long", and "eep" should be read deep. As I
guess you guessed.
"matrge", well, the m is for "l", and the "t" is just a typo, so you
need to read "large".
Well, I am very sorry.
On a less frivolous note, Craig has been making some interesting
comments on the necessity, in his theory, to consider the entire
history leading to the (apparent) presence of something like a
biological cell. But he seems to feel that the deep historical
antecedents of naturally-occurring cells make any attempt to
faithfully reproduce such a cell functionally by "external"
intervention into a hopeless enterprise, because such antecedents
cannot be created ex nihilo. This seems wrong-headed to me for a
variety of reasons, not the least of which is that any apparently
external intervention of which we find ourselves to be capable must
itself have long and deep antecedents. I wonder if your remarks
above can shed any light on this question?
I think this is a bit similar to Brent moves when he invokes the need
of the environment for consciousness. Here Craig generalizes this for
a spatio-temporal environment.
This is not inconsistent with comp, but put the level lower. Now,
Craig will insist that no-matter how low the level is chosen, like
perhaps simulating the entire physical universe (in case this makes
sense), this will not bring consciousness. Then it is more that
Brent's move. It is Brent's move + some move à-la Peter Jones, reyfing
some primitive spatio-temporal realities as necessary, by definition,
for consciousness.
This is ad hoc (even more so in the light of Maudlin or MGA), and it
reintroduces the mind-body problem without adding any light, and just
to contradict the comp theory, I think. It makes also the role of the
brain quite mysterious. Making such move just to make comp false seems
uninteresting, as comp justifies the important 1/3 nuances that Craig
believes non present in arithmetic, from his lack of study of the
question.
Unlike Clark and some other, Craig remains consistent with comp, by
throwing it out at the start, but this prevents him to appreciate it,
and to justify its non-comp assumption, beyond the feeling that 3p
misses the 1p, which is true, but already explained by the machines
(accepting quite standard definitions).
Bruno
It is hard to say a priori. I might also miss what Russell intends
to mean.
Bruno
Brent
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