On 20 February 2014 11:50, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 20 Feb 2014, at 11:55, David Nyman wrote: > > <snip> >>> >>> I think we're talking past one another. You're talking about ontology >>> as the ur-stuff that's really real. I'm talking about the stuff that is >>> assumed as fundamental in a theory. >>> >> >> That's how I define "primitive". It is the intended meaning of the >> primitive object assumed in the theory. >> > > I suspect that this is one of the things that leads to the constant > confusion in the discussions with Craig. He seems to feel that the > ontological postulate can only be the really real thing as distinct to a > primitive theoretical object. And the consequence is, in effect, that he > thinks he can dismiss both the theoretical object and anything derivable > from it as not really real from the outset. I don't (really) know how to > resolve this confusion in our discussions. > > > Yes. Craig confuses regularly a theory of qualia with a qualia. He would > dismiss "E = mc^2" by arguing that you cannot boil water with "m", "c" and > "2" and multiplication, and exponentiation. > Of course, in comp, the artificial brain is not a metaphor, and so Craig's > confusion here does not simplify the matter in the extreme. > > here S4Grz and the X logics, should help him, if he did the work, as the > confusion is not possible. S4grz literally talk about something which > cannot be captured in any 3p way, except by God. Unfortunately he uses his > prejudicial theory to avoid that kind of work at the start. >
Yup. > >> That definition allows some unimportant convention. For example, we might >> say, with PA, that the primitive object is just 0. And consider that s(0), >> s(s(0)), ... are already "emergent". Of we can assume all numbers, and then >> say that the notion of prime number is emergent, or we can accept as >> primitive all notions definable by a first order arithmetical formula, in >> which case "'[]p" itself is primitive, and yet []p & p is still emergent. >> By default I prefer to see 0, s(0), etc. as primitive, and the rest as >> emergent. >> >> But note this: physicalism or materialism usually assumes some UR matter >> as primitive in this sense. >> In that case, the two notions referred in your paragraph coincide. >> >> I am not sure what Russell means by a fact needing to be observed to be a >> fact. "111...1" (very long but definite) is either prime or not, despite I >> will, plausibly, never been able to know or observe which it is. >> Even with comp, there might be entire physical universe without any >> self-aware or conscious observers in them, and despite the fact that matter >> arise from machine self-reference in arithmetic. > > > I would like to ask something here that is stimulated by my recent > discussions with Craig and Stathis. It is clear that any viable theory must > be able to resolve what would otherwise lead to paradoxes of reference and > and indeed of "causal" relations. > > > OK. > > If matter, or its appearance, manifests to us as a consequence of > self-reference wherein lies the *specific* justification, in the comp > theory, for our ability to refer to and apparently interact with those > appearances? It occurs to me here that the usual understanding of CTM is > that thought is computed by the brain, which I note you avoid by > stipulating rather that consciousness will be invariant for a digital > substitution. One who studies the UDA might be tempted to suppose that the > reversal of physics-machine psychology necessitated to retain CTM also > salvages the notion that thought is computed by the brain, but this move > doesn't seem capable of avoiding the paradoxes. > > Rather, when you say that "if we are a machine we cannot know which > machine we are" this seems to imply that a brain, or any computations it > might be supposed to instantiate, cannot directly represent the machine > that we are. > > > Actually, it can, at the relevant local level. But we cannot justify this. > That's why we need some irredcatibla act of faith in front of the doctor. I > think. > So, very succinctly, are you saying that: 1) Whatever computations are ultimately responsible for emulating the apparent physics of the brain are the same computations that are responsible for emulating the thoughts, feelings etc. that are correlated with that brain. 2) These computations are in some sense hidden from us because the brain can only appear to us as a physical object and we can never be certain of the level at which that object instantiates the relevant computations. Is that approximately on track? It is related with G* proves []p <-> []p & p, and the fact that G cannot > justify this. > So these modal logics are a method for reasoning at a meta level about the logical consequences of the computations that can emulate them? Rather we find expression through the FPI filtration of the statistics of > computations that are capable of reconciling both the appearance of matter, > including brains and bodies, and our causal and ostensive relations with > it. IOW the brain and the body, as you sometimes say, are the means by > which the person is able to manifest with respect to a particular reality. > So I guess my question, assuming I haven't got hold of the wrong end of the > stick entirely, is which aspects of the hypostases address these > extraordinarily complex and subtle referential issues? > > > OK. Very shortly, as this is the goal of the modal thread, but very > quickly, as I will try to justify, the hypostases come from the 3p > machine's "body" or code (at a correct level, by construction), that the > "[]p" of Gödel. > > Then to get 1p, we just conjuncted it to the "& p", creating an ombilic > chird between the machine beliefs and truth. This works as it give a > knower, (an S4 logic), even close to Brouwer's intuitionist "creative > subject". []p ===> []p & p corresponds to the 3p ===> 1p. > > To get matter and first plural person construct, we add <>t, which is > equivalent with assuming an accessible reality, and avoiding the vacuous > probability arising in the cul-de-sac world. In that case "P = 1" will > correspond as true in all accesible worlds, and there is at least one. This > give a "probability" logic, which will get quantum like, when restricted to > the "UD-sentences" (sigma_1 sentences). > > Then it happens that we can do both (that is the "& p" and "& <>t" moves), > which is handy for a notion of physical sensibility, that we get freely > from incompleteness too. The X logics. > OK. I've been trying to follow the modal thread but Liz is much less lazy than me about the exercises, alas. However I've bought a book on elementary modal logic so I may eventually catch up. > <snip> > > > >> Our own computations can be very mong and eep with martge "period" of non >> presence of observers. > > > I have to say that these are some of your most delightful unintentional > malapropisms - they read almost like Edward Lear :) I think I can intuit > what "mong" and "eep" may be (actually they sound a bit like the Siamese > Twins) but what is martge? > > > I learned at school dactilography. So I type without looking at the > keyboard. But then a bird makes a sound hereby, and I will type entire > gibberish text, just because my hands moves a little bit, and are no more > in the relevant correspondence with the keyboard. > > Just replace "z" by "a" or "e", "e" by "z" or "r", "r" by "e" or "t", etc. > :) > > OK, "mong" should be read "long", and "eep" should be read deep. As I > guess you guessed. > > "matrge", well, the m is for "l", and the "t" is just a typo, so you need > to read "large". > > Well, I am very sorry. > Please don't be sorry - it made me laugh out loud this morning, which is always to be celebrated! By the way, your flying digits seem to have made you type string for strong so frequently recently that I almost started wondering if you had changed your theoretical orientation! > > On a less frivolous note, Craig has been making some interesting comments > on the necessity, in his theory, to consider the entire history leading to > the (apparent) presence of something like a biological cell. But he seems > to feel that the deep historical antecedents of naturally-occurring cells > make any attempt to faithfully reproduce such a cell functionally by > "external" intervention into a hopeless enterprise, because such > antecedents cannot be created ex nihilo. This seems wrong-headed to me for > a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that any apparently > external intervention of which we find ourselves to be capable must itself > have long and deep antecedents. I wonder if your remarks above can shed any > light on this question? > > > > I think this is a bit similar to Brent moves when he invokes the need of > the environment for consciousness. Here Craig generalizes this for a > spatio-temporal environment. > > This is not inconsistent with comp, but put the level lower. Now, Craig > will insist that no-matter how low the level is chosen, like perhaps > simulating the entire physical universe (in case this makes sense), this > will not bring consciousness. > Yes, but in his conversation with Stathis he denies that a biological cell created by any process of molecular assembly other than those presumably exploited by "nature" would be alive, because it would lack those "deep histories". And then he says that this is consistent with his contention that this doesn't violate the known laws of physics! Can this make any sense in comp, whatever the level that is chosen? Then it is more that Brent's move. It is Brent's move + some move à-la > Peter Jones, reyfing some primitive spatio-temporal realities as necessary, > by definition, for consciousness. > This is ad hoc (even more so in the light of Maudlin or MGA), and it > reintroduces the mind-body problem without adding any light, and just to > contradict the comp theory, I think. It makes also the role of the brain > quite mysterious. Making such move just to make comp false seems > uninteresting, as comp justifies the important 1/3 nuances that Craig > believes non present in arithmetic, from his lack of study of the question. > > Unlike Clark and some other, Craig remains consistent with comp, by > throwing it out at the start, but this prevents him to appreciate it, and > to justify its non-comp assumption, beyond the feeling that 3p misses the > 1p, which is true, but already explained by the machines (accepting quite > standard definitions). > Yes. I think I've got about as far as I can in that discussion for the moment but I've found it useful in teasing out my shakier intuitions about the deeper implications of CTM. I don't know if you remember but my original appearance on this list years ago was at your invitation (from FOR) so that we could discuss some ideas of my own that, on reflection were not at all dissimilar to Craig's. It was only after a long drawn out attempt to point out to you precisely where you were going wrong that I concluded that your own views finally shed more light on the mind-body problem than mine did, especially from an empirical perspective. So I feel I have both some appreciation for Craig's position and a feeling for why it is, in the end, unsatisfactory for the problems I want to address. But it may be that Craig wants to address a different problem altogether - it often sounds as though his manifesto is more like the 19th Century romantics like Goethe (despite Craig's comparing himself with Galileo) who seemed bent on creating metaphorical bridges between the natural world and aesthetic expression. This may in itself be a valuable and diverting exercise but it surely has a different - though possibly complementary - goal to that of scientific and mathematical rigour. David > >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
