Bruno (excuse me!) - what is the difference between "* stable patterns of information, e.g. perception..."* and::(your ontological existence?, 'explained' as): * "the primitive objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate some problem, and the phenomenological, or epistemological existence,"????* Ontology is a word. Existence another. So is Information and Perception. Both definitions are based on ASSUMING.human ways of cognition/mentality. Phenomenological in my vocabulary points to "as we perceive" something, the epistemological points to changes of the same. Within our mental capabilities. None cuts into anything " R E A L " . WE CAN NOT.
On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 30 Apr 2014, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote: > > > > So what does "existence" mean besides stable patterns of information, e.g. > perception of the Moon, landing on the Moon, tidal effects of the Moon,... > > > I distinguish the ontological existence, which concerns the primitive > objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate some problem, and the > phenomenological, or epistemological existence, which are the appearance > that we derive at some higher "emergent" level. > > With comp we need to assume a simple basic Turing complete theory (like > Robinson arithmetic, or the SK combinator). And we derive from them the > emergence of all universal machines, their interactions and the resulting > first person statistics, which should explains the origin and development > (in some mathematical space) of the law of physics. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I like when David Mermin said once: "Einstein asked if the moon still > exist when nobody look at it. Now we know that the moon, in that case, > definitely not exist". > > Well, that was a comp prediction, with the difference that the moon > doesn't exist even when we look at it. > Only the relative relations between my computational states and infinitely > many computations exists. > > > Thus completely eviscerating the meaning of "exist". > > > ? > Are you not begging the question? > I would say that comp does not eviscerate the meaning of "exists". The > meaning is provides by the standard semantics of predicate logic, where > "exists" is a quantifier. > > > But that is quite a different sense of "exist". > > > It is most basic one, used at the ontic level. May be you *assume* a > notion of primitive physical existence. Then indeed, with comp we assume > only a simple notion of arithmetical existence (on which most scientists > agree) and derive the physical reality from an epistemological type of > existence. > > > > It just means satisfying axioms and inferences from those axioms. > > > It means more, as we work in a theory which is supposed to be a theory of > everything. It is not pure logic or pure math. It is theology or TOE. > > > > Depending on the axioms and the rules of inference you can prove that > something exists or that it cannot exist or that it might exist but can't > be proven. > > > We work in the comp frame. It presuppose you agree with sentences like "it > exist a number equal to the successor of the successor of 0", etc. > > We want explain complex phenomena, from particles interactions to > conscious awareness, from simple basic assumption. > > > > > > The choosing arithmetic as the base universal theory, > > > And choosing Christianity as the base universal theory.... And choosing > Marxism as the base universal theory.... > > > I have never met a christian, nor a marxist, believing that elementary > arithmetic is false or useless. > I have met arithmeticians doubting Christianity and/or Marxism. > Elementary arithmetic is a "scientific" theory (even a sub-theory of most > applied scientific theories). > Christianity is a fuzzy and vague corpus of hope and belief, presupposing > too arithmetic. > To oppose or compare Christianity and arithmetic is no better than > opposing Christianity and Evolution Theory. > > > > > > only number exists, some number functions and relation exists in a > related but slightly different sense, and then physical existence is > precisely define by the "existence" used in the modal context. > Roughly speaking, we have the intelligible existence the "E" of > arithmetic, then the modal existence: > with [i]p = []p & p, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p, we have different > notion of existence of the type > [i]Ex([i]p(x) and also, (quantized existence) [i]<i>Ex([i]<i>p(x)). Of > course this needs the first order modal logic extending the current > propositional hypostases. > More on this in the math thread. > > > > > > > If my consciousness can survive a physical digital substitution, then it > survives an arithmetical digital substitution, and what we call the moon > has to be recovered as a stable pattern emerging from an infinity of > computations in arithmetic, > > > But only, I think, in a different digital universe in which "we" are also > stable patterns of relations. > > > By the FPI, we are distributed in infinitely many computations (making > the real universe appearance a non digital and unique (yet multiversal) > reality a priori). > > > And in THAT universe what "we" call "the Moon" is what "we" can fly too > and and on. > > > OK, then. but I was using the arithmetic TOE(*), and we have to be clear > on all the different notions of existence which emerge in it. > > Bruno > > > (*) the TOE chosen is Robinson arithmetic. Precisely, it is predicate > logic + the non logical following axioms: > > 0 ≠ s(x) > s(x) = s(y) -> x = y > x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) > x+0 = x > x+s(y) = s(x+y) > x*0=0 > x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > An observer is a believer in the axioms above + some induction axioms. > > > IF you can build a world out of those, THEN an a believer in those axioms > is an observer in THAT world. But that's a long way from showing it's true > of THIS world. > > > The term "world" is ambiguous. In our case, we derive a many-world > structure from those axioms. > > The goal consists in explaining complex things from simple principle. The > physicalist string theory tries to do that too, but, as I explained, has > some issue with the mind-body problem. > > I comment your other posts here: > > The point is that "what we call the Moon" IS the Moon. > > > The question is: *what* is the moon, in the fundamental TOE (that we > derive from comp, for example). > > If not, you become instrumentalist, and just abandon the idea of searching > a fundamental theory. > > > Not at all. The Moon is defined ostensively. But that doesn't mean I'm > prevented developing a theory about what it's made of, how it formed, what > effects it has, ... That's why I said you've been a logician to long; you > mistake a definition for the thing itself and when it's defined you suppose > nothing more can be said. > > > Doing that confusion would mean that I have not been a logician long > enough, as definition theory is part of logic. Such confusion are the > object of study of the logician, which are supposed to be expert on this. > You don't define the moon ostensively. You provide evidence for a possible > repeatable and sharable experience, but that does not tell us what the moon > is, what ontological and epistemological status it can have. > > I am not sure of your motivation here. It looks like "don't ask what is > the fundamental nature of the things we talk about"? > My point is that such nature will depend of the fundamental principle we > agree on (if only for the sake of research: agreeing on axioms does not > mean knowing they are true of course (pace Craig). > > I am just saying that if comp is true, existence of physical object must > be explain by "machine's theology or self-referential logics". > > > Sure. But why is that any more interesting than, "If theism is true, > existence of physical objects must be explained by theist theology." ? > > > That correct, but less interesting because man fight on the theist > assumptions, which are hard to make precise. But comp is simpler, get a lot > of evidence, is believed/assumed by most scientist, and machine's theology > is a precise branch of math. Indeed we get testable consequences, which is > not clearly the case for the current theist theology. The gain is there. > > > > Note that any noun whatsoever can be inserted in place of "theism" and > it's still a true sentence. That's the beauty, and the failure, of logic. > > > Not really. Many people believe in comp *and* in primitive physical > object. A priori that seems plausible, but the UDA shows that this is not > plausible. It is not obvious that if comp is true, physics becomes reduced > to intensional number theory. You need to study the comp mind-body problem > to understand the necessity of that reduction, in that frame. > Logic fails anyway, that is why we need non logical axioms, like 0+x = x, > etc. > > Last post: > > That's why I wrote "what WE call the Moon". The meaning of terms in > language depends on agreed understanding of speaker and hearer. You can't > ostensively define the moon in your dreams to someone else. > > > I can, to someone else I am dreaming too. > I have no real problem with your "instrumentalist" definition of the moon, > but it is not enough for solving or progressing in the mind-body problem, > and in the question of the origin. > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
