On 4/30/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2014, at 20:34, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/29/2014 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Apr 2014, at 19:38, meekerdb wrote:
On 4/27/2014 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I think the same. That's close to Platonism. There is more than what we see,
measure, etc.
Then we can theorize, which means making assumptions (like "the moon exist"), and
experimentation, like "going on the moon". This will not prove that the moon exists
in any real or fundamental way,
LOL. I think you've been a logician to long. :-)
Just being a rationalist, and interested in things going beyond the usual FAPP (For
All Practical Purposes).
To go to the moon, we need some "existence" of the moon, not necessarily an
ontological existence.
To solve the mind-body problem, or to put light on the nature of matter and
consciousness (and their relations) it is important to understand that seeing,
experiencing, ... don't prove (in the informal logician or mathematician sense indeed)
anything about 'reality'.
Proof in the informal logician or mathematical sense don't prove anything about reality
either. A proof is just a set of relations between premises and conclusions that
preserve a measure "T", we nominally call "true". So who you gonna believe, your
premises and inferences or your lyin' eyes? :-)
I will just remain agnostic, and prove things only relatively to this or that
theory.
I will not take visual data as proving anything. Seeing is no proof, but evidence, not
of existence, but of stable information patterns.
So what does "existence" mean besides stable patterns of information, e.g. perception of
the Moon, landing on the Moon, tidal effects of the Moon,...
I like when David Mermin said once: "Einstein asked if the moon still exist when
nobody look at it. Now we know that the moon, in that case, definitely not exist".
Well, that was a comp prediction, with the difference that the moon doesn't exist even
when we look at it.
Only the relative relations between my computational states and infinitely many
computations exists.
Thus completely eviscerating the meaning of "exist".
?
Are you not begging the question?
I would say that comp does not eviscerate the meaning of "exists". The meaning is
provides by the standard semantics of predicate logic, where "exists" is a quantifier.
But that is quite a different sense of "exist". It just means satisfying axioms and
inferences from those axioms. Depending on the axioms and the rules of inference you can
prove that something exists or that it cannot exist or that it might exist but can't be
proven.
The choosing arithmetic as the base universal theory,
And choosing Christianity as the base universal theory.... And choosing Marxism as the
base universal theory....
only number exists, some number functions and relation exists in a related but slightly
different sense, and then physical existence is precisely define by the "existence" used
in the modal context.
Roughly speaking, we have the intelligible existence the "E" of arithmetic, then the
modal existence:
with [i]p = []p & p, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p, we have different notion of
existence of the type
[i]Ex([i]p(x) and also, (quantized existence) [i]<i>Ex([i]<i>p(x)). Of course this needs
the first order modal logic extending the current propositional hypostases.
More on this in the math thread.
If my consciousness can survive a physical digital substitution, then it survives an
arithmetical digital substitution, and what we call the moon has to be recovered as a
stable pattern emerging from an infinity of computations in arithmetic,
But only, I think, in a different digital universe in which "we" are also stable
patterns of relations.
By the FPI, we are distributed in infinitely many computations (making the real universe
appearance a non digital and unique (yet multiversal) reality a priori).
And in THAT universe what "we" call "the Moon" is what "we" can fly too and and
on.
OK, then. but I was using the arithmetic TOE(*), and we have to be clear on all the
different notions of existence which emerge in it.
Bruno
(*) the TOE chosen is Robinson arithmetic. Precisely, it is predicate logic + the non
logical following axioms:
0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
An observer is a believer in the axioms above + some induction axioms.
IF you can build a world out of those, THEN an a believer in those axioms is an observer
in THAT world. But that's a long way from showing it's true of THIS world.
Brent
First task = to derive the existence of the observer in the TOE, then to derive the
logic of its points of view (the [i] and [i]<i> above), including the logic of physics.
Brent
Everyone knows that dragons don't exist. But while this
simplistic formulation may satisfy the layman, it does not
suffice for the scientific mind. The School of Higher Neantical
Nillity is in fact wholly unconcerned with what does exist.
Indeed, the banality of existence has been so amply demonstrated,
there is no need for us to discuss it any further here. The
brilliant Cerebron, attacking the problem analytically,
discovered three distinct kinds of dragon: the mythical, the
chimerical, and the purely hypothetical. They were all, one might
say, nonexistent, but each nonexisted in an entirely different
way...
--- Stanislaw Lem, The Cyberiad
and cannot be related from anything else. The math confirmed that this makes sense, as
the logic of 'certainty" ([]p & <>t) gives a quantum logic on the arithmetical sigma_1
(computational) proposition p.
Bruno
Brent
He's like a philosopher who says, "I know it's possible in
practice. Now I'd like to know whether it's possible in
principle."
--- Daniel Dennett, on Michael Behe
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