On 24 Feb 2014, at 04:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 11:50:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an
> illusion
Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time.
I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about
originality itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something
can occur for the first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by
extension that everything is in some sense utterly unique and
irreplacable.
You reify an 1p notion.
What makes you think its more of a 1p notion than arithmetic is?
What makes you think that arithmetic is a 1p notion?
Answer: because you assume only 1p, and believe that you can derive
anything from that.
The problem is that you don't have a theory, but a collection of
image, which I still could appreciate, if you were not using it in a
non valid way on computationalism.
In the H-WM
duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience
of the type
I am the H-guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy
I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy
and again Moscow guy ...
He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get
doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their
personality.
I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that "I am
the H-guy" comes along for the ride when you reproduce a
description of his body, or the blueprints for his behaviors.
Or a diophantine approximation of the quantum string-brane state
with 10^(10^10) correct decimal for the rational complex numbers
involved.
That assumes originality is not fundamental though.
I grant you that. Nor is it easy to define.
I don't see a compelling reason to allow that bottom up construction
of consciousness will work.
I might agree with you. I am not sure comp allow a bottom up
construction of consciousness, due to its peculiar relation with truth.
You must study a theory, as you take time to criticize only your own
restricted comprehension of it.
To the contrary, everything that I have seen suggests that it cannot.
I think you are right on this. It is only your uses of things like
this against computationalism which are not valid.
My point has been from the start that this is false.
But that is an extraordinary claim, which requires an extraordinary
arguments.
Why would it be any more extraordinary than the claim that a unique
conscious experience can be assembled from generic unconscious parts?
That uniqueness is 1p. Comp, if true, guaranties it for each 1p view.
God knows better, but we are not yet there, isn't it?
No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be reproduced wholly -
I completely agree with you, but those are 1p notion. They have
referent, but we cannot invoke them when we study them.
All notions are 1p, including the notion that there could be notions
which are not 1p.
That is akin to solipsism.
And then again explain me why 0 = 0 in your theory, of why there is an
infinite of primes.
The acceptable level of rigor is to be able to be clear enough so that
someone else can translated in a first or higher order logic or in
some already existing theory.
I love poets but I dislike the use of poetry in science.
there is no such thing.
You have to prove that.
It may not be possible to prove anything related to consciousness.
Again I can make a lot sense to this.
If it can be proved, then it only has to do with some particular
relation within consciousness.
But then how do you know that the digital duplicate is a doll.
Very often, you do the opposite of what your own phenomenology should
suggest.
All that can be reproduced is a representation within some sensory
context. Outside of that context, it is a facade.
You should search for an experiment testing your idea, if only with
the pedagogical goal of giving more sense to it.
The experiments are all around us. I see an actor on TV, but if I
turn off the TV, it becomes clear that the image is only a visual
facade.
This is not valid, and beside I was asking for an experience giving a
different number than say string theory, or computationalism.
Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with
representations of a particular kind of logic and measurement.
On the contrary, CT makes many different logics mathematically
amenable, that is the reason to be study it. Whatever the truth is,
it can only be more complex and subtle.
But is still quantifiable, impersonal kinds of logic, as opposed to
dream logic or sentimental logic, etc.
You ignore the subject. Modal logic have been invented by Aristotle to
handle qualitative problems in metaphysics and has been used by
scholastic medieval in theology, then come back with Leibniz, and then
get the normal status as a branch of logic, philosophical and/or
mathematical. The Gödel incompleteness theorem, then, illustrates how
modal logics emerge from arithmetical (and non arithmetical) self-
references.
You seem to depreciate anything that might help to communicate your
idea, or to recognize it elsewhere.
Your intution that comp is false is "correct", but it is 1p, and by
itself, it does not provide a refutation of comp, as comp already
explain why machine can develop that intuition, and this correctly.
If you use comp to explain why I develop this correct intuition then
comp cannot explain how you use your incorrect counter-intuition to
support the possibility of comp.
It is here that you, and sometimes others, are deadly wrong on what I
did. I am not supporting the possibility of comp at all.
An honest scientist never support the possibility of a theory. If it
supports something it is only the refutability: it offers test to
refute it.
Your assertion that my intuition is 1p is also a 1p intuition based
on your 1p experiences with math.
I just don't worry about that, as long as those who read the papers
can add and multiply.
The 1p is not a machine, he is the owner of the brain, that it
borrows to the most probable universal neighbors.
I am not the owner of a brain, I am the participant in a life. I
don't think that a true 1p exists in Comp, only a 3p-x.
We know your belief. You have the right to believe what you want. Even
that we can cross the ocean with a sieve.
It is measurement which provides the local appearance of
substitution. In reality, theory can never substitute for
consciousness,
You don't know that, and there are no evidences.
There is no reason to expect that there ever can be evidences, and
there is no reason to expect that not knowing it is any reason to
doubt it if it make more sense than Comp.
So you condemn my sun in law to the status of a doll, without any
evidences.
An organic brain might already be a dynamical theory reflecting
diverses dynamical theories. A genome might already be a theory. The
theory is not a substitute for consciousness, but it might be handy
to make possible for a conscious 1p person to say hello to other
persons, and share histories.
If it was already a theory, why would it ever become anything more
than that?
Because theories are incomplete and the arithmetical reality is
inexhaustible.
The normal machine has the good, but she search for the best, she find
the bad, and very often, but not always, she keep it, by fear of the
worst.
and consciousness can have no theories outside of consciousness.
Not sure.
This further convinces me that Comp has no business talking about
consciousness at all. If we don't need consciousness to make
theories, then life is no different from death, and it is clear that
what Comp has in mind for consciousness is a blind man's definition
of seeing.
In the eye of the outer God, or from the 0 person point of view but we
are simply not there (yet).
> Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that
can
> only be done once.
That is ambiguous.
I don't think it is. Arithmetic is based on recursive enumeration.
Notably. But also on non recursive enumeration, and arbitrarily
complex. recursive is just sigma_0 or sigma_1, beyond that the
arithmetical proposition are not computably decidable.
But they still depend on lower levels of arithmetic, don't they?
The interest relies in that simple dependence. Why add magic when the
magic is an internal free consequence of every simple statements (like
0+x = 0, etc.).
Keep in mind arithmetical is a much more general notion than
computable (or sigma_1 arithmetical).
There is no one and only time that any number can appear. Every
number can be arrived at by many different routes - every number is
always repeatable and transferable. Numbers can't own anything,
they are generic addresses in a theoretical schema that appears
again and again.
They can talk also, but if your philosophy prevents you to listen to
them, then well, that's not a good point to your philosophy.
I listen to them like I listen to the I Ching - as an uncanny oracle
to impersonal perspectives, only from the metatheoretic rather than
metaphenomenal range.
No, you don't listen to them. Your conception of machines and numbers
is still Hilbertian.
All "conscious present instant" are done once, in
arithmetic.
Where do we find a conscious present instant in arithmetic? If you
assume that, then you would be begging the question of consciousness.
Comp assumes that consciousness is invariant for a digital
transformation, and the UDA shows that this associates consciousness
to the computations which can already be proven to exist in
arithmetic.
Eventually consciousness appears in arithmetic when universal
numbers are confronted with true sigma_ sentences which are
consistent and true.
I would fully expect conscious tropes to have generic correlates
within arithmetic, but again, its a pseudo-1p reflection, not a 1p
authentic phenomenon.
Given the absence of precision all this seems 1004 distinction to me,
unless you add this to continue to treat my sun in law like he was a
doll.
> Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more
> than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one
time.
From inside arithmetic that's necessarily the case.
Then how can it be said to have a substitution level?
It cannot be said. But it still can be hoped, and bets are open.
How can it be hoped though? What you are intending to substitute is
perpetually incomplete and self-diagonalizing, so how can you
simulate something that is not finished becoming what it is?
Besides, as soon as you try, the diagonalization will respond with a
meta-diagonalizing entanglement.
Study the theory. The universal machine ability is immune for
diagonalization. that is why Church thesis is consistent, and that is
why universality get a price (the possibility of crashing, dreaming,
etc.).
> It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite,
> progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability
for
> beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other
> sensibly.
The UD, and arithmetic determines all effective endings and non
endings (by Church's thesis). Then the internal views put colors on
this.
Why and how would internal views put anything non-arithmetic on it
though?
That's what happens by theorems like Tarski theorem and Gödel theorem.
How do you know?
By studying those theorems.
What do they produce which is irreducibly non-arithmetic?
Well Tarski one is Arithmetical Truth itself, but Kaplan and Montague,
shows this for a notion of Knowledge corresponding notably to those
associated to the machine by the definition of Theaetetus.
Roughly speaking, when arithmetically correct machine self-
introspect, they can't avoid the non-arithmetic, and more so if they
want speed their relative provability and computability powers.
Just because a computation uses processes which are unavailable to
our inspection doesn't mean they are non-arithmetic.
Those things exists, even more trivially if you accept some amount of
set theoretical realism (but comp does not need that in the ontology).
Why and how does the UD develop the idea of endings and non-
endings? It is not clear that there can be any endings or
beginnings within arithmetic.
All 3p propositions concerning any possible computations, including
their endings when it exists, and its non ending (proved or not)
done by any universal machines are, when true, theorem of
arithmetic. Arithmetic contains also all emulation of Löbian
numbers, which are the one I interview about the "physics", that is
the measure (1) on the consistent/correct continuations.
What theorem of arithmetic defines endings or beginnings?
The theorems of the true sigma_1 sentences (the proofs of "EnP(n, y)",
with P decidable or even quite elementary).
But you must study a bit of computer science, and understand that all
universal machines can imitate all universal machines, and that very
little theory of arithmetic (even without the induction axiom) are
universal machine in that sense.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
> Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it
reflects
> itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of
form.
OK.
>
> The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and-
> overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from
> any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a
local
> perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and
> therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously
> measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of
> originality is preserved, but always behind our back.
OK.
By "OK" I mean that the correct Lôbian machines roughly agree with
you
(stretching definitions enough ...
> Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and
> unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world
> that we can become the understanding that we expect.
... up to where the definitions broke.
Not sure if I understand, but if so, I would say 'up to the limit
of the range of sensitivity;.
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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