On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
> illusion
Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time.
I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about
originality itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something
can occur for the first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by
extension that everything is in some sense utterly unique and
irreplacable.
You reify an 1p notion.
In the H-WM
duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience
of the type
I am the H-guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy
and again Moscow guy ...
He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get
doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their
personality.
I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that "I am
the H-guy" comes along for the ride when you reproduce a description
of his body, or the blueprints for his behaviors.
Or a diophantine approximation of the quantum string-brane state with
10^(10^10) correct decimal for the rational complex numbers involved.
My point has been from the start that this is false.
But that is an extraordinary claim, which requires an extraordinary
arguments.
No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be reproduced wholly -
I completely agree with you, but those are 1p notion. They have
referent, but we cannot invoke them when we study them.
there is no such thing.
You have to prove that.
All that can be reproduced is a representation within some sensory
context. Outside of that context, it is a facade.
You should search for an experiment testing your idea, if only with
the pedagogical goal of giving more sense to it.
Of course in your theory that is an illusion, as they are all zombies,
and the H-guy is dead.
Never zombies - always dolls.
Zombies are supernatural fiction, dolls are ordinary. The
consciousness of dolls is not at the level of the plastic figure -
there is consciousness there but on the level which holds the
plastic together, and perhaps which on the metaphenomenal level of
synchronicity, poetry, etc.
> and simulation is absolute.
Emulation is absolute by Church thesis, and a "correct" simulation is
what comp assumes the existence through the existence of the
substitution level.
Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with
representations of a particular kind of logic and measurement.
On the contrary, CT makes many different logics mathematically
amenable, that is the reason to be study it. Whatever the truth is, it
can only be more complex and subtle.
Your intution that comp is false is "correct", but it is 1p, and by
itself, it does not provide a refutation of comp, as comp already
explain why machine can develop that intuition, and this correctly.
The 1p is not a machine, he is the owner of the brain, that it borrows
to the most probable universal neighbors.
It is measurement which provides the local appearance of
substitution. In reality, theory can never substitute for
consciousness,
You don't know that, and there are no evidences. An organic brain
might already be a dynamical theory reflecting diverses dynamical
theories. A genome might already be a theory. The theory is not a
substitute for consciousness, but it might be handy to make possible
for a conscious 1p person to say hello to other persons, and share
histories.
and consciousness can have no theories outside of consciousness.
Not sure.
> Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can
> only be done once.
That is ambiguous.
I don't think it is. Arithmetic is based on recursive enumeration.
Notably. But also on non recursive enumeration, and arbitrarily
complex. recursive is just sigma_0 or sigma_1, beyond that the
arithmetical proposition are not computably decidable.
Keep in mind arithmetical is a much more general notion than
computable (or sigma_1 arithmetical).
There is no one and only time that any number can appear. Every
number can be arrived at by many different routes - every number is
always repeatable and transferable. Numbers can't own anything, they
are generic addresses in a theoretical schema that appears again and
again.
They can talk also, but if your philosophy prevents you to listen to
them, then well, that's not a good point to your philosophy.
All "conscious present instant" are done once, in
arithmetic.
Where do we find a conscious present instant in arithmetic? If you
assume that, then you would be begging the question of consciousness.
Comp assumes that consciousness is invariant for a digital
transformation, and the UDA shows that this associates consciousness
to the computations which can already be proven to exist in arithmetic.
Eventually consciousness appears in arithmetic when universal numbers
are confronted with true sigma_ sentences which are consistent and true.
Trivially in the bloc mindscape of the numbers possible
extensional and intensional relations.
What is making "relations" possible, other than sense?
Other senses.
> Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more
> than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time.
From inside arithmetic that's necessarily the case.
Then how can it be said to have a substitution level?
It cannot be said. But it still can be hoped, and bets are open.
> It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite,
> progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for
> beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other
> sensibly.
The UD, and arithmetic determines all effective endings and non
endings (by Church's thesis). Then the internal views put colors on
this.
Why and how would internal views put anything non-arithmetic on it
though?
That's what happens by theorems like Tarski theorem and Gödel theorem.
Roughly speaking, when arithmetically correct machine self-introspect,
they can't avoid the non-arithmetic, and more so if they want speed
their relative provability and computability powers.
Why and how does the UD develop the idea of endings and non-endings?
It is not clear that there can be any endings or beginnings within
arithmetic.
All 3p propositions concerning any possible computations, including
their endings when it exists, and its non ending (proved or not) done
by any universal machines are, when true, theorem of arithmetic.
Arithmetic contains also all emulation of Löbian numbers, which are
the one I interview about the "physics", that is the measure (1) on
the consistent/correct continuations.
Bruno
> Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects
> itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of
form.
OK.
>
> The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and-
> overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from
> any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local
> perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and
> therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously
> measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of
> originality is preserved, but always behind our back.
OK.
By "OK" I mean that the correct Lôbian machines roughly agree with you
(stretching definitions enough ...
> Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and
> unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world
> that we can become the understanding that we expect.
... up to where the definitions broke.
Not sure if I understand, but if so, I would say 'up to the limit of
the range of sensitivity;.
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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