On 20 Feb 2014, at 14:36, David Nyman wrote:
On 20 February 2014 11:50, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 20 Feb 2014, at 11:55, David Nyman wrote:
<snip>
I think we're talking past one another. You're talking about
ontology as the ur-stuff that's really real. I'm talking about the
stuff that is assumed as fundamental in a theory.
That's how I define "primitive". It is the intended meaning of the
primitive object assumed in the theory.
I suspect that this is one of the things that leads to the constant
confusion in the discussions with Craig. He seems to feel that the
ontological postulate can only be the really real thing as distinct
to a primitive theoretical object. And the consequence is, in
effect, that he thinks he can dismiss both the theoretical object
and anything derivable from it as not really real from the outset.
I don't (really) know how to resolve this confusion in our
discussions.
Yes. Craig confuses regularly a theory of qualia with a qualia. He
would dismiss "E = mc^2" by arguing that you cannot boil water with
"m", "c" and "2" and multiplication, and exponentiation.
Of course, in comp, the artificial brain is not a metaphor, and so
Craig's confusion here does not simplify the matter in the extreme.
here S4Grz and the X logics, should help him, if he did the work, as
the confusion is not possible. S4grz literally talk about something
which cannot be captured in any 3p way, except by God. Unfortunately
he uses his prejudicial theory to avoid that kind of work at the
start.
Yup.
That definition allows some unimportant convention. For example, we
might say, with PA, that the primitive object is just 0. And
consider that s(0), s(s(0)), ... are already "emergent". Of we can
assume all numbers, and then say that the notion of prime number is
emergent, or we can accept as primitive all notions definable by a
first order arithmetical formula, in which case "'[]p" itself is
primitive, and yet []p & p is still emergent. By default I prefer
to see 0, s(0), etc. as primitive, and the rest as emergent.
But note this: physicalism or materialism usually assumes some UR
matter as primitive in this sense.
In that case, the two notions referred in your paragraph coincide.
I am not sure what Russell means by a fact needing to be observed
to be a fact. "111...1" (very long but definite) is either prime or
not, despite I will, plausibly, never been able to know or observe
which it is.
Even with comp, there might be entire physical universe without any
self-aware or conscious observers in them, and despite the fact
that matter arise from machine self-reference in arithmetic.
I would like to ask something here that is stimulated by my recent
discussions with Craig and Stathis. It is clear that any viable
theory must be able to resolve what would otherwise lead to
paradoxes of reference and and indeed of "causal" relations.
OK.
If matter, or its appearance, manifests to us as a consequence of
self-reference wherein lies the *specific* justification, in the
comp theory, for our ability to refer to and apparently interact
with those appearances? It occurs to me here that the usual
understanding of CTM is that thought is computed by the brain,
which I note you avoid by stipulating rather that consciousness
will be invariant for a digital substitution. One who studies the
UDA might be tempted to suppose that the reversal of physics-
machine psychology necessitated to retain CTM also salvages the
notion that thought is computed by the brain, but this move doesn't
seem capable of avoiding the paradoxes.
Rather, when you say that "if we are a machine we cannot know which
machine we are" this seems to imply that a brain, or any
computations it might be supposed to instantiate, cannot directly
represent the machine that we are.
Actually, it can, at the relevant local level. But we cannot justify
this. That's why we need some irredcatibla act of faith in front of
the doctor. I think.
So, very succinctly, are you saying that:
1) Whatever computations are ultimately responsible for emulating
the apparent physics of the brain are the same computations that are
responsible for emulating the thoughts, feelings etc. that are
correlated with that brain.
If this works, the "primitively material brain" appearance is a 1p
plural sum on all finite pieces of all computations.
This should allow stable geographies. Phase randomization does this in
the Everett quantum theory, but it is an open problem with comp. that
might seem impossible, but the arithmetical quantization shows at the
least that such an idea is consistent (and unavoidable in its []p &
<>t sense).
2) These computations are in some sense hidden from us because the
brain can only appear to us as a physical object and we can never be
certain of the level at which that object instantiates the relevant
computations.
Is that approximately on track?
Yes. If the Z1* or X1* logic, or S4Grz1 provide some particular
quantum logic, such that the measure is given by trace of statistical
linear operator, then we might bet that our common level of
substitution is the Heisenberg uncertainty level, and in that case, we
are classical, boolean, machines.
But discrepancies can be expected if we are quantum machine, which
would mean that our consciousness already exploit directly the
infinite sum below the substitution level. I doubt this is the case,
from empirical observation, but that are difficulties on the road.
It is related with G* proves []p <-> []p & p, and the fact that G
cannot justify this.
So these modal logics are a method for reasoning at a meta level
about the logical consequences of the computations that can emulate
them?
It is about what any self-referentially correct machine can prove or
not prove about itself and its consistent extensions, relativized by
its correct (by construction) substitution level.
It does not concern us, but it might concerns the "correct part of
us", and that is enough to get the "theology", including physics, or
its lawful roots.
Rather we find expression through the FPI filtration of the
statistics of computations that are capable of reconciling both the
appearance of matter, including brains and bodies, and our causal
and ostensive relations with it. IOW the brain and the body, as you
sometimes say, are the means by which the person is able to
manifest with respect to a particular reality. So I guess my
question, assuming I haven't got hold of the wrong end of the stick
entirely, is which aspects of the hypostases address these
extraordinarily complex and subtle referential issues?
OK. Very shortly, as this is the goal of the modal thread, but very
quickly, as I will try to justify, the hypostases come from the 3p
machine's "body" or code (at a correct level, by construction), that
the "[]p" of Gödel.
Then to get 1p, we just conjuncted it to the "& p", creating an
ombilic chird between the machine beliefs and truth. This works as
it give a knower, (an S4 logic), even close to Brouwer's
intuitionist "creative subject". []p ===> []p & p corresponds to
the 3p ===> 1p.
To get matter and first plural person construct, we add <>t, which
is equivalent with assuming an accessible reality, and avoiding the
vacuous probability arising in the cul-de-sac world. In that case "P
= 1" will correspond as true in all accesible worlds, and there is
at least one. This give a "probability" logic, which will get
quantum like, when restricted to the "UD-sentences" (sigma_1
sentences).
Then it happens that we can do both (that is the "& p" and "& <>t"
moves), which is handy for a notion of physical sensibility, that we
get freely from incompleteness too. The X logics.
OK. I've been trying to follow the modal thread but Liz is much less
lazy than me about the exercises, alas. However I've bought a book
on elementary modal logic so I may eventually catch up.
Liz is less lazy, yes.
Please feel free to ask explanation.
<snip>
Our own computations can be very mong and eep with martge "period"
of non presence of observers.
I have to say that these are some of your most delightful
unintentional malapropisms - they read almost like Edward Lear :) I
think I can intuit what "mong" and "eep" may be (actually they
sound a bit like the Siamese Twins) but what is martge?
I learned at school dactilography. So I type without looking at the
keyboard. But then a bird makes a sound hereby, and I will type
entire gibberish text, just because my hands moves a little bit, and
are no more in the relevant correspondence with the keyboard.
Just replace "z" by "a" or "e", "e" by "z" or "r", "r" by "e" or
"t", etc. :)
OK, "mong" should be read "long", and "eep" should be read deep. As
I guess you guessed.
"matrge", well, the m is for "l", and the "t" is just a typo, so you
need to read "large".
Well, I am very sorry.
Please don't be sorry - it made me laugh out loud this morning,
which is always to be celebrated!
OK. It is better than pulling the hairs.
By the way, your flying digits seem to have made you type string for
strong so frequently recently that I almost started wondering if you
had changed your theoretical orientation!
It is my annulus finger, of my right hand, which suffers from
arthrosis, and has the orientation problem.
I have seen that my "strong" became "string".
So sorry ...
On a less frivolous note, Craig has been making some interesting
comments on the necessity, in his theory, to consider the entire
history leading to the (apparent) presence of something like a
biological cell. But he seems to feel that the deep historical
antecedents of naturally-occurring cells make any attempt to
faithfully reproduce such a cell functionally by "external"
intervention into a hopeless enterprise, because such antecedents
cannot be created ex nihilo. This seems wrong-headed to me for a
variety of reasons, not the least of which is that any apparently
external intervention of which we find ourselves to be capable must
itself have long and deep antecedents. I wonder if your remarks
above can shed any light on this question?
I think this is a bit similar to Brent moves when he invokes the
need of the environment for consciousness. Here Craig generalizes
this for a spatio-temporal environment.
This is not inconsistent with comp, but put the level lower. Now,
Craig will insist that no-matter how low the level is chosen, like
perhaps simulating the entire physical universe (in case this makes
sense), this will not bring consciousness.
Yes, but in his conversation with Stathis he denies that a
biological cell created by any process of molecular assembly other
than those presumably exploited by "nature" would be alive, because
it would lack those "deep histories". And then he says that this is
consistent with his contention that this doesn't violate the known
laws of physics! Can this make any sense in comp, whatever the
level that is chosen?
Logically, it can make sense, and quantum mechanically too, but there
are no evidences for this, and it put the level very low.
But Craig has to make the level infinitely low, to escape the
consequences of comp, and he should be careful to not use the
infinitely lower level of the physical reality, which if they existed,
should be FPI recoverable on all computations.
Non-comp is consistent with comp (like []f is consistent with
arithmetic, note. Consistency is cheap). But to build an authentically
non-comp theory, you need a solid notion of comp.
Arithmetic is very rich, it contains a lot of Löbian entities, having
power surpassing a lot the Turing universality. Most still obeys to G
and G*.
Then it is more that Brent's move. It is Brent's move + some move à-
la Peter Jones, reyfing some primitive spatio-temporal realities as
necessary, by definition, for consciousness.
This is ad hoc (even more so in the light of Maudlin or MGA), and it
reintroduces the mind-body problem without adding any light, and
just to contradict the comp theory, I think. It makes also the role
of the brain quite mysterious. Making such move just to make comp
false seems uninteresting, as comp justifies the important 1/3
nuances that Craig believes non present in arithmetic, from his lack
of study of the question.
Unlike Clark and some other, Craig remains consistent with comp, by
throwing it out at the start, but this prevents him to appreciate
it, and to justify its non-comp assumption, beyond the feeling that
3p misses the 1p, which is true, but already explained by the
machines (accepting quite standard definitions).
Yes. I think I've got about as far as I can in that discussion for
the moment but I've found it useful in teasing out my shakier
intuitions about the deeper implications of CTM. I don't know if you
remember but my original appearance on this list years ago was at
your invitation (from FOR) so that we could discuss some ideas of my
own that, on reflection were not at all dissimilar to Craig's. It
was only after a long drawn out attempt to point out to you
precisely where you were going wrong that I concluded that your own
views finally shed more light on the mind-body problem than mine
did, especially from an empirical perspective. So I feel I have both
some appreciation for Craig's position and a feeling for why it is,
in the end, unsatisfactory for the problems I want to address.
Nice.
But it may be that Craig wants to address a different problem
altogether - it often sounds as though his manifesto is more like
the 19th Century romantics like Goethe (despite Craig's comparing
himself with Galileo) who seemed bent on creating metaphorical
bridges between the natural world and aesthetic expression. This may
in itself be a valuable and diverting exercise but it surely has a
different - though possibly complementary - goal to that of
scientific and mathematical rigour.
Both poems and theories become ugly when asserted as true peremptorily.
Bruno
David
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