On Saturday, May 3, 2014 9:14:41 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 03 May 2014, at 16:38, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Bruno (excuse me!) - what is the difference between
> "* stable patterns of information, e.g. perception..."*
> and::(your ontological existence?, 'explained' as):
> * "the primitive objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate
> some problem, and the phenomenological, or epistemological existence,"????*
> Ontology is a word. Existence another. So is Information and Perception.
>
>
> I would say "ontology" is a word. But ontology is what exist, and that can
> be a word in some theory but could be a giraffe or a dinosaur, or a planet,
> or a number, in this or that other theory.
>
> The same for "existence", "information" and "perception", those are words.
> But I don't see why information, perception and existence would be word.
>
A word is just a word, when someone has suggested a personal quality or
major accomplishment on their part by associating a word to themselves or
what they[ve produced.
It's
> (Later, in the math thread, I might denote the number 2 by s(s(0)), and
> denote the sequence "s(s(0))" by the number 2^(code of s)*5^(code of "(";
> ...., which will give a large number s(s(s(s(s(s(s(...(0)))...).
> This is necessary to distinguish in arithmetic a number and a code for
> that number.)
>
>
>
>
> Both definitions are based on ASSUMING.human ways of cognition/mentality.
>
>
> We can work from the cognitive abilities of machines. Those abilities can
> be defined in elementary arithmetic, or in any computer language.
>
>
>
>
> Phenomenological in my vocabulary points to "as we perceive" something,
> the
> epistemological points to changes of the same. Within our mental
> capabilities.
>
>
> All right.
>
>
> None cuts into anything " R E A L " .
>
>
> You don't know that.
>
> WE CAN NOT.
>
>
> You cannot know that too.
>
> What we cannot do, is express that we can. But we can't express that we
> cannot do it either.
> We cannot pretend having stumble on some truth, but we might still stumble
> on some truth. Why not?
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>>
>> On 30 Apr 2014, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> So what does "existence" mean besides stable patterns of information,
>> e.g. perception of the Moon, landing on the Moon, tidal effects of the
>> Moon,...
>>
>>
>> I distinguish the ontological existence, which concerns the primitive
>> objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate some problem, and the
>> phenomenological, or epistemological existence, which are the appearance
>> that we derive at some higher "emergent" level.
>>
>> With comp we need to assume a simple basic Turing complete theory (like
>> Robinson arithmetic, or the SK combinator). And we derive from them the
>> emergence of all universal machines, their interactions and the resulting
>> first person statistics, which should explains the origin and development
>> (in some mathematical space) of the law of physics.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I like when David Mermin said once: "Einstein asked if the moon still
>> exist when nobody look at it. Now we know that the moon, in that case,
>> definitely not exist".
>>
>> Well, that was a comp prediction, with the difference that the moon
>> doesn't exist even when we look at it.
>> Only the relative relations between my computational states and
>> infinitely many computations exists.
>>
>>
>> Thus completely eviscerating the meaning of "exist".
>>
>>
>> ?
>> Are you not begging the question?
>> I would say that comp does not eviscerate the meaning of "exists". The
>> meaning is provides by the standard semantics of predicate logic, where
>> "exists" is a quantifier.
>>
>>
>> But that is quite a different sense of "exist".
>>
>>
>> It is most basic one, used at the ontic level. May be you *assume* a
>> notion of primitive physical existence. Then indeed, with comp we assume
>> only a simple notion of arithmetical existence (on which most scientists
>> agree) and derive the physical reality from an epistemological type of
>> existence.
>>
>>
>>
>> It just means satisfying axioms and inferences from those axioms.
>>
>>
>> It means more, as we work in a theory which is supposed to be a theory of
>> everything. It is not pure logic or pure math. It is theology or TOE.
>>
>>
>>
>> Depending on the axioms and the rules of inference you can prove that
>> something exists or that it cannot exist or that it might exist but can't
>> be proven.
>>
>>
>> We work in the comp frame. It presuppose you agree with sentences like
>> "it exist a number equal to the successor of the successor of 0", etc.
>>
>> We want explain complex phenomena, from particles interactions to
>> conscious awareness, from simple basic assumption.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The choosing arithmetic as the base universal theory,
>>
>>
>> And choosing Christianity as the base universal theory.... And choosing
>> Marxism as the base universal theory....
>>
>>
>> I have never met a christian, nor a marxist, believing that elementary
>> arithmetic is false or useless.
>> I have met arithmeticians doubting Christianity and/or Marxism.
>> Elementary arithmetic is a "scientific" theory (even a sub-theory of most
>> applied scientific theories).
>> Christianity is a fuzzy and vague corpus of hope and belief, presupposing
>> too arithmetic.
>> To oppose or compare Christianity and arithmetic is no better than
>> opposing Christianity and Evolution Theory.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> only number exists, some number functions and relation exists in a
>> related but slightly different sense, and then physical existence is
>> precisely define by the "existence" used in the modal context.
>> Roughly speaking, we have the intelligible existence the "E" of
>> arithmetic, then the modal existence:
>> with [i]p = []p & p, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p, we have different
>> notion of existence of the type
>> [i]Ex([i]p(x) and also, (quantized existence) [i]<i>Ex([i]<i>p(x)). Of
>> course this needs the first order modal logic extending the current
>> propositional hypostases.
>> More on this in the math thread.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> If my consciousness can survive a physical digital substitution, then
>> it survives an arithmetical digital substitution, and what we call the moon
>> has to be recovered as a stable pattern emerging from an infinity of
>> computations in arithmetic,
>>
>>
>> But only, I think, in a different digital universe in which "we" are also
>> stable patterns of relations.
>>
>>
>> By the FPI, we are distributed in infinitely many computations (making
>> the real universe appearance a non digital and unique (yet multiversal)
>> reality a priori).
>>
>>
>> And in THAT universe what "we" call "the Moon" is what "we" can fly too
>> and and on.
>>
>>
>> OK, then. but I was using the arithmetic TOE(*), and we have to be
>> clear on all the different notions of existence which emerge in it.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> (*) the TOE chosen is Robinson arithmetic. Precisely, it is predicate
>> logic + the non logical following axioms:
>>
>> 0 ≠ s(x)
>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
>> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
>> x+0 = x
>> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
>> x*0=0
>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>>
>> An observer is a believer in the axioms above + some induction axioms.
>>
>>
>> IF you can build a world out of those, THEN an a believer in those axioms
>> is an observer in THAT world. But that's a long way from showing it's true
>> of THIS world.
>>
>>
>> The term "world" is ambiguous. In our case, we derive a many-world
>> structure from those axioms.
>>
>> The goal consists in explaining complex things from simple principle. The
>> physicalist string theory tries to do that too, but, as I explained, has
>> some issue with the mind-body problem.
>>
>> I comment your other posts here:
>>
>> The point is that "what we call the Moon" IS the Moon.
>>
>>
>> The question is: *what* is the moon, in the fundamental TOE (that we
>> derive from comp, for example).
>>
>> If not, you become instrumentalist, and just abandon the idea of
>> searching a fundamental theory.
>>
>>
>> Not at all. The Moon is defined ostensively. But that doesn't mean I'm
>> prevented developing a theory about what it's made of, how it formed, what
>> effects it has, ... That's why I said you've been a logician to long; you
>> mistake a definition for the thing itself and when it's defined you suppose
>> nothing more can be said.
>>
>>
>> Doing that confusion would mean that I have not been a logician long
>> enough, as definition theory is part of logic. Such confusion are the
>> object of study of the logician, which are supposed to be expert on this.
>> You don't define the moon ostensively. You provide evidence for a
>> possible repeatable and sharable experience, but that does not tell us what
>> the moon is, what ontological and epistemological status it can have.
>>
>> I am not sure of your motivation here. It looks like "don't ask what is
>> the fundamental nature of the things we talk about"?
>> My point is that such nature will depend of the fundamental principle we
>> agree on (if only for the sake of research: agreeing on axioms does not
>> mean knowing they are true of course (pace Craig).
>>
>> I am just saying that if comp is true, existence of physical object must
>> be explain by "machine's theology or self-referential logics".
>>
>>
>> Sure. But why is that any more interesting than, "If theism is true,
>> existence of physical objects must be explained by theist theology." ?
>>
>>
>> That correct, but less interesting because man fight on the theist
>> assumptions, which are hard to make precise. But comp is simpler, get a lot
>> of evidence, is believed/assumed by most scientist, and machine's theology
>> is a precise branch of math. Indeed we get testable consequences, which is
>> not clearly the case for the current theist theology. The gain is there.
>>
>>
>>
>> Note that any noun whatsoever can be inserted in place of "theism" and
>> it's still a true sentence. That's the beauty, and the failure, of logic.
>>
>>
>> Not really. Many people believe in comp *and* in primitive physical
>> object. A priori that seems plausible, but the UDA shows that this is not
>> plausible. It is not obvious that if comp is true, physics becomes reduced
>> to intensional number theory. You need to study the comp mind-body problem
>> to understand the necessity of that reduction, in that frame.
>> Logic fails anyway, that is why we need non logical axioms, like 0+x = x,
>> etc.
>>
>> Last post:
>>
>> That's why I wrote "what WE call the Moon". The meaning of terms in
>> language depends on agreed understanding of speaker and hearer. You can't
>> ostensively define the moon in your dreams to someone else.
>>
>>
>> I can, to someone else I am dreaming too.
>> I have no real problem with your "instrumentalist" definition of the
>> moon, but it is not enough for solving or progressing in the mind-body
>> problem, and in the question of the origin.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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