(sorry if you get that mail twice. problem mails, coming from the
provider now. This was answered thursday morning)
On 07 May 2014, at 17:39, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-05-07 17:20 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:
On 07 May 2014, at 11:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2014-05-07 11:13 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>:
On 06 May 2014, at 20:22, [email protected] wrote:
<snip>
But you do not ever make a hard prediction Bruno.
I have no clue why you say that. It is the object of the whole
work. You seem to misunderstand something in the UDA.
I have to agree with ghibbsa... your actual prediction are vague,
there isn't any numerical hard predictions that we could do an
experiment and compare and refute or not...
And even if you would give any, you can always ascribe the non-
corresponding result to geography... I asked you several time what
in comp is not "geography" ? As comp entails all and every
simulations (as precise as we can imagine them to be), it contains
all numericable value for any observable... so it must be
geography... so what *hard* prediction does comp make that can
falsify it here and now ? I really mean hard prediction, not some
vague retrodiction of current theories.
Comp, and to my knowledge, only classical comp, gives a precise
criteria to distinguish physics and geography.
Physics concerns laws, that is physical rules of prediction true for
all universal machine. Geographies concern only prediction which
are contingently verified.
So what are physical facts that comp predict ? what laws ? what can
I measure in this universe that would not be *geography* but *true
for all universal machine* and be able to falsify comp ? what is
it ? what is the predicted value ? How comp predict it ? How can I
measure it and confront it to comp prediction ?
Regards,
Quentin
We have no choice on this. Without incompleteness, all modalities
corresponding to the arithmetical definitions of the points of view
would collapse, and in that case, but only in that case, physics
would have been reduced to an empty set, or to a boolean logic, and
all physical facts would have been shown to be geographical.
That case is ruled out by incompleteness. So we have a non trivial
(non empty) set of physical laws, and we have that the observable
obeys a different logic than boolean logic. Indeed the math shows
already a quantum logic.
Now we can test quantitatively if our observable verifies that
logic. Indeed the quantitative result already obtained rules out
boolean logic, and are given by quantum logic, and comp predicts and
explains exactly that.
From each Kripke model of the translation of that quantum logic in
G, which is an the output of the theorem prover for the logics Z1*
(and S4Grz1, and X1*), you can build experimental devices refuting
classical computationalism.
You argument based on the fact that comp entails all and every
simulations, does not work, because physics is given by the first
person indeterminacy on the points of view, and so to get the number
exact, you need the exact *proportions* on the relative
continuations, which is what today is given by quantum
probabilities, and comp confirms and explain that.
The rest are open problem, and it is just a (difficult) exercise to
see if qZ1* can justifiy the presence or not of a "real time"
quantum computer. As I tend to believe QM (as physical, not
geographical), if neither qS4Grz1, qZ1*, qX1* can emulate a quantum
computer, I would consider that as making classical comp, if not
comp itself, refuted.
Note that it would be very astonishing that the Comp Quantum Logic
is equal to von Neuman main quantum logics, because their modal
descriptions are not exactly the same (we lost the necessitation
rules), and so get plausibly some different physical predictions
already, but without progressing in some optimization of the theorem
prover of those modal logics, we cannot say having isolate the
experimental device making the difference.
The P = 1/2 in the WM-duplication, is a physical law, but the events
"I am in W" and "I am in M" are contingent. "Once in M I stay in M"
is physical, well it should be, and it is the case when you do the
math.
By UDA comp generalizes QM. Instead of Everett quantum relative
computational states, we have *all* comp relative computational
states, and the appearance of the universal wave is already
partially explained (and retrodict) by the universal machine
introspection (or the arithmetical UDA-reflexion). The point of UDA
is that we *have to do* that generalization, if saying yes to the
doctor is correct at some level, so that Everett's work is not
completed.
At first sight the probabilities can only add in the UD*, but that
is exactly what the machine explains as not obeying a boolean logic,
and obeying a quantum logic. The arithmetical quantization are
given, the rest is technical, highly technical (and that is a
weakness if you want, as philosophers fear math, and mathematicians
fear philosophy, today).
If classical comp is false, the qZ1* machinery provides a tool to
measure experimentally our divergence from comp.
My feeling is that somewhere you might forget that physics is 1p
(plural) and non Turing emulable a priori, as you cannot emulate at
each physical instant the entire UD*. You can fail a simulated
observer either by simulating the right quantum logic below its
substitution level, but then from his point of view, he is in all
versions of that "correct" simulation, or by building a lie and
revised infinitely often your program along with the observation
progress of the simulated observer.
I guess more precisions will be given in the math thread.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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