On 4/8/2014 5:36 AM, aeternadei D. wrote:
To argue your case, you would need to come up with some physical
property that is indubitably _not_ a consequence of how we perceive
the world. I don't think you can do that. It is a very high standard
of proof. Consequently, it does not follow that intersubjective
consistency necessarily implies the existence of some external
ontological reality.
Cheers
Quantum mechanics is so counterintuitive I'd say that it is not a consequence of 'how we
see the world'. In fact it's difficult to explain how we see the world as we do given
QM. This is known as the classical-from-quantum problem.
To say that an external ontological reality does not necessarily follow from
intersubjective consistency is just setting the bar too high. Theories of the world are
inductive inventions and cannot provide logical necessity. It's like asking that we prove
the world is Euclidean.
Brent
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