On Sunday, February 23, 2014 11:50:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> > If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an >> > illusion >> >> >> Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time. > > > I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about originality > itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something can occur for the > first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by extension that everything is in > some sense utterly unique and irreplacable. > > > You reify an 1p notion. >
What makes you think its more of a 1p notion than arithmetic is? > > > > >> In the H-WM >> duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience >> of the type >> >> I am the H-guy >> I am the H-guy-Washington guy >> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy >> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy >> I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy >> and again Moscow guy ... >> >> He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get >> doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their >> personality. >> > > I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that "I am the > H-guy" comes along for the ride when you reproduce a description of his > body, or the blueprints for his behaviors. > > > Or a diophantine approximation of the quantum string-brane state with > 10^(10^10) correct decimal for the rational complex numbers involved. > That assumes originality is not fundamental though. I don't see a compelling reason to allow that bottom up construction of consciousness will work. To the contrary, everything that I have seen suggests that it cannot. > > > My point has been from the start that this is false. > > > > But that is an extraordinary claim, which requires an extraordinary > arguments. > Why would it be any more extraordinary than the claim that a unique conscious experience can be assembled from generic unconscious parts? > > > > No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be reproduced wholly - > > > > I completely agree with you, but those are 1p notion. They have referent, > but we cannot invoke them when we study them. > All notions are 1p, including the notion that there could be notions which are not 1p. > > > > there is no such thing. > > > You have to prove that. > It may not be possible to prove anything related to consciousness. If it can be proved, then it only has to do with some particular relation within consciousness. > > > > > > All that can be reproduced is a representation within some sensory > context. Outside of that context, it is a facade. > > > You should search for an experiment testing your idea, if only with the > pedagogical goal of giving more sense to it. > The experiments are all around us. I see an actor on TV, but if I turn off the TV, it becomes clear that the image is only a visual facade. > > > > > > >> >> Of course in your theory that is an illusion, as they are all zombies, >> and the H-guy is dead. >> > > Never zombies - always dolls. > > > > > > > > Zombies are supernatural fiction, dolls are ordinary. The consciousness of > dolls is not at the level of the plastic figure - there is consciousness > there but on the level which holds the plastic together, and perhaps which > on the metaphenomenal level of synchronicity, poetry, etc. > > >> >> >> >> > and simulation is absolute. >> >> Emulation is absolute by Church thesis, and a "correct" simulation is >> what comp assumes the existence through the existence of the >> substitution level. >> > > Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with representations of > a particular kind of logic and measurement. > > > On the contrary, CT makes many different logics mathematically amenable, > that is the reason to be study it. Whatever the truth is, it can only be > more complex and subtle. > But is still quantifiable, impersonal kinds of logic, as opposed to dream logic or sentimental logic, etc. > > Your intution that comp is false is "correct", but it is 1p, and by > itself, it does not provide a refutation of comp, as comp already explain > why machine can develop that intuition, and this correctly. > If you use comp to explain why I develop this correct intuition then comp cannot explain how you use your incorrect counter-intuition to support the possibility of comp. Your assertion that my intuition is 1p is also a 1p intuition based on your 1p experiences with math. > > The 1p is not a machine, he is the owner of the brain, that it borrows to > the most probable universal neighbors. > I am not the owner of a brain, I am the participant in a life. I don't think that a true 1p exists in Comp, only a 3p-x. > > > > > It is measurement which provides the local appearance of substitution. In > reality, theory can never substitute for consciousness, > > > You don't know that, and there are no evidences. > There is no reason to expect that there ever can be evidences, and there is no reason to expect that not knowing it is any reason to doubt it if it make more sense than Comp. > An organic brain might already be a dynamical theory reflecting diverses > dynamical theories. A genome might already be a theory. The theory is not a > substitute for consciousness, but it might be handy to make possible for a > conscious 1p person to say hello to other persons, and share histories. > > If it was already a theory, why would it ever become anything more than that? > > > and consciousness can have no theories outside of consciousness. > > > > Not sure. > This further convinces me that Comp has no business talking about consciousness at all. If we don't need consciousness to make theories, then life is no different from death, and it is clear that what Comp has in mind for consciousness is a blind man's definition of seeing. > > > > > >> >> >> >> > Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can >> > only be done once. >> >> That is ambiguous. > > > I don't think it is. Arithmetic is based on recursive enumeration. > > > Notably. But also on non recursive enumeration, and arbitrarily complex. > recursive is just sigma_0 or sigma_1, beyond that the arithmetical > proposition are not computably decidable. > But they still depend on lower levels of arithmetic, don't they? > > Keep in mind arithmetical is a much more general notion than computable > (or sigma_1 arithmetical). > > > There is no one and only time that any number can appear. Every number can > be arrived at by many different routes - every number is always repeatable > and transferable. Numbers can't own anything, they are generic addresses in > a theoretical schema that appears again and again. > > > They can talk also, but if your philosophy prevents you to listen to them, > then well, that's not a good point to your philosophy. > I listen to them like I listen to the I Ching - as an uncanny oracle to impersonal perspectives, only from the metatheoretic rather than metaphenomenal range. > > > > > > >> All "conscious present instant" are done once, in >> arithmetic. > > > Where do we find a conscious present instant in arithmetic? If you assume > that, then you would be begging the question of consciousness. > > > Comp assumes that consciousness is invariant for a digital transformation, > and the UDA shows that this associates consciousness to the computations > which can already be proven to exist in arithmetic. > > Eventually consciousness appears in arithmetic when universal numbers are > confronted with true sigma_ sentences which are consistent and true. > I would fully expect conscious tropes to have generic correlates within arithmetic, but again, its a pseudo-1p reflection, not a 1p authentic phenomenon. > > > > > > >> Trivially in the bloc mindscape of the numbers possible >> extensional and intensional relations. >> > > What is making "relations" possible, other than sense? > > > Other senses. > Haha, what makes them other? Senses all have in common that they are ways of manifesting sense. > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> > Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more >> > than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. >> >> From inside arithmetic that's necessarily the case. >> > > Then how can it be said to have a substitution level? > > > It cannot be said. But it still can be hoped, and bets are open. > How can it be hoped though? What you are intending to substitute is perpetually incomplete and self-diagonalizing, so how can you simulate something that is not finished becoming what it is? Besides, as soon as you try, the diagonalization will respond with a meta-diagonalizing entanglement. > > > > > >> >> >> >> > It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, >> > progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for >> > beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other >> > sensibly. >> >> The UD, and arithmetic determines all effective endings and non >> endings (by Church's thesis). Then the internal views put colors on >> this. >> > > Why and how would internal views put anything non-arithmetic on it though? > > > > That's what happens by theorems like Tarski theorem and Gödel theorem. > How do you know? What do they produce which is irreducibly non-arithmetic? > Roughly speaking, when arithmetically correct machine self-introspect, > they can't avoid the non-arithmetic, and more so if they want speed their > relative provability and computability powers. > Just because a computation uses processes which are unavailable to our inspection doesn't mean they are non-arithmetic. > > > > > Why and how does the UD develop the idea of endings and non-endings? It is > not clear that there can be any endings or beginnings within arithmetic. > > > All 3p propositions concerning any possible computations, including their > endings when it exists, and its non ending (proved or not) done by any > universal machines are, when true, theorem of arithmetic. Arithmetic > contains also all emulation of Löbian numbers, which are the one I > interview about the "physics", that is the measure (1) on the > consistent/correct continuations. > What theorem of arithmetic defines endings or beginnings? Craig > Bruno > > > > > > > >> >> >> >> >> >> > Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects >> > itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form. >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> > >> > The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and- >> > overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from >> > any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local >> > perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and >> > therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously >> > measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of >> > originality is preserved, but always behind our back. >> >> OK. >> >> By "OK" I mean that the correct Lôbian machines roughly agree with you >> (stretching definitions enough ... >> >> >> >> > Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and >> > unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world >> > that we can become the understanding that we expect. >> >> ... up to where the definitions broke. >> > > Not sure if I understand, but if so, I would say 'up to the limit of the > range of sensitivity;. > > Craig > > >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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