Is there anything in particle physics that emulates the processing capabilities 
of computers, analog or digital? My question goes below Chaitin's metabiology. 
Something that is a characteristic of physics.


-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Mon, Mar 24, 2014 2:08 pm
Subject: Re: Chaitin's Metabiology




On 23 Mar 2014, at 21:40, [email protected] wrote:


One might note that at the end of Chapter Three (Proving Darwin)  Greg has the 
"caveat" "Metabiology in its present form cannot address thinking and 
consciousness, fascinating those these be." (page 21).

I do not see any reason why plants should not be included.




I think so to. 







If one has the inspiration to imagine that the act of reproduction *is like* a 
computation (math and philosophy different) and abstract simply that we humans 
reproduce

 and if one thought that all of algorithmic complexity in metabiology (as a 
subect) was derived from a difference in that biotic potential in different 
lineages then...

metabiology applied might not be a part of the/an algorithmic theory of 
everything yet different computations that "emerge" in different lineages would 
be differentiable.  A machine cannot know what computations "support it" but 
propagtion of species differences is a different kind of monkey at the 
qwerty...I would think and be conscious of...There are really no physical laws 
that support pure metabiology (only generalized matheatical function through 
arbitrary points) and the step to physical lawys engineer-able in applied 
metabiology is actually a bit more than would be for non preserved force 
propagations. These kinds of contained algorithmic sets are only thus a part of 
what a theory of everything etc would contain but it might be more somatically 
correct even if not currently inclusive of any kind of plant or animal.  What 
is contained and what can exist for longer times are different things.




OK. That is the problem, but it helps to put it in mind/body or 
first-person/third person terms, and assuming, like Chaitin, digitality put a 
lot of interesting constraints, especially if you take into account 
tractability and resources.


My questioning is more fundamental, and eventually consists in a translation of 
the mind body problem into a "stable belief in body" problem arising in 
arithmetic and meta-arithmetic (but meta-arithmetic is in some part in 
arithmetic: this is exploited maximally).


Bruno





On Friday, March 21, 2014 5:26:20 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Mar 2014, at 19:18, [email protected] wrote:



Are you still interested in talking about metabiology?

http://www.axiompanbiog.com/Pages/Metabiology.aspx

On Wednesday, November 24, 2010 2:10:42 PM UTC-5, thermo wrote:
Chaitin is currently drafting some attemps on metabiology and biological 
evolution of creativity. I read the latest:

http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~chaitin/darwin.pdf
 
I found it very interesting in it's simplicity.

Strong features:

 - Abstract and theorems can be proved.
 - Includes algorithmic mutations.
 - Fitness is general enough to enable infinite evolution.
 
Weak features:

 - Some oracles are used.
 - Biological features such as replication, environment were removed favoring 
more abstract concepts.
 - Evolution is only associated with mathematical creativity, IA?
 
Can someone can explain how this theory is related to Algorithmic Theories of 
Everything?






It *is* an algorithmic theory of everything, but like digital physics, it still 
assumes a brain-mind identity thesis, which does not work when you assume 
computationalism in the cognitive science. It avoids the comp mind body 
problem, which forces us to derive the core of the physical laws from a 
statistics on all computations. 
It cannot work because it implies comp, and comp implies that "reality" is a 
view from inside the space of all computations, and this is not entirely 
reductible to an algorithm. 
Like Wolfram, they still don't take into account that a machine cannot know 
which computation support it, and can know she is distributed in many 
computation. They miss the "Everett" aspect of arithmetic or computer science. 
I would say in a nutshell. 


Bruno














Cheers,
José.

-- 
A los hombres fuertes les pasa lo que a los barriletes; se elevan cuando es 
mayor el viento que se opone a su ascenso.
 José Ingenieros (1877.1925)
 
*thermo*
http://www.mechpoet.net
 



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